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This study aims to analyze and uncover the relationship between education 
(defined here as human capital) and economic growth in Indonesia. It is hoped that this 
study could provide explanations on the nature and magnitude in which education 
relates and contributes to economic growth and performance.  
The links between education and economic growth could happen in many ways. 
The links are also likely to involve a two-way rather than one-way relationship. This 
study attempts to do a broad based research on education and economic growth in 
Indonesia. The stream of analysis is done at three levels. 
1. The Macro-Aggregate Level (Human-Education-Skills) 
2. The Household Level (Human-Education-Allocation) 
3. The Ideology-Policy Level (Human-Education-Ideology) and The 
Institutional Level (Human-Education-Institution/Culture). 
Based on the three levels of analysis, it is clear that economic growth should not 
and cannot be simply viewed only in terms of physical or material phenomenon. 
Structural change occurs both at the physical and at the deeper ideological level. 
Economic growth has brought changes in both the society and the individuals.  
While it may provide support for ‘physical’ growth in the framework of human 
capital both in the household and national levels, education or schooling could have 
done better should it also be directed towards building an ‘Indonesian Man’ that is self-
sufficient, independent and entrepreneurial. Only then, economic growth could be said 
to be ‘self-driven’, and not to follow the current pattern of dependence, either on FDI, 
international trade, or on oil. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the objectives and methods applied in conducting this 
research. Reasons for applying a combination of quantitative and qualitative, as well as 
inter-discplinary research, are specified. The contributions of this research are 
highlighted in the end of this chapter. 
  
1.1 Overview 
Issues regarding education are especially relevant and important to Indonesia. 
With a total population estimated at around 213 million as of 2001, an uneducated 
populace would become a burden rather than an ingredient for development. The size 
of the economically active population aged 15 and over in 2001 was estimated to be 
144 million with the largest share of the workforce still dominated by workers with 
only a primary-school education (around 50 million workers in 2001) (Muhamad 
2002). Muhamad (2002) noted that the share of workers with high school and 
university degrees has been increasing in urban areas, but less-well educated workers 
are still a majority even in cities. 
At one level, Indonesia has been quite successful in extending formal education, 
at least at the primary level (World Bank 1996). Over the last three decades, a universal 
13
access to primary education has already been achieved. Primary education (grades 1 
through 6) has been made available to nearly all children. The costs of schooling for 
children are considered low and primary schools are located in nearly every village 
throughout Indonesia.  
Some have questioned, however, that perhaps Indonesia has not invested 
enough in education. Some data suggest that Indonesia spends only around 1.4% of 
GNP on education, compared with a global average of 4.5%1.  
Indonesia is also the largest energy producer in ASEAN. Indonesia is endowed 
with rich natural resources2 (like oil and gas, copper, rubber, etc.) compared with other 
ASEAN countries. Table 1.1 describes the energy production in ASEAN that could be 
used as a proxy for natural resource endowments. In ASEAN, Indonesia is the largest 
energy producer, followed by Malaysia and Brunei. 
Table 1-1 Energy Production by Source: Total from All Sources 
Units: Thousand metric tons oil equivalent (ktoe) 
 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
6,650.6 14,378.0 20,742.1 15,736.5 15,299.9 17,837.6 19,158.6 
Indonesia 72,936.0 96,972.1 128,996.0 132,786.9 161,518.0 206,837.4 229,478.4 
Malaysia 4,770.2 6,673.6 18,202.3 34,197.9 48,726.8 64,701.9 76,759.5 
Myanmar 7,340.5 8,133.8 9,512.6 11,095.6 10,650.6 10,996.7 15,144.1 
Philippines 6,308.7 7,101.7 10,670.0 14,947.1 15,902.8 16,807.7 20,922.1 
Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. 63.6 
Thailand 7,892.8 10,113.8 11,182.4 17,252.0 25,907.7 31,404.3 41,117.5 
Viet Nam 14,204.5 16,660.7 18,363.7 20,090.5 24,987.7 34,509.6 46,299.4 
World 5,671,575.3 6,326,416.2 7,347,591.6 7,752,391.2 8,806,950.1 9,307,807.6 10,077,983.5 
Source: IEA Energy Balances, International Energy Agency (IEA). 
  Indeed the economies of Southeast Asia consist of a very diverse group. The 
fast growing economies of Southeast Asia, especially those of Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia are being labeled a ‘miracle’ by the World Bank (1993). The lessons from 
                                                 
1 BPS-Statistics Indonesia, BAPPENAS, UNDP (2001). 
2 The extraction of oil and gas from the Indonesian archipelago has, over the past thirty years, realised a 
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these fast growing economies, according to the World Bank, are macroeconomic 
stability, market-friendly policy and institutions, a philosophy of shared growth, and 
high human capital accumulation (Hwa 2001).   
Booth (1998) considered that the growth model of Southeast Asian economies 
are in a number of important respects different from the fast growing economies of 
Northeast Asia, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Different colonial legacies3 that have 
had important consequences for educational progress and the distribution of income 
and wealth have made the difference.   
The main explanations for the Northeast Asian growth model, according to 
Booth, are the importance of investment in both human and physical capital, the 
egalitarian distribution of income and assets, the importance of rapid export growth and 
the "insulated" nature of government decision-making. The differences in natural 
resource endowment (the resource poor Northeast Asia compared with the resource-
rich Southeast Asia) has caused the latter to be actually benefited (or cursed?) by being 
able to exploit their abundant reserves of land and natural resources in initiating 
economic growth. This in turn will affect the role of government and the nature of their 
relationship with the business sector in both the colonial and the post-colonial era. 
(Amsden 1995: 794) in Booth (1999: 310) argues that Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailands’ rich natural resources allowed a…  
…more modest initial role for the government than in Korea and Taiwan. The 
leading sectors of these South East Asian countries were agro-based and 
competitive in world markets without substantial productivity-augmenting 
support from government, and without significant reliance on imported inputs.  
                                                                                                                                              
value of about 300 billion dollars. (Sangkoyo 2003).   
3 Chandra (2000) traces the origins of the local nationalist and anti-Chinese Sarekat Islam movements 
(1912-16) in the context of colonial policy and movements in industrial wages for subjects of the Indies 
for the period 1908-17 in which the conclusion is that “nationalist movements are not born from notions 
of absolutely splendid ancestors; their origins lie in humbler, and often economic, phenomena”. 
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The objectives of this dissertation are to analyse and uncover the relationship 
between education (could be narrowly defined as human capital) and economic growth 
in Indonesia. It is hoped that the thesis could provide explanations on how and on what 
magnitude has education been related to and contributed to economic growth and 
performance. The links and channels between education and economic growth could 
happen in many ways. The links also likely involve a two-way rather than a one-way 
relationship.  
As both education and economic growth are the desired goals of development, 
the determination of the relationship between them could provide a valuable tool for 
policy-making, in which it could be made more efficient, especially in a budget-
constrained government like Indonesia’s.  It may also help to prevent conflicting 
policies such that the gain from related policy reform could be maximized.   
Additionally, learning from other East Asian countries could provide deeper and 
broader insights into the analysis. With similar economic structure and societies, the 
experience of other East Asian countries could provide additional insights in explaining 
the relationship between education and economic growth. The differences among these 
countries would also help in learning how the relationship will change under different 
situations -either economic or political- and how to address those changes. 
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1.2 Objectives of the Research 
 
The primary objectives of this research are to analyze the relationship between 
education and economic growth in Indonesia at both the micro-level and at the macro-
level. The suggested framework is discussed below. 
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The Household Level (Human-
Education-Allocation)   
  
The Ideology-Policy Level (Human-
Education-Ideology) and The 
Institutional Level (Human-
Education-Institution/Culture)   
     
 
 
1.3 Method of Research 
In researching any issue in the social sciences, it is important to find a proper 
and suitable way for doing so given the vast amount of research methods available. It is 
hoped that the research could be carried out using an interdisciplinary approach 
considering that various factors simultaneously affecting economic growth and 
Education  Economic Growth  
17
education (combining economics, politics, history4 and maybe other social sciences 
where appropriate). Traditional economic growth theory basically tries to find and 
identify equilibrium growth paths5. Its approach is explicitly ahistoric, and the expected 
result is that in the long run, the growth rate of per capita income will only depend on 
exogenous technical change. So if technical change falls like ‘manna from heaven’, and 
no other variables have any long-lasting influence on the per capita growth rate, 
nothing else can be done in order to improve the growth performance of a country 
(Graff 2001). On the other hand, conventional “development economics” theories 
follow a more historical approach, started by the work of W.W. Rostow, The Stages of 
Economic Growth, in which he concluded that the developmental path is common to all 
countries following a sequence of stages to achieve development.6 
It has to be remembered that the most appropriate method for research is not 
easily and directly visible and even as the final choice is made, the never-ending debate 
over methodology can always arise. These debates have happened even in established 
sciences such as economics and political science and are as old as these sciences 
themselves without showing signs of convergence. Indeed, those debates have made 
science progress. I would argue that in determining which method is more appropriate 
is to carefully define the problems at hand and to use proper reasoning by applying the 
basic method available. 
                                                 
4 For example, Emil Salim, a prominent academic and technocrat of economic development in Indonesia 
during Soeharto era has noted that the history of hundreds of years of colonization in Indonesia has put a 
strong influence on the economic structure that is biased towards producing raw materials from natural 
resources through agriculture and mining. Salim feels that the imbalance in economic structure should be 
amended to be more balanced by developing industrial and services sector (Salim 1995: 60). 
5 The most recent ‘hybrid’ of growth theories is the Evolutionary Theories of Growth. This literature 
stresses the empirical study of technological change and innovation in firms, of the processes by which 
firms innovate and of the characteristics of, and relationships between, innovating firms (Sheehan 2000). 
6 A summary of various development economic theories are provided by Hidalgo Capitán (1994). 
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1.3.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Research Method 
Both the quantitative method (such as regression analysis) and the qualitative 
method are applied with different goals in mind.7 The quantitative method is a means 
for providing ‘empirical observations’ in a narrow sense, leading to a positivist nature 
of conclusion. The argument for positivist, is that empirical tests must in every case be 
the final arbiter between theoretical disputes (Alexander and Reed 2003), so it is very 
much useful for prediction purposes.8  
The qualitative method then would serve as a complement, as Alexander and 
Reed (2003) argue that it is to become a humanistic alternative to scientific study that 
had in common their anti-scientific stances, a position which was held to imply the 
following: a focus on people rather than external forces; an emphasis on emotions and 
morality rather than instrumental calculation; interpretative rather than quantitative 
methods; the ideological commitment to a moral society, i.e., one which fights the 
dangers of technology and positivist science. As such the existence of 'multiple social 
realities' (i.e. the co-existence of different understandings and interpretations of 
experience) is acknowledged, and it questions the ontological realism of a ‘narrow’ 
positivist science (i.e. of a 'real world' that is simply ‘out there’ to be discovered) 
(DeLong 2003). 
                                                 
7 There are conflicting conceptions of the role of general theories in the social sciences; we could take 
economics as an example. Whereas the “theoreticians” insisted that economics could derive assumptions 
concerning functional relationships between quantifiable flows of goods and money in the form of 
axiomatic-deductive system of statements, and thus could be established as mathematical economic 
theory, the ‘historians” understood the economic process as a real social life-process that would have to 
be grasped descriptively in terms of the institutions of economic activity. (Habermas 1994)  
8 Karl Popper in the 1930s rejected the idea of empricial proofing. With the problems of selection, 
certainty, error and interpretation in empirical method, he argued that the scientific method of induction 
envisaged by crude empiricism was a myth. For a complete discussion regarding empiricism  refer to 
Doyal (1986: 10).  
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As economic growth is a social phenomenon, we could apply a different 
framework when we think about and analyze economic growth. The framework 
proposed in this research is not exhaustive; it just represents an effort to view economic 
growth from a human-development perspective. The research will also try to view the 
problems at hand from an area-studies point of view, meaning not to be overly trapped 
by the strict methodological rigor from the respective discipline. 
It is acknowledged that the process and result of this research will be affected 
by the background and subjectivity or interpretation of the author, without any intention 
to mislead the reader and to reduce the scientific content of the research. The author 
views that social science – which involves human beings and thus highly unpredictable 
and uncertain – is a social construct; and the positivism nature of scientific method in 
social science is limited.9 However, clear conclusions and recommendations are hoped 
to be achieved in the end of the research to avoid mere speculation and 
misunderstanding and to provide a clearer path for further research.  
The mixture of both quantitative and qualitative method is possible. Both 
quantitative and qualitative method have both advantages and disadvantages. The two 
methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as substitutes. While the 
quantitative approach might be more useful in deriving a ‘positivist’ conclusion, 
qualitative approach could complement to enrich and enhance the precision of 
quantitative method. As Cupchik (2001) argued: 
If the two approaches offer complementary views of the social world, this 
implies that richness can enhance precision because the in-depth account 
                                                 
9 According to Ragin (2000), social scientists often face a fundamental dilemma when they conduct their 
social research. They could emphasize the complexity of social phenomena or they can make broad, 
homogenizing assumptions about cases and document generalities – patterns that hold across many 
instances.  
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encompasses more information, while a focus on precision can lead to a 
clarification of basic concepts. The thick descriptive data produced by 
qualitative research can shape the choice of variables in quantitative research.10 
 
For the quantitative method, the statistical method of regression would be used 
to quantify statistical relationship between education and human capital by using the 
human capital model. For the qualitative method, the method of historical, comparison, 
cultural and biographical analysis would also be adopted in order to provide a stronger 
argument.  
1.3.2 Comparative Research Methods 
The comparative approach has always existed and played a major role in the 
social sciences. It is different with the natural sciences, which think of themselves as 
universal in their approach and adopt a more positivist approach to science. The 
comparative approach could be used as an essential means for generating and 
improving knowledge. But in doing so, it requires a willingness to go beyond the 
frontiers that the social sciences have imposed upon themselves. Comparing similar 
problems in relatively similar contexts would enable researchers to dispose of the 
aspects that obscure the conceptualization process and enable them to get to the 
essential core of the problems – focusing more on the problems rather than on the 
method (Zahariadis 2000). The comparative approach would also serve as a device for 
classifications of social phenomena and for establishing whether shared phenomena can 
be explained by the same causes and to what extent are they different. The comparative 
approach in the social sciences is usually adopted in an implicit rather than explicit 
                                                 
10 Cupchik, Gerald (2001). 
21
manner since the aim is above all to identify the specificity of a particular phenomenon 
or region (Ghorra-Gobin 1999). 
The comparative approach has a long tradition dating back to ancient Greece. 
As Hantrais (1996) claimed “Since the nineteenth century, philosophers, 
anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists have used cross-cultural 
comparisons to achieve various objectives”.  
Mill's work is considered to be the first systematic formulation of the modern 
comparative method.11 The method of agreement is by far the simplest and the most 
straightforward of Mill's methods, but it is also viewed as an inferior technique because 
it is likely to lead to faulty empirical generalizations. The application of this method is 
as follows: if a researcher wants to identify the cause of a certain phenomenon, he or 
she should firstly identify instances of the phenomenon and then attempt to determine 
which circumstance or condition that always precedes its occurrence. The circumstance 
that satisfies this requirement is the cause (Ragin 1990). 
The method of comparison being put forward by Mills is applied to provide a 
comparative analysis12 between different stages of growth and different government 
administration within Indonesia. A comparative analysis13 between Indonesia with its 
                                                 
11 Mill (1925) cited in Amitai and Frdedrie (eds.) (1970: 205-210). 
12 Ragin (1990) asserts that good comparative analyses must emphasize on cases and on variables. 
Historically, comparative social science has been more skewed about cases than about variables. Case-
oriented discourse  directly point to the events and experiences of cases, abstracting from their histories, 
characteristics and circumstances to construct theoretical significance. Beginning in the 1960s, a more 
shopisticated and ‘radically analytic’ techniques of data analysis shifted the balance towards variable-
oriented discourse.  
13 According to Landman (2000), nowadays the reasons for comparing countries could be classified into 
four main objectives, which are: 1. Contextual description: to allow an inquiry to the condition of other 
country; 2. Classification: to simplify the phenomenon at hand, effectively providing the researcher with 
‘data containers’; 3. Hypothesis-testing: allows the elimination of rival explanations about particular 
events, actors, structures, etc. in trying to construct a more general theories; 4. Prediction: to forecast the 
likely outcomes in the future given the presence of certain antecedent factors. 
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Southeast Asian counterparts –particularly with Malaysia- and with the industrialized 
countries as a benchmark will also be conducted sporadically.  
1.3.3 Approaching Southeast Asia 
The major critique in studying Southeast Asia is that scholars tend to be 
western-biased in their framework of thinking. Many of the current economic analyses 
and methods are based on the mainstream economics deeply rooted in the capitalistic 
ways of thinking, mostly known from the work of Adam Smith. The so-called 
neoclassical economics doctrine has dominated many of the international organizations 
such as the IMF and the World Bank, and many of the policy elites and technocrats in 
the developing countries, and Indonesia is not an exception.  
In order to break away from the western-biased approach and to gain deeper and 
critical understanding about the formulation of government policy in Indonesia, the 
study will also attempt to discuss explicitly the origin of ideas in policy making through 
some sort of biographical approach of the policy makers or an actor-oriented analysis 
of development policy (DeLong 2002). Why are some policies favorable compared 
with others?14 Understanding the process of decision-making could give broader insight 
for policy analysis purpose. This is particularly relevant in Southeast Asia where the 
state and policy elites played a central and dominant role in economic development as 
well as in politics.15 
                                                 
14 For example, the capitalist development path that is being taken by Indonesia is actually not even 
mentioned in the Indonesian constituition. On the contrary, the 1945 Indonesian constitution actually 
oppose the notion of capitalism  (by proposing a system called “Econonomic Democracy”) by stating 
“The welfare of the society should be emphasized, and not individual welfare. As such the economy 
should be built as a joint effort based on ‘azas kekeluargaan’. The structure of company that suitable then 
is cooperative (koperasi).” (Swasono 1995: 84). 
15 The “Berkeley Mafia” economic thought of capitalism has obviously defeated earlier models of 
deveopment being proposed by one of the founding fathers of Indonesa, Muhammad Hatta, which 
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1.3.4 Data Collection  
The data that will be used in this research could be divided into two types: 
quantitative and qualitative data. First the quantitative data will come from the census 
conducted by the Central Agency of Statistics (also known in Indonesian as ‘Badan 
Pusat Statistik’). The advantage of using a census data is that it allows for a greater 
degree of generalization. The drawback is that the census is for general purpose, the 
census was not done solely for this research. As such the census data has to be further 
processed to match the specific needs of this research. It can be said that there is an 
abundance of data, but a scarcity of information (Betke 2001: 5). These data would be 
most useful for an analysis of the social and economic structure. They provide data 
with individuals, households or villages as the units of analysis. 
The types of census data that can be used are: 
1. Consumption/expenditure data are collected through the National Socio- 
Economic Survey. The survey popularly known as Susenas (Survey Sosial 
Ekonomi Nasional), was conducted for the first time in 1963. Prior to 1980, 
Susenas was undertaken irregularly, i.e, in 1963, 1964/65, 1967, 1969/70, 1976, 
1978, and 1979. Since 1980 Susenas was conducted annually, except in 1983 
and 1988. Before 1980, consumption/expenditure data were always covered in 
every Susenas. But since 1981, due to the inclusion of some additional topics16 
(modules) into Susenas, the consumption/expenditure module as well as the 
other modules, have been collected every three years. Therefore, after 1980 the 
consumption/expenditure data are available for 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, and 
                                                                                                                                              
adopted a more Kaleckyan development view (Arief 1995: 104). 
16 Some of the modules (topics) are consumption, income, health and welfare modules. 
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1993. According to the schedule, this module will be covered again in the 1996 
Susenas.  The Susenas data are divided into two categories, namely core and 
module. Prior to 1992 what was termed as core consisted only five variables, 
i.e. four demographic and one educational characteristic of individual members 
of the chosen household. Starting in 1992 the core variables were expanded 
(called the ‘new core’). This new core contains some basic information that is 
needed to generate yearly welfare indicators. Detailed description about the 
Susenas new core could be found in Indonesia's National Socio-Economic 
Survey. Susenas is a household survey, intended to cover all provinces of 
Indonesia to enable production of figures of national level. However, due to the 
limitation of budget and manpower, the 1963 and 1967 Susenas covered only 
Java, while for some other years, several remote areas were excluded. Prior to 
1993, the Susenas sample size varied from time to time. The first four (1963, 
1964/65, 1967, 1969/70) and the 1978 Susenas were designed to produce 
national and regional (group of provinces) estimates, while for the other years 
the sample size was representatives up to province level. From 1993 the sample 
size were increased up to more than 200,000 households, from only 65,000 
households in 1992. Before 1992 the Susenas sample size was always below 
60,000 households. The additional sample size however, applied only for the 
core questionnaire, while for the module questionnaires (including 
consumption/expenditure module) the sample size remained at 65,000 
households.  
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2. Sakernas (Survey Ketenagakerjaan Nasional), otherwise known as the National 
Labor Force Survey (NFLS), is a nationwide survey conducted to obtain 
statistics on employment patterns in Indonesia. Variables include main activity 
last week, employment situation, type and  status of main occupation, number 
of hours and days per work week in main occupation, wages received per week 
and month,  whether respondent is looking for work, methods employed to find 
a job and how long the respondent has spent looking for work. Background 
variables include sex, age, education, province and county of residence. 
Second, qualitative data, would be based on interviews with academics, public 
officials or policy makers from related institutions. The list of institutions that is 
relevant for the goal of this research is as follows: 
1. Ministry of Education: to gather information related to the educational system, 
how it is planned, its structure, and the policy goals of the government. 
2. Ministry of Manpower: to gather information regarding the labor market, its 
limitations, minimum wage policy, barriers of manpower planning, etc. 
3. Coordinating Ministry of Economics and Finance: to get perspectives on the 
prospect of economic growth, barriers and key sectors for future growth, etc. 
4. Ministry of Industry and Trade: to see the blueprint of industrial policy (if any), 
the trade prospect related to with free trade and globalization, etc. 
5. Business sector: to gather information regarding the needs of the business 
sector, mismatch in the labor market, skills needed, wage and incentive system, 
etc. 
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6. International organizations: such as ILO, UN, UNDP, The World Bank, IMF 
and NGOs. 
 
Other important sources of qualitative data would be the biographies of policy 
makers, policy documents, books written by policy makers. Written documents often 
provide valuable information compared with interview, since it is often a product of a 
more careful thinking. These secondary sources also enable us to analyze from ‘within’ 
the elites themselves, understanding why they do what they did, and the backgrounds 
and rationale behind it. Literature related to the topics, especially those written by 
indigenous scholars, would also provide excellent insights. 
1.4 Contributions of the Research 
 Specific studies relating education (or schooling) with Indonesia’s economic 
development have not been extensively explored and usually are fragmented. The 
existing literature usually consists of the following broad themes. First, it speaks of 
education as a part of demographic reality. It touches on education as the needs of the 
people that have to be fulfilled and what is the best way of fulfilling them and why it 
has not been fulfilled. The second line of reasoning usually relates education with the 
labor market, how a more educated labor could contribute more to the economy – and 
this is usually done in relation with the manufacturing industry.  
 Not many have tried to look into the evolution of education in Indonesia, 
relating it with the economic development process. As I have mentioned, the process 
could involve a two-way rather than a one-way relationship. Also as Indonesia is a 
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developmental state, the role and functioning of the state should be looked upon from 
the perspective of historical transformation and policy making processes. 
 As such I hope to contribute by examining the relation between education and 
economic growth in a more thorough manner, combining the perspectives from the 
household (demography), labor market, businesses, government, history and policy 
makers.  
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
This research attempts to conduct a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
method in trying to explore the relationship between education and economic growth. 
In addition, this research attempts on focusing more on the problems, rather than on the 
method – such that it justifies the application of a multi-discplinary research. 
The hazard of doing a broad-based research is noted. But to view that more as a 
challenge for creating a conclusive research is more appropriate.  After all, the focus in 
this research is in the ‘human’ aspect, as human behavior is highly unpredictable and 
varied, it is a necessity to provide a broad-based research in order to yield a justified 
judgment and analysis. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Reviews: Concepts and 
Definitions 
Literature Reviews: Concepts and 
Definitions  
 
Definitions on education and economic growth are discussed in this chapter. 
The literatures on ‘human capital’, the most straightforward concept highlighting the 
contributions of education towards education are also touch on. The argumentation 




Education unquestionably is important and has many roles to play in the 
society. In ancient Greece, where the state could be considered the main provider of 
education, Aristotle said:   
No one can doubt that it is the legislator’s very special duty to regulate the 
education of youth, otherwise the constitution of the state will suffer harm. The 
citizen should be trained in accordance with the particular form of government 
under which he is to live; for each type of constitution has a distinctive 
character which originally formed it and makes possible its continued 
existence...again some preliminary training and habituation are required for the 
exercise of any faculty or art; and the same, therefore, obviously applies to the 
practice of virtue (Hummel 1999: 4). 
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According to Hummel (1999: 5) “Aristotle believed that, contrary to the 
common practice of his day, education was a responsibility of the state”. Thus, in this 
view education was equitable and expected of all citizens, not just the upper classes 
people. In this case, education would become a political matter, rather than a mere 
family affair.  
There is, of course, the alternative view that education in general was to be 
considered a leisurely pursuit only available to the privileged few who belong to the 
elite classes. The poor, of course, do not have time to pursue education. They must use 
their time to work in order to barely survive. The rich, on the other hand, have time and 
money to spend. They could call upon a private teacher in their homes to bring 
knowledge for their families. That is why education is sometimes associated with the 
formation of social class.  
Every civilization has its own perspective on the function and role of education. 
The ancient Greeks’ interest for education is because of ‘education’ itself, it is for the 
sake of science itself, it is perceived as ‘the way of life’ or ‘the art of living’ (Infinito 
2003). The Greek’s ultimate goal was to prepare intellectually well-rounded young 
people to take active and leading roles in the government and society. The American 
system, which could be said is based on the Greek’s classical approach, emphasizes 
concentrating on academic ability. Under this system, learning leads to goodness.   
The Hebrews’ and Muslims’ primary purpose for education was to train for 
lifelong obedient service to God. Abraham Heschel noted: 
 "Genuine reverence for the sanctity of study is bound to invoke in the pupils 
the awareness that study is not an ordeal but an act of edification; that the 
school is a sanctuary, not a factory, that study is a form of worship (Heschel 
1972 cited in Regalado 2000)" 
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The Islamic boarding schools in Java (the most densely populated island in 
Indonesia, which is the most populous Muslim-nation in the world), known as 
‘pesantren’ (or ‘madrassa’) and are the training grounds for religious leaders. 
Traditionally, pesantren only taught an almost exclusively religious curriculum with 
little or no secular content (Bell 2000). The Chinese, some would say, are only 
interested in the ‘pragmatic function’ of education, as they mostly study fields that 
could help them to solve problems in everyday lives.  
The goal of education or the way society views the function of education greatly 
affects the type of education provided. In ancient Greece, fields of art, politics, and 
philosophy became prominent. While today, the fields of computing, information 
technology, medicine and biotechnology seem to be at the forefront and attracting and 
yielding an increasing number of students and graduates. As shown in Table 2-1, 
natural and medical sciences have attained a considerable portion of students and 
graduates in Asia, ranging from the highest enrollment percentage of 62% (in China) 
and graduates of 61% (in Singapore) to the lowest percentage of  6% and 4% 
respectively (in  Brunei).  
Education, the most easily measured form of human capital, could be viewed 
like an asset such as land and other forms of wealth. Birdsall (1999: 1) maintains that 
education, however, is a special asset in two respects: 
First, once acquired, it cannot be stolen or sold -- it cannot be alienated from its 
owner.  Second, as the amount of education increases, other assets such as land 
and physical capital decline as a proportion of total wealth in an economy; 
since the ownership of these latter assets is usually more concentrated than that 
of education, the overall concentration of all assets declines.  Thus, an increase 




In this respect, we could view education as a “capital” that is not prone to “capital-
flight syndrome”, one of the reasons for the 1997 financial crises that will be discussed 
in the next chapter.   
Table 2-1 Tertiary education: students and graduates by broad field of study 
in Asia (selected countries), 1996 
Percentage of students (and graduates) 
by field of study 
  
  










Asia          
          
Brunei Darussalam ♦ 62 (80) 1 (3) 19 (13) 6 (4) – (–)
Cambodia 26 (...) 2 (...) 29 (...) 23 (...) 20 (...)
China ♦ 16 (28) 6 (8) 9 (22) 53 (35) 9 (6)
   Hong Kong SAR ... (9) ... (9) ... (34) ... (42) ... (4)
Dem. People’s Rep. of Korea ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...)
India 4 (...) 70 (...) ./. (...) 25 (...) 2 (...)
Indonesia 17 (14) 6 (7) 46 (50) 28 (27) 2 (2)
Japan 8 (8) 56 (55) ./. (./.) 23 (23) 8 (8)
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. ... (28) ... (7) ... (13) ... (38) ... (11)
Malaysia ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...)
Myanmar 0 (–) 42 (61) 22 (9) 37 (30) – (–)
Pakistan ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...)
Philippines ... (15) ... (6) ... (31) ... (28) ... (19)
Republic of Korea 6 (8) 17 (18) 25 (28) 34 (38) 5 (6)
Singapore ... (7) ... (33) ... (./.) ... (58) ... (3)
Thailand 9 (7) 4 (7) 60 (56) 21 (18) 6 (11)
Viet Nam ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...) ... (...)
Source: World Education Report 2000, UNESCO's World Education Indicators. 
 
We could consider two types of education: formal and informal17.  Formal 
education usually happens in school. In Indonesia there are two types of formal schools 
available according to the Indonesian Law no 2/1989 (figure 2-9); one is the normal 
(secular) school (administered by the Ministry of Education, whether it is public or 
                                                 
17 Pernia and Wilson (1989) stated that the term ‘non-formal’ is actually imprecise, since most of the 
informal education are actually being ‘formalized’ in a sense that there are registration process, regular 
class schedule and the providing of text-books and materials. 
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private); while the other is the Islamic religious school, known as madrassa18 
(administered by the Ministry of Religion Affairs). Indonesian madrassas19 provide 
education also at three levels: primary, lower secondary and upper secondary. These 
schools teach the (secular) national education curriculum and use extended hours in 
which to teach religious and basic Islamic education and principles. According to 
Anzar (2003) the great majority of the madrassas are privately owned and operated 
while others operate under the Ministry of Religion (table 2-2). In addition Anzar 
(2003) stated that madrassas are less expensive than public secondary schools and 
provide access to basic education in rural and urban low-income communities.  
Table 2-2 Madrassas in Indonesia 2000-2001 
Level  Private  Public  Total  Teacher 
Students 
Ratio  




3130 575  3705  1:44  576,000  
Lower       
Secondary 9,624  1168  10,792  1:10  1.9 million  
Primary  20,554 1,481  22,035  1:18  2.9 million  
Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Educational Statistics. “Indonesia School Year 2000-2001” in 
Anzar (2003).  
                                                 
18 For a history on madrassa refer to Anzar (2003). 
19 Some of the Islamic informal education has its roots from the traditional Islamic education within the 
small village, usually held in langgar (small prayer house) (Pernia and Wilson 1989) 
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Figure 2-1 School System in Indonesia, Law No. 2 1989 
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Source: http://www.kbri.org.sg/education_system_in_indonesia.htm  
 
The informal school or out-of-school education could consist of Packets A and 
B for elementary level and other private Islamic religious-school (pesantren) that may 
not be in accordance with the state regulation. The Pesantren is of special significance 
in Indonesia, since many national leaders (like former President Wahid) were graduates 
from pesantren and also later on built and established their own pesantren as well. 
Zamakhsyari (1999) as cited in Anzar (2003) described pesantren as:  
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… independent Islamic self- governing schools, outside of the national 
Madrassa and public education system. They exist as a community with a 
compound, mosque and boarding system where students and teachers eat, 
sleep, learn and generally interact throughout the day. Most are located in rural 
areas. Pesantrens vary considerably in size from only a few hundred students to 
as many as 4,000 or more. The majority of Pesantrens have a customized 
curriculum that consists mainly of Islamic teachings that are based on the 
interpretation of the headmaster (Kyai) or the school of thought under which 
the school operates…. Many Pesentrens have a business to make it self-
supporting, so they provide training for the students in trading, farming, 
cottage industries, and other community based incomegenerating activities.  
 
Based on the latest data from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, in 2001, there 
were 11,312 Pondok Pesantren in Indonesia. In general, Pondok Pesantren can be 
categorized into traditional and modern Pondok Pesantrens, and the combination 
between the two (Nurcahyati 2003). 
2.2 Economic Growth 
Economic growth is usually measured by increases in real gross domestic 
product (GDP) or in GDP per capita, the increase in the national product, measured in 
constant currency. It usually means that a higher output is being produced in a certain 
region, with the expansion of production of marketable goods and services (Denison 
1962: 3). Ideally, to be sustained in the long run, the increase in output should come 
from the widening of the production scale in a country as a whole, or from a more 
efficient use of its economic resources to produce goods and services. Since the 
productive capacity of a nation can only be increased in the long run, economic growth 
usually is considered a long-run phenomenon.  
Social scientist attention towards growth has put much effort on understanding 
growth; for example why some countries are richer than others. This has become a very 
interesting topic explored by many academics. Denison’s study (1962) in decomposing 
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the source of American economic growth could be said to be the initial effort in 
understanding growth, using a mechanistic and accounting framework from national 
income data in looking at the source of growth. Robert Solow in 195620 came up with 
the neoclassical growth theory with a main emphasis in the production function and 
thus focuses on the supply-side of the economy. The neoclassical growth model 
emphasizes capital as the engine of economic growth21. This would explain why a 
simple ratio such as ICOR (Incremental Capital-Output Ratio) has become important 
indicators for many development planners.22 
The neoclassical model implies several important propensities, like the 
‘catching-up’ and ‘convergence’ hypotheses23 of economic growth because it assumes 
that there are diminishing returns to aggregate capital. The main weakness is that the 
neoclassical model basically concludes that (long-run) growth is exogenously 
determined (mostly by the level of technological progress24), so it is often referred to as 
‘exogenous’ growth model (Arraes and Teles 2003: 1). Another weakness is that the 
neoclassical model could be seen to be ignoring the role of government policy in 
affecting long-run growth. This neoclassical growth model remained ‘unchallenged’ 
                                                 
20 Rodrik (2003) quoted Solow (1956) as the ‘landmark’ in the neoclassical analysis of economic growth. 
21 According to Stiroh (2003) “…capital accumulation contributes to growth in the short-run, but long-
run growth is totally determined by technical progress”.  Early classical economists such as David 
Ricardo (1951) and Karl Max also emphasised on capital and investment in machinery as a cause for the 
increase in the per capita income (in Greiner, Semmler, and Gong 2004). 
22 The ICOR measures the increase in output (or income) as a result of the increments to the capital stock 
(or investment) which is based on the Harrod-Domar growth model (1939,1947). Easterly (1997), calling 
the Harrod-Domar model as ‘ghost’ because it supposedly died in the academic literature some time ago, 
shows that despite the failure of Harrod-Domar model in explaining the performance of growth, it is still 
widely used (over 90 percent of country desk economists at the World Bank, for example) by leading 
international financial institutions for making growth policies and prescriptions.   
23 One of major implications of the neoclassical growth model is that, subject to certain assumptions, per 
capita income levels across countries should converge as they approach to their respective steady states. 
24 Solow (1957) as cited in Stiroh (2003) estimated that nearly 90% of the increase in U.S. output per 
person in the first half of the 20th century was due to broadly-defined technical change. 
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until the mid 1980s (Arraes and Teles 2003: 2) and has attracted much empirical 
research25. 
After the neoclassical theory, the endogenous growth theory (or the ‘new 
growth theory’) emerged in the 1980s starting with the work of Romer (1986) and 
Lucas (1988).26 Romer (1986) attempted to endogenize the exogenous technological 
factor by arguing that research and development (R&D) would create externalities and 
spillovers to the aggregate economy by increasing the stock of knowledge that is 
accessible to other firms. Similar attempts to endogenize ‘knowledge’ actually has been 
done by Arrow (1962) who discussed “learning-by-doing” effects. Arrow defined that 
learning could only happen through experience, and that the level of ‘experience’ can 
be measured by the ‘cumulative gross investment’ (cumulative gross production of 
capital goods). 
Lucas (1988) formally includes ‘human capital’ (defined as ‘general skill level’) 
in his paper. Some scholars differentiate between the ‘growth’ and ‘level’ (or stock) 
effect of human capital. Schumann (2002) asserts that the Lucas model would mean 
that economic growth would also depend on the human capital investment (the 
accumulation process) while other scholars like Aghion and Howitt (1998) and 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) strongly argue that the ‘level’ of human capital is most 
important for generating and fostering domestic innovation as well as speeding the 
ability of the workforce to adapt to new technologies. 
                                                 
25 For examples of the empirical growth research  refer to Mankiw, Romer & Weil (1992), Sachs and 
Warner (1995) and  Krugman (1994). 
26 Fine (1998: 1) noted that in only three years, “…the number of articles explicitly drawing upon 
endogenous growth theory almost certainly borders on a thousand.” 
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The two mainstream growth theories (neoclassical and endogenous growth 
model) above seemed to disregard the importance of natural resource as the engine of 
growth. The passage from Solow (1974: 11) has often been quoted and sometimes 
taken out of context. The passage is written below: 
If it is very easy to substitute other factors for natural resources, then there is in 
principle no ‘problem.’ The world can, in effect, get along without natural 
resources, so exhaustion is just an event, not a catastrophe. 
 
Robert Solow (and many other growth theorists I suspect), may regard ‘natural 
resources’ as the same as ‘capital’. But the two are actually very different especially in 
practical terms. Capital has often been associated with ‘investment’, as the difference in 
capital has often been said to be the same as investment (I = K2 - K1). But the value of 
natural resource usually would not be reflected in the investment figures. Investment 
figures in oil exploration, for example, would only reflect the exploration and the 
extraction costs of pumping the oil out, and not the value of oil reserves available. It is 
also somewhat strange that the ‘endowment’ of natural resources has often been viewed 
as a ‘curse’27 and ‘disease28’ that could hamper growth, rather than to an engine of 
growth. Indeed, in his latest book, Growth Theory: An Exposition (2000), Solow 
mentions hardly anything about the role of natural resources, while he devoted an 
individual chapter to discuss matters about human capital, technology and 
Schumpeterian ideas. 
                                                 
27 Among others, Rosser (2004: 1) wrote “In general, then, there appears to be broad agreement among 
scholars that natural resource wealth is, perhaps contrary to initial expectations, a curse rather than a 
blessing.”  
28 There is an economic phenomeon known as ‘dutch disease’, a condition where “…a natural resource 
boom and the associated surge in raw-material exports drive up the real exchange rate (or real wages), 
thus hurting other exports (Corden 1984 cited in Gylfason 2000)”. 
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Another group of so-called ‘structural transformation’ development models is 
evident. The works of Chenery (1975) and Syrquin (1984) claim that as output grows, 
and development process unfolds, a concomitant shift in the composition of output also 
takes place with the production typically shifting away from agriculture towards 
manufacturing and service sectors29. The process of development is thus being 
described as “…a transition from a low income agrarian economy, to an industrial 
urban economy with substantially higher income” (Chenery and Syrquin 1989: 81). In 
this regard, industrialization is viewed as the ‘engine’ of growth or leading sector in the 
development process as Kaldor (1966) cited in Pieper (1999) also argued. Similar 
structuralist approach also provided by Boeke (1951) cited in Djojohadikusumo 
(1994)30 and Lewis (1954) describes the economy as consisting of two sectors, namely 
modern (industrialized) and traditional (rural). Finally, Rostow (1956: 25) introduced 
the appealing concept of the ‘take-off’ stage, where he stated that the process of 
economic growth depends crucially on a relatively brief time interval (20-30 years) 
where the economy and the society within are able to transform themselves such that 
the process of growth become more or less ‘automatic’ and self-sustained. 
Other social scientists, like Schumpeter (1911) cited in Fagerberg (2003) 
emphasizes the role of entrepreneur, innovation, creativity and ideas but still 
                                                 
29 The shift happens because of the Engel Law (Engel 1857 cited in Foellmi and Zweim¨uller 2002) 
postulate that as income grows the budget share for food would be declining. The surplus created then 
would be invested in the manufacturing sector. As such the structuralist developmental model is also 
known as the unbalanced growth model. 
30 In Boeke, the dualism was more related with the social and cultural structure. Boeke categorizes two 
types of society, capitalism (commercial-industrial-financial) and pre-capitalism. In a capitalism social 
structure, ‘needs’ is viewed ‘economically’ and ‘rationally’, meaning that society is faced with unlimited 
wants constrained by limited resource. This condition would force the society to become ‘efficient’ in 
allocating their needs and to become more productive. On the other hand, ‘needs’ in pre-capitalism 
society is more driven by ‘social needs’, to maintain social status and social standing; such that it is 
consumptive and unproductive (Djojohadikusumo 1994: 68-70). 
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acknowledging the pivotal role of the elastic supply capital to facilitate the effects of 
innovations (through ‘creative destruction’) on economic growth. A different discourse 
is taken by Myrdal (1968) in studying why some countries remained poor despite their 
attempts to achieve modernization and industrialization; he concluded that cultural 
factors are the main culprit.  
Some critics have been directed towards the structuralist approach. Sanchez-
Ancochea (2005), who labels it as the “Anglo-Saxon structuralist”, criticizes it because 
it believes in the uniqueness of the process of the structural change and ignores the 
special characteristics of developing and underdeveloping countries. The idea of the 
structuralist framework could be seen as originating from the unprecedented high 
growth in the economies of Western Europe (labeled as the ‘golden age’ of growth, 
1950-73) and the structural transformation that accompanied them31. Rodrik (2004: 4) 
asserts that growth-promoting policies tend to be context specific and admits that 
“…despite a voluminous literature, cross-national growth regressions ultimately do not 
provide us with much reliable and unambiguous evidence on such operational 
matters...” 
The theories of growth described above could also be classified according to the 
method used. Most neoclassical and new growth theories could be seen to be using 
‘inductive’ reasoning, while the structuralist approach applied mostly deductive 
reasoning in developing their arguments. 
On the other hand, some of the theories of growth developed by mainstream 
economists could pose some problems to the economics profession. Economics is 
regarded to be more removed from the real world and any practical relevance, thus 
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alienating itself from other branches of social sciences. Fine (2000: 10) even wrote that 
economics ‘..has been colonizing the other social sciences’. Fine (2000: 11-12) also 
asserts that “…it has become commonplace to complain that economists know very 
little about the world they inhabit.” Blaug (1997: 3) gave an even grimmer glimpse of 
modern economics as follows: 
Modern economics is sick. Economics has increasingly become an intellectual 
game played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences for 
understanding the economic world. Economists have converted the subject into 
a sort of social mathematics in which analytical rigour is everything and 
practical relevance is nothing. To pick up a copy of The American Economic 
Review or The Economic Journal these days is to wonder whether one has 
landed on a strange planet in which tedium is the deliberate objective of 
professional publication. 
 
Hodgson (2004) contends that “…the victory of technique over substance is a 
chronic problem within modern economics.” In 1988,  the Commission on the State of 
Graduate Education in Economics in the US set up by American Economic Association 
was worried that “…graduate programs may be turning out a generation with too many 
idiot savants skilled in technique but innocent of real economic issues” (Krueger et. al. 
1991: 1044–5). 32 
In addition, despite its claim to be ‘objective’ and ‘value-free’, economics, as 
many other social sciences, are still highly related with ‘ideologies’. As Lebowitz 
(2004) noted: 
Economic theory is not neutral, and the results when it is applied owe much to 
the implicit and explicit assumptions embedded in a particular theory. That 
such assumptions reflect specific ideologies is most obvious in the case of the 
neoclassical economics that underlies neoliberal economic policies. 
 
                                                                                                                                              
31 For a recent discussion regarding this ‘golden-age’, refer to Temple (2001). 
32 The commission still, however, satisfied with the condition of economics graduate programs based on 
the notion that the graduates earnings were on par with their siblings in the engineering department. 
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In retrospect, the industrial revolution could be considered as the starting point 
of ‘modern economic growth’. Indeed, industrialization is mostly seen as the 
prerequisite and the consequences of economic growth. Economic growth since the 
industrial revolution33 has shown remarkable progress. Angus Maddison (1982) quoted 
in Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) estimates that for a sample of 16 industrialized 
countries, there was a 60-fold increase in the total product and a 13-fold increase in per 
capita product since 1820. Indeed, after the 18th century, growth in real world GDP per 
capita has increased markedly and this could be assumed to have its origin from the 
process of industrialization (refer to figure 2-2). Although this assertion might be 
biased from the East Asian point of view, because the origins were coming from the 
Europe or western paradigm where its main dogma of capitalism34 stated that capital 
(which resembled ‘machinery’ in the real world) is the ultimate source of growth. 
                                                 
33 Historically, industrialization started from the industrial revolution that usually originated from the 
period of dramatic economic and technical change happened in Britain between 1760 and 1850, where 
the steam engine first came into widespread use. The steam engine provides power for newly developed 
machines that previously utilized using the physical human hands. The first sector that gain benefits from 
it is the cotton textile industry and has facilitated further industrial innovation. Then the development of 
the internal combustion engine, atomic energy and computer technology sometimes is being referred to 
as “third,” “fourth” and “fifth” industrial revolutions (Albrechtsen 2000). 
34 According to World-System Theory (Wallerstein 1976), a mutually reinforcing system of nation-states 
and a market system of capitalism emerged in Europe between 1450 and 1620 (McCormack 1999). For a 
complete history of capitalism refer to Beaud (2001). 
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Figure 2-2 Growth in Real World GDP per Capita, 1000-present 
 
Source: DeLong (2000)  
 
However, the impact of industrialization may have different consequences for 
developing economies such as Indonesia.35 Industrialization may have a negative 
impact on the social structures or system that if not handled correctly would deteriorate 
the future economic growth and could lead to social instability in Indonesia since 1997 
Miguel (2001). The phenomena of ‘uneven development’ in Southeast Asia have been 
discussed extensively by Dixon and Drakakis-Smith (1997).  
Federman and Levine (2003: 1) summarize the pros and cons of 
industrialization as follows:  
From Adam Smith (1776) and Marx and Engels (1848) in centuries past to the 
‘Washington Consensus’ of the 1980s and 1990s as discussed by Williamson 
in 1990, many analysts have made the case that industrialization brings 
“development.” The implicit assumption is that industrialization improves a 
                                                 
35 The positive impact of Industrialization has been largely acknowledged. For example, it is concluded 
that export-led industrialisation concentrated in Java-Bali has contributed to labor market transformation 
and income growth outside Java-Bali (Manning 1996). 
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nation’s well-being along a number of dimensions, including education quality 
and attainment. At the same time, Smith, Marx, and the originator of the term 
“Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1999) have warned of the potential 
downside of industrialization, including increased pollution, growing 
inequality, and lower social cohesion. An additional concern is that 
industrialization may reduce school enrollments by increasing child labor and 
increasing the need for youth to help in the home.  
 
  While for the case of Indonesia, ILO (1998: 27) notes  that:  
The government’s industrialization-led strategy neglected the development and 
diversification of the agricultural sector, compelling the country to use scarce 
foreign exchange to import ever-larger quantities of rice, soybean, sugar and 
other basic commodities. Industrialization, though rapid, remained highly 
dependent on imported materials, parts and components, and therefore 
generated limited value-added. Manufacturing did not develop sufficient 
technological depth, ignored the need to foster backward linkages with local 
suppliers, and deferred import substitution in basic materials, such as refinery 
products and basic metals. 
 
The importance given to industrialization as the only path to growth and 
prosperity has also been fueled by neo-classical economists, with their emphasis on 
capital as the source of long-run growth. Most economic policies have revolved around 
‘capital’ (in trying to utilize more capital, and how to use it efficiently).  Indonesia is 
also a case in point. By adopting free capital-mobility and a flexible exchange-rate, 
Indonesia has managed to attract massive Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) since its 
first deregulation in 1967, and a series of deregulations and reform efforts in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Simultaneously, the banking sector and the stock market have also been 
growing extensively, thanks to the efforts of government policies (through banking and 
financial liberalization) and the growing income and savings of the population. The 
result of these economic policies is not all bad, as Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2004: 4) 
noted:  
In 1965 when Suharto took power, Indonesia was widely considered one 
of the developing world’s basket cases. GDP per capita, for example, 
was only half that of India, Bangladesh, or Nigeria. By 1997, Indonesia 
44
was known as one of the Tiger Cubs. Its GDP per capita was 3.5 or more 
times that of India, Bangladesh, or Nigeria.  
 
As Alvares, et. al. (2003: 38) and Darnell (2002) pointed out, the developed or 
high-income countries, could be characterized by  
…a preponderance of workers who are fully integrated or at least directly 
affected by the characteristics of the new economy. The economies of 
these countries are heavily dependent on services and industry, and are 
heavily involved in the world economy (as measured by trade and 
investment). Virtually all competitive companies in major industries rely 
on the technologies and skills of the modern age, although a substantial 
number of jobs and firms that serve local or specialized markets can still 
productively absorb traditional workers.  
 
For most of the developing countries in Asia, more often than not, the main 
source of economic growth and diversification is the transfer and adaptation of existing 
technologies from developed countries, usually in the form of FDI.36 This is not to set 
aside the prospect of developing countries in achieving technological breakthroughs at 
their own expense, but the imbalance that occurs in technological capabilities and the 
lower R&D expenditures might make it a lot cheaper and profitable for developing 
countries to just imitate and apply the existing technologies from the developed 
countries (Ortiz 1994).  
During the Soeharto era, Indonesia has put industrialization as the backbone of 
the economy. The period of industrialization was marked by extensive capital-intensive 
industries and massive foreign investment. As a result, the private sector has 
significantly replaced the state as the engine of growth.  
Many economists believe that for growth to be sustained in the long run, it has 
to be based on the production side (supply side) or by increasing the productive 
                                                 
36 FDI is said to have played an important role in rehabilitating Indonesia’s economy especially at the 
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capacity of an economy. Focusing on aggregate demand (such as an increase in 
government spending or a cut in taxes) will only affect economic growth in the short 
run. Over the long run, the aggregate supply depends on the following factors which 
affect the potential output: capital, labor, natural resources, public sector investment, 
and human capital (Dornbusch et. al. 2001). 
In this thesis, the term economic growth would be viewed in broader terms, in 
that it would be associated more with economic development. Economic development 
has a wider and broader dimension (like poverty, health and education), which actually 
tries to capture the meaning of ‘welfare’. And, since ‘welfare’ is usually associated 
with ‘income’ and ‘output’ (economists have this rooted assumption that people’s 
behavior is driven by the endless effort to maximize ‘utility’ which comes from the 
consumption of ‘goods or outputs’) the two terms actually have a very close 
relationship. As such even though the term “development” encompasses a wide range 
of phenomena ranging from indicators of “quality of life” to “human development,” the 
increase in GDP is a major component of economic and social development 
(Kibritcioglu and Dibooglu 2001: 1).   
Nevertheless, Adelman (2000) defines economic development as distinct from 
mere economic growth, which includes (1) self-sustaining growth; (2) structural change 
in patterns of production; (3) technological upgrading; (4) social, political and 
institutional modernization; and (5) widespread improvement in the human condition. 
Aykut Kibritcioglu and Selahattin Dibooglu from the Department of Economics 
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign assert that economic growth and 
development is a complicated process that falls into the domain of many disciplines in 
                                                                                                                                              
beginning of 1967 (Setiawan 2002). 
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social sciences and humanities. Kibritcioglu and Dibooglu (2001) said that it is natural 
then to study the fundamental aspects of economic growth by synthesizing research in 
relevant fields.  
As a summary, it is useful to look at other types of taxonomy of economic 
growth. Rodrik (2003) mentions the need to distinguish between the ‘proximate’ and 
‘deep determinants’ of growth. Physical capital deepening, human capital accumulation 
and productivity growth could be the ‘proximate’ determinants, while geography, 
integration (trade) and institutions are ‘deeper’ determinants of growth (Rodrik 2003: 
4). 
 
2.3 Attention Towards Education as the Source of Growth 
The focus on education as one of the factors contributing to economic growth 
began in the 1960s when the work of Schultz (1961), Denison (1962), and Becker 
(1962) shed some light on how (direct or indirect), and to what extent, education (either 
from schooling or on-the-job training) contributes to the enhanced productivity of the 
labor force and, in turn to growth in national income and to the economy at large. 
Initially, most of these human capital theorists, and to some extent the neoclassical or 
new growth theorists, seem to put more emphasis on on-the-job training as the ‘human 
capital’ or ‘knowledge’ that contributes to national income or economic growth. It is 
not surprising since it is easier, theoretically, to relate training with the theory of the 
firm both at the micro and macro level.  
Although more attention has usually been paid to the accumulation of physical 
capital, and development specialists in the 1950s and 1960s came perilously close to 
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saying that investment in physical capital was all that mattered37, important thinkers 
since Adam Smith have argued that education also has a critical role to play. Utilizing 
physical capital effectively surely requires many different skills be learned. Pyo (1995) 
in investigating how much the accumulation of human capital has contributed toward 
economic growth in South Korea reached a conclusion that human capital accumulation 
has been equally important as physical capital accumulation in explaining economic 
growth. Pyo (1995: 238) argues that:  
“…for a growing economy which has not yet arrived at a long run steady 
state and has not completed its productivity convergence to the industrial 
nation level, human capital plays the role of accumulating capital, 
complementing physical capital and labor rather than providing 
economy-wide externality as hypothesized by the endogenous growth 
models. The low estimates for the labor coefficient indicate that human 
capital is accounting partly for labor embodiment and partly for capital 
embodiment.”. 
 
Lee (1996) argues that the rapid growth of the Japanese and South Korean 
economies probably owed much to the mass literacy and numeracy achieved early in 
the process. This produced a labor force that adapted rapidly to changes in technology 
and the economic environment. Together with good economic management, this 
enabled agricultural and industrial productivity to be increased. 
Richardson (1997) points out that there is a wide consensus in economic theory 
that human capital is an essential determinant of productivity growth. As well as 
facilitating technological advancement and diffusion of techniques, higher education 
levels may also improve the mobility of the labor force towards more productive 
activities, facilitating factor reallocation. Empirical evidence provides considerable 
                                                 
37 Denison (1980) share his puzzled regarding the over-emphasized of capital as he wrote: “Why many 
people share a vision of growth that assigns exclusive attention to capital I do not know” (p.220). 
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support for a role for both the initial stock and the subsequent investment in human 
capital in fostering faster income growth.  Educational expenditures by governments 
also have been found to have a strong positive impact, and the rate of return on public 
education is also found to be high. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) find an annual rate 
of return on public education to the order of 20%.  
Gundlach (1999) mentions that over the last ten years, growth theory has 
celebrated a remarkable come-back in mainstream economics. The new growth theories 
highlight the impact of human capital on economic development. However, Gundlach 
also felt that there is a relative lack of macroeconomic studies that support the 
presumed role of human capital in development in an empirically convincing way. 
When it comes to human capital, economic theory seems to be well ahead of 
measurement (Gundlach 1999: 7). 
Investment in education should be viewed to be more specific than human 
resource development. A human resource development program could be successful in 
producing high level of literacy but much less so in the supply of skilled worker. A 
severe shortage of skilled and experienced technical and vocational personnel could act 
as a major constraint in economic growth (expatriates continue to fill key positions), 
such that Lim (1996) argues is the reason behind the under-developed nature in the 
South Pacific countries.  
In addition, Krueger and Lindahl (2000: 14) concludes from their regression 
analysis that countries with more schooling would be expected to have a higher steady-
state income so that more educated countries should be expected to grow faster. 
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2.4 Human Capital Theory and Productivity 
Today, learning and education are viewed purely as secular pursuits. Economics 
perceives education as one of the components of ‘human capital’38 or sometimes 
termed as ‘human resources’ or ‘human development’. It is being treated like ‘physical 
capital’: as one of the inputs for production of goods and services. It is no longer 
something that people do during their leisure times, as in ancient times. Education is a 
key to the job market, a prerequisite for work interview, a key to survive the 
globalizing world. Education is anything except what people do for leisure, students are 
even granted holidays for leisure after receiving their education.  
The so-called “new growth theory” or “endogenous growth” perceive education 
or “Human Capital” as important or even more important than physical capital in 
achieving economic growth. Human capital is seen to be the key for any country to 
achieve long-term and sustainable growth path models. These endogenous growth 
models are trying to find direct links between human capital and investment in physical 
capital, with its relationship to economic growth (Lattimore 2002). For example 
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2000) cited in Storesletten (2000), argues that education, 
innovation and learning by doing have an effect on long-run economic growth and 
sustainable labor productivity growth.  However, ambiguity in empirical results hinder 
consensus among researchers as to which educational policies produce sustained 
economic growth, despite the optimism that the new growth theory holds promise for 
future theoretical and empirical study of the relationship between human capital and 
growth (Dahlin 2002).   
                                                 
38 Education is not the only factor building human capital; health is often cited as another factor 
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The theory of human capital developed by Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath 
(1967) and later by Mincer (1974) is considered one of the most important 
contributions in the field of labor economics. The human capital, particularly the one 
that is obtained through education, is a dominant factor to increase the long term 
competitiveness of an economy. Better educational attainment will make workers more 
skilful and productive. The abundance of well-educated workers facilitates the 
absorption of sophisticated technologies from developed countries through FDI.39 In 
addition, the distribution of income is highly affected by the changes in the level and 
the distribution of schooling. The evidence demonstrates that higher attainment and 
more equal distribution of education play significant roles in the narrowing of income 
inequality. The improvement in equality of income, subsequently, would affect the long 
term growth of the economy positively (Lee 2000b). 
The investment flow of human capital is shown in Figure 2-3.  
                                                                                                                                              
contributing to human capital. The literature of investment in health actually is as old as the literature of 
investment in education. 
39 Higher foreign direct investment could lead to higher wages in locally-owned establishments and, 
since the foreign establishments pay higher wages than locally-owned ones, that higher foreign presence 
raises the general wage level in a province and industry. (Lipsey and Sjöholm 2001). 
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Figure 2-3 Human Capital: As Stream of Past Investments 
on the job 
training
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Source: Statistics New Zealand, Review of the Statistical Measurement of Human Capital, Adolf 
Stroombergen, Dennis Rose, Ganesh Nana, November 2002.  
 
The above chart signifies the treatment of economics towards education as an 
‘investment’ or some sort of ‘cost of capital’ that provides returns from employment 
earnings. This could be categorized as the ‘micro’ or ‘household’ level impact of 
human capital. The ‘macro’ side is actually related with the ‘productivity’ level as it 
explained in economic growth theories. Indeed, ‘productivity’ (the macro side) and 
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‘returns’ or ‘earnings’ (from the household side) are closely related as one affects and 
directly connects with the others40.  
In terms of agricultural production, significant effects of education on 
productivity in agriculture are evident in several East Asian countries. According to the 
available evidence, the contribution of education to agricultural productivity is quite 
high in South Korea: one year of additional education was estimated to increase 
productivity by 2.22% (Jamison and Lau 1982). Education also influences the selection 
of technologies in farming. A better educated farmer may be able to choose a superior 
technology compared to a less educated farmer, and the productivity levels obtained 
with the new technology may crucially depend on the level of farmers’ education. 
Education also acts as a complementary input for the appropriate use of technologies 
(Cotlear 1990 and Tilak 1999: 12). 
A study by two World Bank economists, John Dixon and Kirk Hamilton, 
highlights the important role of human capital. The study estimates the total wealth per 
person in different parts of the world and then decomposed the total wealth into human 
capital, physical capital, and various natural resources. Their results are shown in Table 
2-5 (Abler 2003):  
                                                 
40 The nature of economic growth would also determine the employment effect; it is usually labelled the 
‘elasticity of employment’ (Islam 2001). Some economic growth would create more employment and 
earnings compared with others. The export-oriented (in manufacturing) development being pursued by 
Indonesia has been able to create significant employment creation (and thus earnings) for the early 
1980s. However, in the late 1990s the employment effect was not as large as before. In the latter period 
the largest gains were in services rather than in manufacturing. (James and Fujita 2000).     
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Table 2-3 Wealth per capita and components, by region, 1994 
Sources of Wealth (%) Region Wealth per 
Person (PPP-













U.S., Canada  325 76 19 3 1 1 
Australia, New  302 68 30 2 * * 
Zealand, Japan        
Western Europe  236 74 23 2 1 * 
Middle East  146 38 19 5 * 38 
South America  94 74 17 5 2 2 
North Africa  54 68 26 2 * 3 
Central 
America  
52 79 15 5 1 * 
East Asia  46 76 16 6 1 1 
East & 
Southern  
30 65 25 7 2 1 
Africa        
West Africa  22 60 19 16 2 3 
South Asia  22 64 19 15 1 1 
Source: John Dixon and Kirk Hamilton, "Expanding the Measure of Wealth,"  Finance & Development, 
December 1996 in Abler (2003).  
Notes: Physical capital includes the value of urban land. Percentages may not add to 100 due to 
rounding. An * means less than 0.5%.   
 
It seems that the dominant form of wealth in all the regions is human capital 
except for the Middle East (38%) due to its abundant oil resources. The highest share of 
human capital is in Central America (79%). The share of East Asia is 76% while in 
West Africa is 60% and in South Asia is 64%. It is then interesting to understand why 
despite the high share of human capital in wealth, at least based on the calculation, the 
growth performance of those countries remains strikingly different and shows no signs 
of convergence.   
The World Bank has also developed a parallel model of "The Four Capitals" 
that is deemed necessary if sustainable development is to be achieved- which includes 
(Henderson 2000):  
• Social Capital (levels of trust, mutuality, shared norms and values and networks 
within a community)  
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• Environmental Capital (our natural resources)   
• Economic (or fixed) Capital  
• Human Capital (health, skills and adaptability)  
 
The World Bank believes that these different types of capital are substitutes for 
one another, and when the total value of the four remains constant, then a sustainable 
growth can be achieved. If some natural capital is lacking, then, an increase in the value 
of ‘human capital’ – through education, for instance – is an adequate substitute and 
necessary to maintain a sustainable growth.41 
Despite the growing view that human capital is as important as ‘physical’ 
capital, the latter has been regarded to be more important and directly linked to 
economic growth, either by government or by scholars. Governments have been using 
the indicator of ‘investment’ as a major indicator or goal of development, and to use it 
as a political currency and as a success indicator. In efforts to increase economic 
growth, more focus is given to investment; how to attract them, how to utilize them, 
etc. Less effort is given for building a solid human capital base. The exception is of 
course those countries that lack natural resource base, like Singapore. More recently, 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been trying to ‘market’ their 
new welfare indicators, the Human Development Index, to make governments care not 
only about their economic wellbeing but also about their citizen’s welfare.   
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
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2.5 Other Linkages of Education to Economic Growth 
The theory of human capital could be the first theoretical ground that provides a 
direct linkage between education and economic growth. Education affects economic 
growth through the increase of skills in workers (that is on the assumption that an 
increase in the education of workers would lead to an increase in skills or capability of 
workers) that would make them more productive. Indeed, the higher level of skills of 
workers would make them more capable in applying new technologies or techniques in 
production that would lead to an increase in productivity.42  
Besides the direct linkage of education and economic growth that happened in 
the labor market43, there are other indirect ways that education could affect economic 
growth. Education – on the micro level - could help people to become a ‘better’ human 
being, forming strong and stable neighborhoods and for a conducive and enabling 
environment for growth to occur and to help overcome poverty.  
These so-called indirect benefits, or ‘externalities’, create additional push for 
higher and a more ‘meaningful’ economic growth in terms of quality. The indirect 
impact of human capital and some examples of human capital indicators could be seen 
in Figure 2-4.  
                                                 
42 A combination of FDI and capable workers could lead to higher productivity. For example, heavily-
foreign plants in Indonesia tended to have higher average labor productivity than local plants in the late 
1980s and in 1998 but lower or  equal productivity in 1990-1997 (Takii and Ramstetter 2000). 
43 The nature (or efficiency level) of the labor market would also determine the earnings difference from 
labor with different educational background. A study at a manufacturing firm-level in Indonesia suggest 
that more educated production workers earned more than less educated workers. The results also suggest 
that the earnings differentials between more and less educated workers were smaller than corresponding 
differentials in marginal products for production workers. This could imply that the nature of labor 
market in Indonesia were not perfectly competitive (Takii  2000). 
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Figure 2-4 Indirect impact of human capital and human capital indicators 
> Pupil/teacher ratios > Literacy rates
> Class size > School enrolment rates
> Teacher salary > Drop-out rates
> Per pupil funding > Years of schooling Reductions in:
> Length of school > Test scores > incarceration
year > Earnings > delinquency
> Teacher > Employability > morbidity
qualifications > unemployment











 Source: Buffalo IGERT in Geographic Information Science, Human Capital Research Using GIS,  
http://www.geog.buffalo.edu/igis/IGERT_humcap.html.  
  
In addition, the low quality of human capital is being seen as the major cause 
why poor countries cannot break-out of the poverty trap despite the sufficiently high 
economic growth that they have achieved44. It could also happen as a result of the 
deficiencies of private incentives (could be due to structural barriers) in investing in 
human capital. Individual choices – being left alone without intervention – could lead 
to the lack of human capital accummulation compared with the socially desirable level.  
Individuals do not consider the positive externalities in making their decisions. 
If individuals – through correct incentives - could be guided to invest more in human 
capital, the human capital formation that is taking place in an economy could rise to the 
socially optimal level of human capital (Stark and Wang 2001).  
Indeed the economic system is so complicated that identifying the exact role of 
education in economic growth might not be easy. Figure 2-4 describes the various 
factors in the economic system. Even if education does matter for economic growth, 
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how significant is it? More education surely would not be harmful. But for a 
developing country, where resources are scarce and capacity is limited, any resources 
spent on some sectors would mean less are available for other uses. However, the 
strong proponent of education would argue that a ‘virtuous cycle’ exists, where more 
educational investment leads to more growth and to further expenditure, especially in 
the case of developed countries (Irfan 2003).  
Lim (1996) notes that education contributes to economic growth in six ways:  
1.  it improves generally the quality of the labor force by imparting skills and work 
knowledge;  
2.  it increases labor mobility and therefore promotes the division of labor; 
3.  it enables new information to be absorbed faster and unfamiliar inputs and new 
processes applied more effectively;  
4.  it improves management skills which leads to a more efficient allocation of 
resources;  
5. it removes many of the social and institutional barriers to economic growth;  
6. it encourages entrepreneurship by promoting individual responsibility, 
organizational ability, risk-taking in moderation, and planning over the long-
term.  
To conclude this section, the education level of population can affect the 
economy directly through the labor market by increasing the skills of workers and by 
creating entrepreneurs. Education also brings some positive externalities, like reducing 
unemployment, creating equality, creating an intelligent society that could lead to a 
better institution. Indirectly, or in the long-run, education could improve the 
                                                                                                                                              
44 A summary of relationship between economic growth and poverty is given in Sumner (2003).   
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technological capacity that is related with the endogenous growth theory proposed by 
Lucas (1988). While capital-oriented development models would assume free-market 
as the best institution for economic growth to occur (leading to policy like free-trade, 
deregulation and liberalization), policy for promoting education and/or technology 
should be done actively by government, since it has (positive) externalities and high 
risk such that should it left in the hand of business or else it would not reach the optimal 
level.  
In trying to consider explicitly the two-way linkages between economic growth 
and other factors, Kibritcioglu and Dibooglu (2001) propose a matrix of interactions as 
a frame of reference. In this matrix, they claim, it is possible to summarize all potential 
linkages and hypothesize their relative strengths; they then hypothesize two-way 
linkages between possible explanatory factors and long-run growth as shown in the 
Figure 2-6 which indicates the aggregate set of factors interacting with economic 
growth into nine groups.  
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Figure 2-5 Possible Interactions in the Economic Growth Process 
 
Note: There are 55 possible two-way direct linkages that form an intricate web of interactions. The 
direction of arrows in the numbered 55 cells of the table shows the expected direction of the influence 
between two sets of corresponding factors. A sign  , for example, denotes an expected causality 
running from the row factor to the corresponding column factor. A bi-directional arrow (  ), on the 
other hand, is an indication of a two-way causality. Moreover, solid black arrows show stronger 
anticipated effects in comparison to gray arrows. Finally, cells with a hollow circle    represent weak 
or negligible interactions. Note that these arrows represent direct two-way interactions; causal effects 
through third variables are possible as indicated by their relevant cells.  
Source: Kibritcioglu and Dibooglu (2001: 8).    
 
2.6 Recent Studies about Education in Indonesia 
Ibrahim (1998) discusses the role of investment in human capital in the form of 
education for ASEAN countries. Specifically Ibrahim studied the impact of investment 
in human capital by differentiating between primary, secondary and tertiary education 
towards economic growth for ASEAN countries. It is interesting that Ibrahim has 
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differentiated the impact of each educational level towards economic growth. The basic 
premise is that, of course, as a nation grows economically the skills needed – thus the 
level of education required – would also experience some forms of structural change. 
Ibrahim also provides estimates of rates of return to each level of educational 
investments for ASEAN countries.  
In addition, Ibrahim (1998) shows that educational investment at each level of 
education is a productive investment that yields high rates of return. Her estimation on 
ASEAN countries shows that the social rate of return is highest for primary, followed 
by secondary and tertiary education.  
Lee Kam Hing’s (1995) study analyzes the development of education in 
Indonesia, especially from the historical and political angles, for the period of 1945-
1965. It highlights the tension arising when Indonesia was experiencing a transitional 
phase from colonial to independent government. Lee highlights the closeness of the 
link between education and politics, before and after independence. The link between 
the two is actually a two-way relationship, where political actors often used education 
as a means to achieve some goals. On the other hand discussions in the education fields 
do exercise some influence on the country’s political history. Thomas (1973), in 
analyzing the Indonesian Higher Education, provides a policy analysis on education 
sector for the period of 1920-1970.   
As for indigenous scholars, the works of Tilaar (1995, 2000 and 2003) describes 
more recent developments in the Indonesia schooling system as well as policy analyses 
and some historical perspectives. Atmodiwirio (2000) discusses the schooling 
management system in Indonesia during the colonial and new order era. Mastuhu 
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(2003) discusses the effectiveness of the new schooling system in Indonesia in coping 
with globalization. As the state has a pivotal role in Indonesia’s development, the type 
of ‘state’ that was and is evolving in Indonesia would also significantly affect the 
education system. This kind of phenomenon also happened in Korea, for example. Kim 
and Lee (2001: 18) mention how the state has influenced the state of education system 
in Korea:  
The prevalent practice of private tutoring in Korea can be traced to the 
paradigm of developmental state that pursued rapid economic growth through 
industrialization and export promotion. Following the universal primary school 
education, the military government has equalized secondary education so that 
opportunities for secondary education greatly expanded. Concerns over the 
excessive wasteful competition among students to enter better schools during 
the process of rapid expansion of school system made the public more 
receptive to the strong government intervention on education.  
  
As such, it is important to examine the paradigm of the state development 
model in Indonesia to provide a more thorough understanding of educational issues.  
 
2.7 Miraculous Growth, Developmental State and Industrial Policy 
The dramatic (and not-so-dramatic) growth experiences of East Asian countries 
after the World War II have received much attention. Basically the ‘successful’ 
experiences of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have contributed to the term “Asian 
Model” of economic development. Noland and Pack noted that for a period of roughly 
thirty-five years, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan have implemented 
industrial policies aimed at altering the sectoral structure of production toward sectors 
believed to offer greater prospects for accelerated growth than a typical process of 
industrial evolution would generate (Loayza and Soto 2002). This ‘typical process of 
industrial evolution’ could be assumed to refer to the type of industrial evolution that 
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comes under the free-market or capitalistic system from the developed countries’ 
experience in the west.   
Powell (2003) describes the model as one that “maintains some international 
market forces, but also involves heavy direction of the economy by state industrial 
development planning agencies”. The term “industrial policy”45 evokes the image of 
Japanese bureaucrats of the 1960s or 1970s vintage picking high growth sectors 
(“winners”) and guiding industrial firms into those sectors through financial incentives 
and an appeal to their sense of obligation to society (Mody 1999). Chalmers Johnson 
(1982: 21), also uses the terms ‘miracle’ and ‘effective’ to describe the involvement of 
the Japanese state in the economy. The model seems to be considered a form of ‘best 
practice’ that other Southeast Asian countries eagerly tries to mimic. Singapore for 
example launched a “learn from Japan” campaign in 1978 while Malaysia began a 
“Look East” policy in 1982 (Lee (2000)). 
These attempts of generalization in ‘best-practices’ are not without critics. 
Haggard (1990) considers country-specific conditions and circumstances to be the main 
determinants of policy outcomes and any attempts to generalize then would be 
disappointing and fruitless. Autonomy of the Developmental State means that there is 
public-private cooperation and relationship in which the state (and the developmental 
or policy elites) independently (or autonomously) develops national goals and translates 
these broad national goals into an effective policy action (Karagiannis 2002). Leftwich 
                                                 
45 Bora, Llyod and Pangestu (1999) contend that at the outset that industrial policy is not a well-defined 
term. “It is ill-defined in relation to the objectives, the industries which are covered and the instruments 
that are used. The World Bank (1993) cited Bora, Llyod and Pangestu (1999) has provided a working 
definition of industrial policy as "government efforts to alter industrial structure to promote productivity 
based growth." This definition is useful as it focuses on the objective of economy-wide factor 
productivity growth rather than merely changing the structure of industrial outputs.” 
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(1995) (in Auty and Gelb 2001) bases his characterization of seven successful 
developmental states (South Korea, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Bostwana) and identifies six key features:  
1.  A determined developmental elite, in:  
2.  A weak and subordinated civil society, which confers:  
3.  Relative autonomy, that is deployed by:  
4.  A powerful, competent, insulated economic bureaucracy, in:  
5.  The effective management of non-state economic interests, while:  
6.  Political legitimacy is conferred by repression, and then, performance.  
  Fang (2000) quoted in Shen (2000) asserts that the East Asian Model could be 
characterized by the following six traits:  
1.  high investments in science and technology, and research and development   
2.  high investments in quality education and human resources development  
3.  high savings and investment rates   
4.  a conscious policy of export promotion   
5.  equitable growth  
6.  a stable and strong macro-economic environment  
  
Responding to the miraculous growth performance, the World Bank (1993) has 
written a special report about the rapid growth of eight East Asian Economies titled 
“The East Asian Miracle” (World Bank 1993). The report (p. 367) in Quibria (2002) 
listed  six  lessons that it claims to be a ‘mantra’ that countries need to follow, namely:  
keep the macroeconomy stable, focus on early education, do not neglect agriculture, 
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use banks to build a sound financial system, be open  to  foreign ideas  and technology, 
and  let relative  prices reflect  economic scarcities. This study also found that a 
successful export push, whether an outcome of open economic policies or of ingenious 
policy interventions, offers large economic dividends. 
Only four years later, the East Asian financial crisis in 1997 produced mixed 
effects regarding the effectiveness of the ‘developmental state’ or the so called ‘Asian 
or East Asian model of  growth’. Wade (1998, 2000) attributes much of the blame for 
the crisis to departures from the state-directed model. “Had the governments not 
abandoned some basic principles of the East Asian model – above all, the principle of 
strategic rather than open-ended integration into world financial markets – the 
economies would probably not have experienced a serious crisis, although they would 
have grown more slowly” (Wade 2000: 107 quoted in Powell 2003). 
The East Asian crisis can also be viewed as a failure of industrialization itself. 
The manufacturing sector in Indonesia was the most badly hurt by the crisis, while on 
the other hand the agricultural sectors had slightly benefited from the crisis due to the 
devaluation that has made their products more competitive46. Anecdotal evidence 
would show that some farmers may well receive windfalls due to the crisis and had 
been able to improve their welfare significantly.  
East Asia’s corporate structure and governance mechanism that had acted as the 
engine of growth for the rapid industrialization in the past are under scrutiny in the 
wake of the 1997’s financial crisis. The close relationships between government and 
                                                 
46 The worst contraction was in the construction sector (-39.8 %), the financial sector (-26.7 %), trade, 
and hotel and restaurant revenue (-18.9 %). Other sectors, which have large contractions, are 
manufacturing (-12.9 %) and transport and communication (-12.8 %), while mining and other service 
sectors experienced a contraction around 4.5 %. The agricultural and the utility sectors still experienced 
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business, heavy reliance on bank debt, and the emerged conglomerate firms are under 
criticism for “cronyism” and wasteful investments in real estate and currency 
speculation (Mody 1999). 
Peter Evans (1995) describes the state in East Asia as possessing an “embedded 
autonomy.” Moody (1999: 18) states that:  
The autonomy permits the government to set national goals and to 
discipline private sector behavior. However, the state is also embedded in 
the broader social and economic milieu through personal ties between 
government officials and leaders of the private sector. This delicate 
balance between personal relationships, which foster information flows 
and create trust, and autonomy which allows the government to pursue a 
broad-based social agenda is, according to Evans, the key to East Asian 
success. East Asia is thus distinguished not only from predatory states 
such as Zaire (where the state is rapaciously autonomous) but also from 
intermediate states, such as India and Brazil, where neither autonomy nor 
embeddedness prevail. 
  
Pack and Nelson (1997) and Felipe (1997) further divide the theories of the 
Asian Miracle into two groups47:  
 
1. The Fundamentalists (accumulation theories), who claims that growth in the 
region was mainly input driven, because investments were moving these 
economies “along their production function”.   
2. The Assimilationists (assimilation theories), who argues that the essential 
component of the recipe followed by the East Asian countries was the 
acquisition and mastery of foreign technology, and the capacity to put ideas into 
practice. These theories stress the entrepreneurship, innovation and learning that 
                                                                                                                                              
positive growth of around 0.2 and 3.7 % respectively. (Setiawan 2000: 43-44). 
47 Felipe (1997) divide the categories into three, the last one to be the nihilistic view, who maintain that 
the whole debate about the sources of growth is misplaced due to a serious methodological problem 
inherent in the tools used in the analysis.   
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these economies had to go through before they could master the new 
technologies they were adopting from the more advanced industrial nations; it 
sees investment in human and physical capital as a necessary, but far from 
sufficient, part of the assimilation process.  
 
For the Fundamentalists, rising human capital is treated simply as an increase in 
the quality or effectiveness of labor while the Assimilationists see the effects of sharply 
rising educational attainments to provide important pillar for successful 
entrepreneurship. Both neoclassical and assimilationist theories put considerable 
emphasis on investments in human capital. By stressing the importance of innovation 
and learning, and the role of an educated work force in the processes, the assimilationist 
might push even harder on the education front than would a modern neoclassical 
economist (Nelson and Pack 1997).  
Actually it is difficult to assess whether the World Bank Report of East Asian 
Miracle actually endorses or curses the developmental state model in East Asia. Wade 
(1996) stated that the report was written under the influence of three very different 
constituencies: the Japanese government who financed the report; the World-Bank 
economists, and the larger background which include the neoliberal establishment in 
the World Bank, IMF and the Washington establishment.  Rigg (2002) maintains that 
the East Asian Miracle report does not make clear on which particular ideological 
position it justifies, and Wade (1996: 28) considers the report as “…a report that is not 
only in places inconsistent with its argument but one which can also be used to justify a 
range of apparently contradictory positions.”   
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To conclude, the World Bank report actually cannot be interpreted without 
considering the type of political and or government regimes in East Asia. Most, if not 
all East Asian governments and state cannot be classified as ‘democracies’, as they are 
labeled as “Soft Authoritarianism” (in Malaysia and Singapore) or “Authoritarian” in 
Indonesia (Means 1996; Liddle 1996).  As such it is sufficient to say that the 
Governments in East Asia, have massive control over its society and development path, 
notwithstanding the fact that the dichotomy of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ state exists.  
 
2.8 Conclusion: Argumentation Outline 
The large body of research regarding the relationship between education and 
economic growth can be divided into three levels of analysis, which are described 
below. 
2.8.1 The Macro-Aggregate Level (Human-Education-Skills) 
The growth theories developed by mainstream economists (neo-classical, 
endogenous and new-growth theory) tend to fall under this label. The focus of this 
mainstream economies is on the production side or aggregate supply side. The reason is 
that they see economic growth as mostly long-run phenomena, while aggregate 
demand, according to the mainstream, deals only with the short-run period. However, it 
has never been clear what time span ‘long-run’ or ‘short-run’ implies. In dealing with 
this, Mises (1949: 296) argues: 
…we must guard ourselves against the popular fallacy of drawing a 
sharp line between short-run and long-run effects. What happens in the 
short run is precisely the first stages of the chain of successive 
transformations which tend to bring about the long-run effects.  
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The contribution of education towards economic growth in this framework is 
assessed by using the production function (aggregate supply) approach or by applying 
and measuring the total factor productivity concept. 
2.8.2 The Household Level (Human-Education-Allocation) 
This framework is closely related with the ‘Human Capital’ ideas proposed by 
Becker (1964), Ben-Porath (1967) and Mincer (1974). This model explains the cost of 
schooling, which includes not only financial costs, but also ‘opportunity costs’ (i.e. 
‘income foregone’) of schooling. Gary S. Becker wrote that “..on average, three-fourths 
of the private cost—the cost borne by the student and by the student's family—of a 
college education is the income that college students give up by not working.”48 
A rather complicated issue is that the students, as the ‘consumer’ or ‘investor’ 
of education, do not bear the costs directly; their parents do instead. As such, the 
background of the family is truly important in analyzing the decision for schooling. 
2.8.3 The Ideology-Policy Level (Human-Education-Ideology) 
While economics theory attempts to explain and to understand the phenomenon 
of economic growth, indirectly the knowledge and ideas of ‘economic growth’ affected 
the people in return. These influences appeared more clearly in the policy-making 
process, where the thinking of the elites, either conscious or unconscious, reflects their 
bounded rationality of knowledge that they receive and believe in, especially in the 
developmental context of Southeast Asia. As John Maynard Keynes cited in Formaini 
(2002) stated: 
                                                 
48 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html. 
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The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, 
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, 
who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests 
is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of 
ideas…. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are 
dangerous for good or evil…. 
 
This view is highly related with the ‘developmental state’ paradigm for the East 
Asian countries and for viewing history from the elites perspective. 
2.8.4 The Institutional Level (Human-Education-Institution/Culture) 
The structuralist, as well as other historian or political scientist, falls into this 
category. Simon Kuznets (1941) stresses the importance of history in understanding the 
economic growth process. Without history, the economic analysis of growth would 
remain ‘out-of-context’, it would not describe the ‘reality’ and ‘contextual’ meanings 
following the quantitative analysis of the growth process. However most current 
mainstream economists seem to neglect history, like McCloskey (1976: 434) (cited in 
Fine 2000) argues: 
Smith, Marx, Mill, Marshall, Keynes, Heckscher, Schumpeter, and 
Viner, to name a few, were nourished by historical study and nourished it 
in turn. Gazing down from Valhalla it would seem to them bizarre that 
their heirs would study economics with the history left out … Yet this is 
what happened. It began in the 1940s, in some respects earlier, as young 
American economists bemused by revolution in the substance and 
method of economics neglected the reading of history in favor of 
macroeconomics, mathematics, and statistics 
 
One weakness of this approach is that the theories were developed from the 
successful experience of the developing countries. Landau (2003: 218), on the other 
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hand, argues that “…what needs to be explained is not growth but the failure to grow, 
the failure to engage in the natural process of investment and innovation.” 
This view stresses the importance of institution in understanding growth. 
However, recent findings by Blaeser et. al. (2004: 275) suggest that actually growth 
could lead to institutional improvement and is feasible without institutional 
improvement. Also Rassool (1999) (cited in Bruthiaux 2000: 272) argues that the 
Rostow (1960) model has often prevented the developing countries from defining their 
own development goals and paths in their own terms through its ‘value-free’ model of 
economic development that later on led these countries to failure. 
Education would create the society needed for ‘taking-off’ into modernization. 
Education could also be seen as the prerequisite or sufficient condition for the 
mushrooming of innovative ideas, entrepreneurship, and to start-off and maintain the 
‘creative destruction’ process. 
2.9 Concluding Remarks 
As economic growth includes wide arrays of changes and transformations, its 
relationship with education requires a clear argumentation outline from the large body 
of research. Constructing a four level of analysis  between education and growth would 




Chapter 3 The Economic Growth Process in 
Indonesia 
The Economic Growth Process in Indonesia  
 
This chapter examines the process and progress of the Indonesian economy. The 
focus would be on analyzing the source of growth during the respective periods. Oil 
revenue was important in financing the Indonesian economy during Soekarno and 
Soehartos’ period, up to the deregulation period in the 1980s. After deregulation, 
(manufacturing) non-oil export replaced oil export as the growth engine, supported by 
the globalization era in the 1990s. The crisis in 1997 seemed to halt economic progress 
in Indonesia, with investment activities dilapidated and growth was left to rely only on 
private consumption. 
3.1 Soekarno’s period 
After independence in 194549, the first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, had 
put more effort in the nation-building process rather than to boost economic 
performance.  Soekarno was described to have little interest in economics and 
mismanaged the economy such that the Indonesian economy had ‘disintegrated’ under 
                                                 
49 Some authors considered Indonesia to become a sovereign state in 1949 (for example, see Higgins 
(1957: xi) and Sato (2003: 3)). 
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his rule (Fisher 1967: 155). Despite Soekarno’s vice president, M. Hatta50, was actually 
an economist by training, not much has been documented regarding economic policies 
or achievements during Soekarno’s administration.51 Nevertheless, in 1956, in his 
opening speech for the first elected Parliament on March 26, Soekarno showed some 
interest in seriously managing the economy, as he said that Indonesia is now entering a 
new phase of ‘planning and investment52 (Higgins 1957: xxi). 
Veig (1963) groups Indonesia with other countries like China, India, Pakistan, 
Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma as ‘underdeveloped’ and backward . Veig 
(1963: 54) only praises the Israelis, Lebanese, Nationalist Chinese, and the Filipinos as 
maybe having gotten through the problem of poverty and underdevelopment such that 
they could be regarded as ‘masters of their own economic destiny’. The cause of such 
miserable conditions, according to Veig, is the absence of managerial skills, climate, 
and efficient bureaucracy.  
Others, like Benjamin Higgins, a former monetary and fiscal advisor for 
Indonesian government in the late 1950s, also helped to build the first Indonesian 
government five-year development plan (under Soekarno). He also co-authored 
Indonesia: The Crisis of the Millstones (1963) in which he described the country as a 
“chronic dropout” and “the number one failure among the major underdeveloped 
countries” (in Hill 2000). Despite the criticism, Higgins (1963: 48) actually praises 
Indonesia: “How was it possible for a country with such fertile soil, and so varied 
                                                 
50 Hatta was once considered “the man who direct the Republics economic policies by virtue of his 
position as chairman of the Economic Planning Board”. (Wolf 1947, p.184). 
51 This lack of documentation was probably also related to the ‘history misalignment’ by the Soeharto 
government. But it also could be due to the fact that shows the little interest that Soekarno had on 
economic matters. 
52 At that time per capita income of Indonesia is about $100 per year. 
73
mineral and energy resources, inhabited by an intelligent and gifted people, to be so 
poor?”.  
In 1950, the structure of Indonesian economy was shattered because of the war. 
Java Bank in Booth (1996) estimates the production by sector as a percentage of pre-
war levels: 
 
Foodcrop Production  : 70-75 percent 
Smallholder tree crops : 30-35 percent 
Estate agriculture  : 20-25 percent 
Fisheries   : 50 percent 
Mining   : 20 percent 
Industry    : 30-35 percent 
 
With this condition, the business or private sector could not be expected to 
support economic growth and development. Low savings mean low investment, and the 
financial sector has only started to be restructured. It is natural then to expect that the 
performance of the economy would be very much dependent on the state capability to 
manage and to actively improve the business activities. But again, the state’s ability 
depends on its budget, one concept that Soekarno had failed to realize, leading to 
soaring deficit and inflation in the end of his administration53. 
                                                 
53 The Soekarno’s administration relied  primarily on the central bank to finance the government’s 
budget deficit from the mid-1950s onwards (Fane 1994). 
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3.1.1 Role of investment and industrialization 
The process of economic development and its policies in Indonesia is very 
much affected by the so-called neo-classical and liberal economics framework, with 
much emphasis put on capital and industrialization. As early as May 1956, as Ir. 
Djuanda (the Minister of National Planning at that time) presented the five-year 
development plan for 1956-1960 to the cabinet, the importance of capital was 
highlighted. The plan had set investment target at 6% for the first five-year plan54, then 
consecutively 8.6%, 12%, 16.2% and finally 20% when the five-year plan would be 
expected to end in 1975 with an increase in ICOR to 4:1.  In the first five-year plan, 
total investment was expected to reach Rp 30 billion (Rp 6 billion p.a.). This 
investment was expected to raise national income by 3%, where the implicit 
incremental capital output ratio was 2:1. The emphasis put on industrialization was also 
evident from the fact that industry and mining received 25% of the total budget whereas 
agriculture only received 13%. (Higgins 1956, 1957). Higgins (1957: 50) describes the 
1975 period to be “a stage of self generating expansion”. 
The beginning of capitalist orientation of Indonesian development planning was 
probably due to the strong influence from international advisers from the IFIs 
(International Financial Institutions). Benjamin Higgins, one of M.I.T. economists 
heading the Indonesia Project in July 1955 financed by the Ford Foundation and a 
Visiting Professor of Economics, maintains that: 
Economic Development is largely a matter of capital accumulation or net 
investment. No doubt improvement of labor skills by training, and 
provision of incentives for more and better work, can do much to raise 
productivity and standards of living. But the dramatic economic progress 
                                                 
54 During the period 1951-55, net capital formation was 5-6% of GNP, and the annual increase in GNP 
was around 3%. The ICOR for this period then would be less than 2:1 (Higgins 1957: 48). 
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in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the New 
World during the 19th and 20th, has resulted mainly from technological 
progress of a kind involving net investment in plant and equipment of a 
labor-saving type. Even in agriculture, where great strides have been 
made during the last century, this statement holds (Higgins 1957: 54) 
 
Higgins also pointed out the need of Indonesia to industrialize (which would 
imply again the importance of capital), as he writes: 
The problems of Indonesian agricultural society cannot be solved by 
agricultural programs alone…..Only industrialization can turn the 
(dynamic) disguised unemployment into productive work. (p.81) 
 
The role of foreign investment during Soekarno period was also said to be 
‘minimal’. The cabinet under Ali Sastroamidjojo (1953-1955) was said to be the 
beginnings of ‘a more militant policy towards foreign investment’ (Thee 1996: 327). 
FDI in Indonesia basically stopped after 1941, with no replacement of 
investment activities by the domestic sector (Mackie 1996: 339).  This has contributed 
to the economic stagnation during Soekarno period. If not because of oil, no FDI, and 
probably no investment activities would have occurred during Soekarno period. During 
the ‘Guided Democracy’, the business climate was even worse for any business 
investment attempts as Soekarno nationalized all Dutch businesses in 1958. Only public 
investment has occurred during this period, for example Gresik cement in the 1950s 
and some minor Bappindo projects (Mackie 1996: 340). 
The lack of investment was also caused by the high degree of unused capacity 
in the industrial sector that had reach more than 70% in 1966 (McCawley 1981: 64). As 
McCawley (1981: 63-64) notes: 
General conditions for manufacturing industries during the fifties and 
sixties were poor. The overall economic and political climate was highly 
uncertain and official policy was increasingly to favour public sector 
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manufacturing activities … Throughout the early sixties foreign reserves 
were low, so tight controls were imposed on the allocation of foreign 
exchange which caused shortages of imported raw materials and spare 
parts.  
 
This lack of investment could be seen as one of the barriers for government or 
businesses to generate sufficient employment in the more productive sectors in the 
economy. Indeed, manufacturing labor shares between the 1931 and 1961 Population 
Censuses had actually been declining (Booth 1996: 420). 
It could be concluded that during Soekarno’s period, Indonesia’s economic 
policy was inward-looking with most of its government budget revenues depending 
heavily on foreign trade (Booth and McCawley 1981: 126). Often, the government had 
to increase tariffs to offset state budget deficits, which also pressured imports (Sato 
2003: 10). With limited revenue base, the government could not afford to support 
industrialization process as deficits worsened. Most of economic policies in this period 
were heavily ‘nationalistic’55 in that they tried to improve the entrepreneurship of the 
Indonesian indigenous people. This was achieved by granting selective import licenses. 
But due to limited capital56 and business skills, these indigenous businessmen instead 
sold their licenses to the Chinese for a profit instead. This could be the starting point for 
the emerging ‘socially unproductive rent-seekers’. (Thee 1996: 317) 
In 1958, the government also officially nationalized all the Dutch assets. This 
could be seen as the beginning of the development of State Owned Enterprises (SOE). 
                                                 
55 For example in 1951-56 the government introduced the ‘Benteng’ programme. Even the government 
only predicted that the maximum successful rate of this programme was only 30%. (Thee 1996: 317). 
Under this policy the number of pribumi importers jumped from 145 to 800 in 1953 and further to 3,500 
at the end of 1954. (Sato 2003: 6) 
56 To support the indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs, the government actually had established new 
credit institutions land banks like Bank Industri Negara and Bank Negara Indonesia 1946. (Thee 1996: 
318). 
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There were 489 enterprises turned into SOEs in total, comprising 216 plantations, 161 
mining and manufacturing, 40 trading and 16 insurance companies. One of the SOE’s 
control of imported consumer goods represented 70% of total import at that time. In 
1960 the number of SOEs had reached 986 (Sato 2003: 8-9). However, later on, most of 
these SOEs seemed to perform more as liabilities rather than assets. 
Looking at the economic indicators at this period (1953-65), manufacturing 
growth record was not too dismal, with more than 8% share of GDP and around 2% 
rate of growth p.a., (for details  refer to Table 3-1). Booth (1996) provided different 
annual average growth rate for mining and manufacturing during 1953-57 that differs 
markedly in her previous calculation; where mining and quarrying grew at 25.6% and 
manufacturing grew at 13.9% p.a (Table 3-2).  One possibility was that the period 
1958-59 has such a low economic growth such that it affected the growth calculation. 
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Table 3-1Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Origin (Constant Prices) in 
percentage 
Share Growth Sector of Production 
1953a 1960 1965 1953-59 1960-65 
Agriculture 56.9 53.9 52.4 3.0 1.4 
(Foodcrops) na 34.3 33.1 na 4.2 
(Other)  19.6 19.3 na 1.8 
Mining 2.3 3.7 3.7 5.3 2.1 
Manufacturing 8.5 8.4 8.3 1.9d 2.1d 
Electricity, gas, water b 0.3 0.4 na na 
Construction 1.6 2 1.7  -1.3 
Transport 3.8 3.7 3.5  0.8 
Trade 13c 14.3 15.7  3.8 
Other services 13.9 13.7 14.3  2.8 
Total 100 100 100 3.2 2.0 
GDP (Rp billion, current 
prices) 
84 390 23710   
a\ 1953 data are for Net Domestic Product at factor cost. 
b\ included in manufacturing. 
c\ Includes banking, insurance, and real estate.  
d\Includes electricity, water and gas. 
Source: 1953-9: UN, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1960, New York, 1961. 
!960-77: various issues of the BIES. As quoted in Booth and McCawley (1981). 
 
Table 3-2 Sectoral growth rates, 1953-57 
Sector Annual average 
growth rate 
Percentage breakdown 
of sectoral contribution 
to total growth 
Agriculture 2.8 34 
Mining and Quarrying 25.6 13 
Manufacturing 13.9 27 
Other 4.2 26 
GDP (factor cost) 5.0 100 
GNP (market prices) 5.6  
GDP (Van der Eng) 2.3  
Note: GNP (market prices) refers to 1950/55. 
Source: GDP data: United Nations, 1960: 114; GNP data: World Bank, 1976: 122; 
Van der Eng, 1992: 369. As quoted in Booth (1996). 
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3.1.2 Role of Natural Resources 
Most Indonesians during early independence, and probably up to the oil boom 
period, would feel indifferent with any development plans because they felt that 
Indonesia was rich with natural resources57. As the lyrics of a song by Koes Ploes in the 
1970s describes: 
Bukan lautan, hanya kolam susu/Kail dan jala cukup 
menghidupimu/Tiada badai tiada topan kau temui/Ikan dan udang 
menghampiri dirimu/Orang bilang tanah kita tanah surga/Tongkat kayu 
dan batu jadi tanaman. 
 
Translation in English: It is not sea, it is only a milk pond / No hurricane 
and typhoon will you encounter / Fish and shrimp come willingly to you 
/ People say our land is the land of heaven / Wooden stick and stone 
could turn into plant 
 
Higgins (1957: 53) corrects this view by saying that the interpretation should be 
that “Indonesia has a wide variety of resources”. Higgins then added that it was unclear 
whether the quality, quantity, and location of those natural resources could stand to 
meet the needs of more than 80 million people at that time. 
Different with most of the neoclassical economists, M. Hatta, Indonesia’s first 
vice-president in 1945 and probably the first formally trained Indonesian economists 
stated natural resources as one of the main ingredients for development, as he said in 
his speech in 1946 58: 
A country’s economy would depend generally on three pillars. The first 
is the richness of its soil, second: its position relative to other countries in 
the international community. Third: the nature and skills of its people as 
well as its aspirations (Hatta 1946). 
 
                                                 
57 Even Joseph Stiglitz, a former World Bank economist, in 2004 also said that Indonesia was rich with 
natural resources. http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/indonesia/IndonesiaAgarFokus.pdf 
58 "Ekonomi Indonesia di Masa Datang”, Pidato Wakil Presiden RI tanggal 3 Februari 1946, in Sri-Edi 
Swasono, et al. (eds.), Mohammad Hatta: Demokrasi Kita, Bebas Aktif, Ekonomi Masa Depan (Jakarta: 
UI-Press, 1992), pp. 5-8. 
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During Soekarno’s period, no new crops were actually developed to replace the 
traditional export commodities to support development, even forty years later after 
1930. Oil exports did help, but due to a lack of foreign investment and capital invested, 
these oil exports did not improve much until the late 1960s (Mackie 1996: 340). Rubber 
was still the main commodity of export, contributing $377 million in 1960, followed by 
oil export of $221 milliom. For a detailed account of export commodities and values,  
refer to Table 3-3 and 3-4. 
 
Table 3-3 Exports of Main Commodities, 1960. 1969/70-1971/2 (USD million) 
  
 


























st       % % 
Rubber 377 325 258 266 (52) (119) (111) (20.6) 3.1 
Copra 29 22 32 34 (7) 3 5  45.5 6.3 
Coffee 14 60 74 76 46 60 62  23.3 2.7 
Tobacco 29 19 22 24 (10) (7) (5) 15.8 9.1 
Palm oil, 
kernel 24 29 36 37 5 12 13  20.7 2.8 
Pepper 11 10 7 10 (1) (4) (1) (30.0) 42.9 
Tin 54 56 66 68 2 12 14  17.9 3.0 
Tea 28 6 15 15 (22) (13) (13) 150.0  
Timber -- 53 110 155 53 110 155  107.6 40.9 
Other non-
oil 54 79 100 115 25 46 61  26.6 15.0 
Total non-
oil 620 659 720 800 39 100 180  9.3 11.1 
Oil gross 221 380 440 508 159 219 287  15.8 15.5 
net  (87) (122) (145)      
Total 
(gross) 841 1,039 1,160 1,308 198 319 467  12.9 12.2 
Total (inc. net oil) (746) (842) (945)           
Source: 1960: Bank Indonesia, Monthly Bulletin; 1969/70-1971/2: Nota Keuangan, 
January 1971; in Survey of Recent Developments, BIES, Vol 7 no 1, March 1971. 
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Table 3-4 Foreign Trade of Indonesia (1960 - June1964) in USD million 
  1960 1961 1962 1963 
1964 (1st 
half) 
Exports (total) 840 784 682 696 324
Exports (excl. 
petroleum) 619 524 471 427 226
Imports, c.i.f. 574 794 647 502 n.a.
Index of export volume 
(1958=100) 98 109 95 98 92
Source: International Financial Statistics, May 1965 in Survey of Recent 
Developments, BIES, No 1 June 1965 (Exports in 1964 were slightly lower than in 
1963). 
3.1.3 Assessment of growth 
Looking back, the record of growth performance during Soekarno’s period was 
not too encouraging. Booth and McCawley (1981: 2) note that (after periods of 
economic stagnation) by 1959 national income in Indonesia was only 20% higher than 
195359, and that the most rapid and sustained period of growth happened in the decade 
of 1967-77. Mackie (1996: 336-8) views the year 1957-63 as the beginning of a slide 
towards worsening inflation and currency depreciation as Soekarno marched to his 
‘Guided Economy’ and ‘Socialism a la Indonesia’ concepts in 195960. 
During Soekarno’s period, agriculture was still the dominant sector in the 
economy, followed by trade61 and manufacturing. But the growth rate p.a. for 
manufacturing started to rise in 1960-65 and later on surpassed the trade sector in 1965-
71 (see Table 1.1. in Booth 1981: 4). Booth (1996) concludes that the Indonesian 
economy during 1940-1965 to be retrogressed structurally based on the rising-share of 
                                                 
59 Nevertheless, Mackie (1996: 336) noted that the years 1950-57 Indonesia achieved a quite impressive 
recovery and economic growth despite the inflationary pressures.  
60 In 1956/57 there was also an attempt to implement Indonesia’s first five year development plan. 
(Mackie 1996: 336). 
61 The high share of trade in the economy should be interpreted carefully. Booth (1996: 419) argues that 
by 1960s many of the components in trade sector were actually performing the function of ‘last resort 
employers’.  
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labor-intensive production. Many of the increases in Indonesia’s output production 
during this period came from the labor-intensive sector (reaching as high as 76%), with 
a net reduction of capital facilities in the capital intensive sector, outside the petroleum 
industry (Paauw 1960 cited in Booth 1996).  
In the end Soekarno failed to bring the Indonesian economy on track. 
Incoherent economic policies and political upheavals, triggered also by the drop in 
export commodity prices62 had caused the economy to collapse in the early 1960s; the 
industrial plan had stagnated, the government budget deficit soared63, and inflation 
reached almost 600% in 1965 (Temple 2001). From mid-1952 to mid-1954, Higgins 
(1957: xii) notes that ‘..Indonesia lost foreign exchange reserves at a faster rate than 
any other country in the world”. During the 1950s, Indonesia was also very dependent 
on only a few natural resources export commodities such that the fluctuations of these 
commodities adversely affected the national economy. This economic mismanagement 
had cost the Soekarno government dearly, leading to declining political support to the 
government. Soon after, the Soekarno’s administration was replaced by Soeharto.64 
                                                 
62 The price of rubber, Indonesia’s largest export at that time, dropped in each successive year until 1954, 
after reached its peak in 1951. At the same time, the price of other raw material also decline, upsetting 
the Sumitro Plan for industrialization (Fisher 1967: 173). Minister of Trade and Industry Sumitro 
Djojohadikusomo (in Muhammad Natsir Cabinet of Masyumi Party, 1950-51) presented in 1951 the 
Emergency Economic Plan (Rentjana Urgensi Perekonomian), followed by an Interim Report of the 
Committee on Industrialization (Laporan Interim Panitia Industrialisasi). A liberalist view of 
development actually projected from both documents, were state capital was regarded only as the 
temporary complement to private capital. (Sato 2003: 7). 
63 The Indonesian budget was in deficit since 1952. The deficit was Rp 2.0 billion in 1953, 3.6 billion in 
1954, 2.8 billion in 1956, and Rp 1.6- 6.0 billion in 1957. (Higgins 1957: xiv-xv). In 1951, helped by the 
Korean War, the surplus in budget was evident. 
64 The reason for the fall of Soekarno in 1965 was a complex and debatable issue. Official sources would 
pointed out that the fall was more related to the revolt by the communist party (PKI/G30S). However, 
should the Soekarno’s administration have been able to manage the economy better, he could have 
survived the revolt.  
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3.2 Soeharto’s period 1965-1998 
Soeharto’s regime, also known as the ‘New Order’, was in power from 1965-
1998 and is to be considered an authoritarian regime. Sato (2003) writes that Soeharto 
“…drastically shifted Indonesia’s economic system from ‘Indonesian Socialism’ to 
capitalism”. During his leadership, Soeharto was able to maneuver both the army and 
the parliament to be always in coherence with his decisions and policies. Having taken 
power from Soekarno in times of crisis and instability in 1965, Soeharto promised two 
main goals for the Indonesian society: stability and development65 (often also quoted as 
economic growth). In order to provide legitimacy and justification of his authoritarian 
style Soeharto reconstructed the path of capitalist development by inviting foreign 
investment to resolve the 1966 economic crisis in the form of the Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia (IGGI). The new regime also abandoned its nationalist policies in 
politics and economics and encouraged foreign investment through the foreign capital 
investment law enacted on January 1, 1967. 
After Soeharto took over, the GDP per capita in Indonesia had indeed grown 
substantially. After a negative growth in 1967, GDP per capita in Indonesia grew 
significantly, with only two years of negative growth, in 1982 and in the end of 
Soeharto’s leadership in 1998. Investments had also grown continuously, fueled by the 
oil boom revenue and massive FDI. 
                                                 
65 Abbot (2001) regard Soeharto as following ‘developmental legitimacy’ as Soeharto consequently 
reversing Soekarno’s ‘politics as commander’ dogma, with putting economic development first before 
political development.  
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Figure 3-1 Growth in GDP per capita, Indonesia, 1961-1998 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2000) cited in Temple (2001). 
Figure 3-2 Gross domestic investment (% of GDP) 1960-1998 
 
Source: World Development Indicators (2000) cited in Temple (2001). 
 
Manufacturing was expected to become the engine of growth in Indonesia. The 
benefits of developing a strong manufacturing sector have been put forward by many 
economists (Syrquin and Chenery 1975, Lewis 1954). The growing of the 
manufacturing sector is to be viewed as beneficial for a country through various 
channels. Firstly, manufacturing is viewed to be more productive compared with the 
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traditional rural sector. Secondly, manufacturing creates the incentive for learning-by-
doing – by creating strong demands on skills and so accelerates human capital 
accumulation (Wood and Berge 1997 cited in Auty and Kiiski 2001: 20). 
Officially, agriculture had always been the first `priority of the Soeharto 
administration as it was stated in the Repelita, the official planning document (Hill 
2000, Prawiro 1998). In Repelita, which started in 1968, agriculture had always been 
put forward as the main engine of development, as a base for the national economy. 
This was, at that time, not common for development policies in the Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs), which would usually put emphasis on industrialization (Prawiro 
1998: 189).  
The agricultural policy66 during Soeharto always emphasized the achievement 
of one goal: ‘rice self-sufficiency’ (‘swasembada beras’). Rice67 is an important staple 
food for most Indonesians, except in Irian Jaya and Maluku province where sago palm 
flour, sweet potatoes and cassava are prefered68. Institutions, such as BULOG-Badan 
Urusan Logistik (National Food Logistics Agency) and KUD-Koperasi Unit Desa 
(Rural Cooperatives) were invented to assist the agriculture in terms of price stability 
and finance, respectively. The view that agriculture was always being ‘left-behind’ or 
‘marginalized’ in Indonesia development process69 seems to come from the fact that 
despite the drop in the share of agriculture in national income, a majority of Indonesian 
                                                 
66 Some of the key objectives of agricultural policy in Indonesia are low and stable food prices, rural 
development, employment generation, poverty alleviation, and generating foreign exchange earnings 
(Kustiari, Erwidodo and Bahri 1997). 
67 Rice consumption at in Indonesia is at 115 kg/capita/year, the highest among Asia countries (China 80 
kg, Korea 70 kg, Japan 60 kg) www.lead.org. A focus on rice has often been associated with the concept 
of ‘food security’, which according to Timmer (2004) has supported the Indonesian economic growth. 
68 http://www.sallys-place.com/food/ethnic_cusine/indonesia.htm  
69 For example see Arifin (2004) and Alimi (2004). 
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households still relies on this sector, such that their welfare would be lagging behind 
their counterparts in the industrial sector. 
3.2.1 Narratives in Indonesian Economy during Soeharto. 
Hill (2000: 15-16) divides the Indonesian economy from 1966-1990s into 
several episodes as will be described in the following sections. 
3.2.1.1 Rehabilitation and recovery (1966-1970). 
The main economic policy objective in this period was to stabilize the economy 
by controlling inflation. The government successfully achieved this by applying 
orthodox monetary and fiscal policies. In the early phase of development planning, 
Soeharto set up the ‘balanced-budget’ principle for the government budget (APBN). In 
fact, the term ‘balance’, could be misleading. That is because the government put 
‘foreign aid’ as part of its ‘revenues’ (Prawiro 2004, Hill 2000). Nevertheless, it did 
prevent the government from borrowing domestically as it had done excessively in the 
Soekarno era. 
Budget is one of the most important prerequisites and documents in 
development planning. While revenue is important and maybe the final determinant of 
policy preferences and outputs, Dick (2003) writes that: 
Revenue is the sine qua non of the (nation-) state. Without revenue, the 
state cannot maintain armed forces to defend its borders, provide internal 
security, sustain a bureaucracy, invest in essential infrastructure or offer 
the minimum level of services to retain popular compliance. 
 
The attempt to deregulate investment in 1967 had successfully increased 
investment activities in Indonesia. The law deregulating FDI was enacted with the Law 
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No. 1/1967 to encourage FDI to Indonesia by foreign investors. The law, however, still 
protected the oil and gas, banking, insurance and leasing industries. 70 The law was the 
first regulation about FDI since Indonesia’s independence in 1945. At the beginning of 
the FDI law, many of the FDI were flowing in the synthetic fibers and other spinning-
sectors (Ishida 2003). During the1960s and 1970s, the majority of FDI in Indonesia was 
concentrated in the petroleum sector (oil and natural gas) (Rajenthran 2002).  
The year 1966 also marked the building of Indonesia’s financial system, as 
Hamada (2003: 2) notes: 
The year 1966 saw the emergence of commercial banks in Indonesia. It 
can be said that before 1966 a financial system hardly existed, a fact 
commonly attributed to economic disruptions like the consecutive runs 
of fiscal deficit and hyperinflation under the Soekarno Administration. 
After 1996, with the inauguration of Soeharto, a regulatory system of 
financial legislation, e.g. central banking law and banking regulation, 
was introduced and implemented, and the banking sector that is the basis 
of the current financial system in Indonesia was built up.” 
 
In this period, agriculture remained the dominant sector of the economy, 
followed by manufacturing and mining. Even then, the domestic investment figures, 
showed a very high activity in industry, with 48 industrial investments underway 
reaching a value of Rp 13 billion, which was the largest investment activity in 1968-
1970.  
3.2.1.2 Rapid Growth (1971-1981). 
In this period the economic growth (real GDP) had consistently reached a 
minimum of 5% growth p.a., with a 7.7% growth average (Hill 2000).71 The oil price 
                                                 
70 http://esf.niwi.knaw.nl/esf1997/projects/indonesia/investment/lain/ikht.html  
71 It is important to note, however, that manufacturing employment in urban areas of Indonesia actually 
declined from 684,000 in 1961 to 662,000 in 1971 (Sundrum 1975: 58). 
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shock had increased the revenue in the central government budget72 (Booth 2005). As 
the government was applying the balanced budget principle, an increase in revenue 
must be followed by an increase in spending; this could have supported the growth.  
The role of foreign aid also added further support to the booming growth in this 
period.73 This period also marks a structural change where industry has begun to 
outpace agriculture as the dominant sector in the economy. But still, government 
contributes the majority of capital formation activities in the oil boom period (Sigit 
2004). 
The increase in oil price however also created inflationary pressures74 in the 
domestic economy, creating a negative effect on the agricultural sector, a phenomenon 
known also as ‘Dutch disease’75. As Timmer (1994) notes: 
Because of the large increases in oil prices in the 1970s, Indonesia's rural 
economy was severely buffeted by declining terms of trade. Price policy 
for rice, the fertilizer subsidy, and a more rural-oriented macro policy 
after 197876 helped overcome the pressures exerted by these exogenous 
changes on Indonesia's macro economy. 
 
As such, the increase in oil revenue, the Dutch-disease, and a couple of ‘rent-
seekers’ had provided incentives and capabilities for the government to pursue an 
                                                 
72 The share of oil and natural gas in Indonesia’s export tumbled down soared reaching the peak of 82% 
in 1981, while the share of oil and natural gas in the state revenue reach the peak of 71% in 1981 (Sato 
2003: 20). 
73 Van der Meulen Rodgers (1994: 4) noted that: “Led by primary export recovery and high foreign aid 
from 1970 to 1972, the first oil boom from 1973 to 1978, and the second oil boom from 1979 to 1981, 
Indonesia experienced strong macroeconomic and export performances in the Primary Boom Period.” 
74 Despite the high rates of inflation since 1973, the foreign exchange rate was held constant until late in 
1978 (Booth 1981: 67). 
75 This squeeze in the non-oil traded sector or “Dutch disease” is sometimes referred to as 
‘deindustrialisation’. (Basri 2002) 
76 One of the policy was the devaluation in November 1978. After the devaluation tradable goods 
(particularly agriculture) production recovered and poverty rates fell (Timmer 2004: 17). 
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import-substitution industrialization77 supported by the state-owned enterprises78. 
Pangestu (1997) notes that79: 
The industrial structure was dominated by large state-owned enterprises 
in strategic industries, such as cement, fertilizers, and steel, which were 
funded by oil revenues, and foreign and domestic companies engaging in 
import-substitution activities in various manufactured products, such as 
textiles, garments, consumer electronics, chemicals, and automobiles. 
  
As an assessment, Indonesia has been quite successful in managing the revenues 
from the oil boom to prevent damaging inflationary shocks. During the 1979-81 oil 
boom more than 40% of the windfall profit was saved abroad (Auty 2004) and invested 
in infrastructure and agricultural services that later on spurred a productivity revolution 
in the rice sector such that Indonesia was able to achieve national self-sufficiency in 
rice production by the mid-1980s (Nathan Associates Inc. 2001). These oil boom 
revenues were also used to finance investments in infrastructure and to supplement or 
replace foreign and domestic private investments in manufacturing (Fane 2004). 
However, some inefficiency did occur, as Lankester (2004) writes: 
Many billions of oil revenue dollars were wasted on loss-making projects 
in the public, industrial sector. Yet the Government – unlike many 
developing country oil producers – also spent large amounts on 
productive development. There was massive spending on new primary 
schools and health clinics and on rural infrastructure. 
 
In the early 1970s, traditional light consumer goods (processed food, beverages, 
tobacco and weaving) that were resistant to economic slumps dominated the 
manufacturing sector (Bresnan 1993). The year 1974 marked the critical path where 
Indonesia had turned from a quasi-liberal economy to a more statist-nationalist 
                                                 
77 The oil revenue also created a ‘dual’ industrialization. Most SOEs preferred a capital-intensive 
resource-based industry (RBI) rather than job-intensive light industry. (Auty 2004) 
78 The Soeharto government inherited more than 900 state enterprises spawned during the Soekarno era. 
(Sato 2003: 13) 
79 http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-68161-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html 
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economy (Lankaster 2004). As a result, since 1975, industrial growth in some parts of 
the modern sector appears to have slowed (Booth 1981: 67). The SOEs experienced a 
fast development between 1979-1985, with their total assets growing at 25% p.a., and 
their sales were 20-30% of GDP (Soesastro, et.al. 1988 cited in Bresnan 1993). This 
inward-oriented industrialization strategy80 was able to provide a relatively sustained 
economic growth during the 1971- 1981 period81. As such the growth in the oil-boom 
period had originated mainly from the aggregate demand side (from investment 
demand, consumption demand) and a high import-substitution effect (Jacob 2004).  
The abundance of oil revenues also prevented the attempted consolidation on 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). State enterprises had an important role to play in the 
manufacturing sector. According to 1974-75 census, about 20% of employees in the 
large and medium sectors worked in state enterprises, creating around 25% of value 
added in the respective sectors (McCawley 1981: 74). Lewis (1994: 5) argues that “the 
rapid industrial growth achieved during the boom period occurred in SOE-dominated 
activities such as oil refining, petrochemicals, fertilizer, steel, and the like”. 82 
This period also highlighted the importance of oil in the Indonesian economy. 
Aside from being the dominant export commodity, oil also acted as ‘collateral’ for 
Indonesia to attract FDI, foreign grants and loans (Bresnan 1993: 283). 
                                                 
80 Fane (1996) noted that in “the late 1970s and early 1980s, Indonesia’s economic policy became 
increasingly inward looking as the government pursued a strategy of import substitution”.  
81 Ishida (2003: 4) argued that “import substitution initially becomes necessary for a modern 
manufacturing industry to grow out of conventional sectors including agriculture and simple, primary 
processed products… Industrialization of the modern sector begins with import substitution, which calls 
for construction of domestic factories for manufacturing products that previously had to be imported.”  
82 The emphasis was on achieving production targets and creating capacity in “upstream” input-
supplying industries, rather than on fostering efficient, competitive firms. Concern over profitability was 
virtually non-existent, and SOE managers were instead burdened with numerous “non-economic” 
objectives of the government: regional development, price stabilization, control of “strategic” industries, 
encouraging pribumi (native or indigenous) entrepreneurship, and others (Lewis 1994: 5-6). 
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This period also marked the beginning of industrialization process in Indonesia. 
In 1973-78, as noted by Van der Meulen Rodgers (1994), the share of industrial sector 
in GDP had overtaken agriculture as the main sector in the economy (refer to table 3-5). 
However, the industrial sector in this data also included mining, which includes the oil 
industry.  
Table 3-5 Indonesian Real GDP Composition and Growth, 1970-1990 
Panel A: Structure of Production (Average Shares of GDP)  
 1970-72 1973-78 1979-81 1982-85 1986-90 
      
Agriculture 42.0% 31.1% 24.9% 23.2% 23.4% 
/GDP      
Industry 21.6% 33.0% 40.2% 38.2% 36.8% 
/GDP      
Services 36.4% 35.8% 34.9% 38.6% 39.8% 
/GDP      
      
(Manufacturing 10.1% 10.4% 12.2% 13.8% 18.0% 
/GDP)      
      
      
Panel C: Structure of Demand (Average Shares of GDP)  
 1970-72 1973-78 1979-81 1982-85 1986-90 
      
Private 77.4% 67.0% 59.0% 60.1% 56.7% 
Consumption      
Gross Domestic 16.1% 19.4% 23.9% 27.7% 32.6% 
Investment      
Government 9.0% 10.2% 11.0% 10.8% 9.5% 
Consumption      
Net Exports -2.5% 3.4% 6.1% 1.4% 1.2% 
Notes: Industry includes mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities. Services include trade, 
transport, communication, financial services, and other community services.    
Sources: The World Bank, World Tables, International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistica, cited in Van der Meulen Rodgers (1994). 
 
Imports have been inseparable from industrialization. Most of raw materials and 
capital goods were still imported (for details refer to Table 3-6). Ishida (2003: 4) writes 
“…construction of modern-sector factories requires imports of machinery and other 
capital goods, and imports of capital goods require foreign currencies, and further, 
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earning foreign currencies requires exports”. This would explain oil’s central role in 
Indonesia’s industrialization. 
Table 3-6 Composition of Growth of Imports 
 
Note: USD values converted into rupiah at the prevailing exchange rate, and deflated by the import price 
index from the National Income Accounts. 
Source: Sundrum (1986). 
 
3.2.1.3 Deregulation phase (1982-1991) 
Hill (2000) divides the year 1982-1991 into two periods, one of adjustment83 
(1982-1985) and one of swift liberalization84 (1986-1991). Starting in 1982, we could 
consider that there was a change in the type of industrialization pursued, with 
government policies favoring an export-oriented strategy. The main push for 
deregulation was the drop in oil prices starting in 1982, and with them declining 
                                                 
83 Nasution (1991: 4) has noted that "during 1982-85 the government mainly used discretionary measures 
such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to repress domestic expenditures in order to improve the current 
account. As expected, these policies caused severe distortions in prices and incentives with significant 
losses in growth not necessarily accompanied by benefits in terms of equity.”  
84 According to Nasution (1991: 4):  “the government changed its strategy in October 1986 and 
introduced a comprehensive internal adjustment program, covering both the supply and demand sides of 
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sharply in 1985-86. This decline in the oil prices had reduced the government budget 
and thus the ability of the government to pursue its inward-looking industrialization 
policy. Van der Meulen Rodgers (1994: 6) wrote: 
In response to lower oil revenues, the government cut expenditures on 
large capital intensive projects, so that between 1982 and 1986 the ratio 
of actual to planned capital expenditures fell from 1.54 to 0.65.  
 
The government attempted two large devaluations in 1983 and 1986, which 
made the terms of trade in favor of export commodities and showed the attempt of the 
government to deregulate the exchange-rate.85 The devaluation in 1986 resulted in a 
doubling of the Non-Oil Export/GDP ratio, from 6 to 12 percent (Van der Meulen 
Rodgers 1994). The increase in non-oil export was also due to the deregulation attempt 
by the government in the trade and investment regulations. 
Rachbini (2003: 65) notes that: 
Before 1983, the industry was developed merely for domestic need in 
line with development strategy at that time. Fertilizer, iron, shipping 
industries and others were constructed based on government initiatives 
without considering their competitiveness (government driven). The need 
to develop industry was judged only by opinion of the minister, 
president, and other policy makers. There was no consideration from 
aspect of the market.  
 
Again, oil seems to be the ‘culprit’ for Indonesia’s drastic change of 
industrialization strategies. Declining oil prices that led to a worsening current 
account86 and budget deficit forced the government to find other sources of foreign 
exchange through non-oil export revenues, which would be more competitive after the 
                                                                                                                                              
the economy.”  
85 The US dollar price of crude oil dropped to only half in period between 1985/86 and 1986/87, causing 
a decline in Indonesia's overall terms of trade that was equivalent to a loss of 10 percent in GNP (Fane 
1994). 
86 Oil (crude petroleum and gas) was the major source of export revenue before the 1980s, reaching up to 
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devaluations. This could be seen as an attempt to secure industrialization, since most of 
the capital goods needed for industry and manufacturing still had to be imported.  
Due to declining oil revenues, many SOEs and mega-projects were reduced and 
postponed. Sato (2003: 20-21) writes: 
Of the 52 mega projects in the heavy industry that Minister of Industry 
Soehoed had planned, 48 totaling US$ 21 billion in investment value had 
to be cancelled or postponed. The state enterprise sector became 
subjected to a review from the point of view of efficiency and possible 
privatization. The number of state enterprises began to decrease in 1985.  
 
As the balance of payment problems faded away, due to deregulation efforts 
and devaluation, Nasution (2003: 11) noted that “financial institutions, the state-owned 
enterprises and private conglomerates began to borrow excessively offshore to invest in 
'mega projects' which produce either non-traded or traded goods for the highly 
protected domestic market”. I would argue that devaluation has provided additional 
incentives to invest in non-traded87 domestic market. Increasing opportunities in mega-
projects during the deregulation period substantially raised the demand for borrowing 
from state banks and international institutions. Barito timber group, a well-connected 
conglomerate, was investing in a pulp and paper plant, worth US$2 billion. It also 
invested in the Chandra Asri petrochemical plant at Merak, West Java, worth US$2.25 
billion, to produce polyester for the highly protected domestic market; and a joint 
venture real estate 'super block' in Jakarta, worth US$1.3 billion.88  It was calculated 
that in 1991, at the height of the debt blowout, mega projects potentially involved 
                                                                                                                                              
¾ of total export revenue (Saxena 2002: 546). 
87 Examples of non-traded sector was property and real estate, electricity and telecommunication, and 
other infrastructures. (Nasution 1991 cited Nasution 2003: 11). Nasution (1998) later considers the high 
rate of GDP growth during the 1990s was mostly associated with the ‘bubble’ industries, including 
construction, public utilities, services in non-traded sector of the economy. 
88 Asiaweek, 14 June 1991 in Nasution (1991). 
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US$70 million in foreign loans. With a debt service ratio of 31% and rapidly growing 
foreign borrowings and debt, the pressures on inflation and the currency were 
increased89. 
 Those ‘heavy-weight’ investment activities brought its toll on the domestic 
supply by creating inflationary pressures. As the economy showed signs of 
‘overheating’, the government tried to pull-back domestic economic activities by 
checking the domestic money supply, cutting the overseas loans for mega projects and 
imposing systems for prudential control in the banking sector. In the so called Sumarlin 
shocks (Tight Money Policy) of 198790 and 1991, the government drastically reduced 
the liquidity of state banks, and in 1991 Rp 8 trillion was withdrawn by state companies 
form 8 state banks, sending interest rates to levels above 30 percent, and slowing 
investment and economic activity as a result. The Sumarlin Shock of 1991 had removed 
Rp 10 trillion liquidity in aggregate from the system (Hill 2000: 298).  
Using the non-oil GDP data, this period could also be seen as the starting point 
of industrialization in Indonesia, where the industrial sector had outpaced agriculture’s 
share in the economy. Growth in 1987-1992 was rapid, reaching 6.7% p.a.; most 
importantly it was achieved in the absence of buoyant oil revenues (Hill 2000: 17). Hill 
(2000: 158) also notes that after 1985, “for the first time in the history of new order, 
exports and the private sector became the primary engines of industrial growth”.  
                                                 
89Tempo 27 July 1991. 
90 This happened because capital flight had precipitated monetary crisis. The 1987 TMP resulted in 
interbank rates up to 45%. In June 1987 foreign investment regulations and the textile export quota were 
liberalized. (Hill 2000: 297). 
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Table 3-7 Structure and Growth in Indonesian Industry, 1975-88 
    
Value added 
structure 






31 Food, etc. 40 27 9.5 3.9
32 Textiles, etc. 13 12 15.3 6.4
33 Wood products 3 13 27.6 17.1
34 Paper products 3 5 28.1 7
35 
Chemicals (excluding 
oil/LNG) 21 16 7.2 6.6
36 Non-metallic minerals 4 4 16.9 8.3
37 Basic metals - 8 57.9 20.3
38 Metal goods 15 14 8.9 7.1
39 Other - - 19.2 20.3
 Total 100 100 13.2 6.7
Notes: ‘-‘ indicates less than 0.5%, value added structure figures derived from current price value 
added; (real) value added growth is obtained by deflating nominal growth by the relevant wholesale 
price index. 
Source: Hill (1992), table 7.1 cited Lewis (1994). 
 
The success of the Indonesian economy in this period, with its ability to grow 
and develop without the help of oil, was not a trivial or mediocre achievement. Rosser 
(1994) even considers Indonesia to be one of the countries that had been able to reverse 
the spell of oil curse. Indeed, despite its ability to generate revenues, oil has been 
considered a ‘curse’ rather than blessing. 
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Figure 3-3 Sectoral Shares in Indonesia’s Non-oil GDP, 1900-99 (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from output data in 1993 prices, Van der Eng (2001). 
Indonesia had also undergone a very extensive financial deregulation in 
1980s91. In October 1988, the government announced a deregulation in the banking-
sector where one of its important provisions was the abolishing of restriction on the 
establishment of new private banks that has previously been prohibited since 196892. 
Also existing banks were allowed to open new branches nationwide (Hamada 2003: 
12). In December 1988, capital markets were deregulated, where the stock market was 
                                                 
91 A deregulated finance sector offered tremendous new-opportunities in banking. The number of 
domestic private banks rose from 66 in 1988 to 166 in 1994. New joint banks with foreign banks also 
increased steadily after1989. Their number reached 40, which was 3.6 times the number of those in 
existence in 1989. (Hamada :13).  Also between 1987 and 1996, private Indonesian banks’ share of total 
credit more than doubled, from 23 percent to 49 percent, while the foreign banks’ combined market share 
more than tripled, from 3 percent to 10 percent (Halim 2001: 19). 
92 The reforms also included a major reduction in the reserve requirements of commercial banks (from 15 
percent to only 2 percent). Before that, in June 1983, the first banking reform has removed interest rate 
controls and credit ceilings for all banks, reduced the liquidity credit, and replaced the ineffective credit 
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privatized and foreigners were allowed to buy stocks on the Indonesian stock exchange. 
That was followed by a clarification in 1989 that foreign purchase of up to 49 percent 
of a company’s shares was allowed, except in the case of bank shares93 (Halim 2001: 
18). These extensive reforms in the financial sector have enabled a freer mobilization of 
savings and investment domestically and from international sources as well, as the 
exchange rate was deregulated and an open capital account being operated.  
3.2.1.4 Overheating economy (1992-1996) 
If we look at Figure 3-4, the effect of financial liberalization is obvious in 
transforming the financial sector. The rate of money supply (M2)94 growth has jumped 
from only less than 30% in 1983-1989 to more than 40% in 1990.  
                                                                                                                                              
ceilings with monetary tools and Bank Indonesia certificates (Halim 2001: 18). 
93 After the deregulation of the stock exchange, “the total annual trading volume had skyrocketed from 
just 1.7 billion shares in 1992 to 29.6 billion in 1997, jumping more than 16 times. The number of listed 
companies rose 70 percent from 153 in 1992 to 288 in 1998, and market capitalisation grew from Rp 
24.8 trillion to Rp 225.2 trillion over the same period” (Halim 2001: 18). 
94 Liabilities of the monetary system consisting of currency and demand deposits are known as "narrow 
money" (M1), while those including quasi money are called "broad money" or "domestic liquidity"(M2). 
Currency consists of legal bank notes and coins excluding cash in the Treasury and commercial banks. 
Demand deposit comprises current accounts, transfers, and mature time and savings deposits in rupiah, 
held by residents with the monetary system. Quasi money consists of time and savings deposits in rupiah 
and foreign currency held by residents with commercial banks.  
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Figure 3-4 M2 growth, Credit growth and Foreign Liablity of Banks 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (1998). 
  
However, in 1991 the M2's growth rate dropped to around 20% and remained 
constant until 1994 and then rose again to almost 30% in 1995 and 1996. This was 
caused by the Tight Money Policy that was being adopted by the government by raising 
interest rate to halt the expansion of credits due to 'over-heating' of the economy after 
the start of banking deregulation.95 
 We also notice that the share of foreign liabilities of banks (as a percentage of total 
liabilities) also increased due to financial deregulations moving from only 3% in 1983-
89 to 11% in 1990. However, despite the Tight Money Policy, this share stood 
constantly at around 10%, reflecting a shift of financing sources in tapping more 
foreign capital. If we examine Figure 3-5, we would see that there was a reversed trend 
starting in 1990 concerning the commercial banks' foreign assets and liabilities. Before 
                                                 
95 Generally, in a over-heating economy inflation is relatively high, the real exchange rate is appreciated, 
the current account deficit has widened, domestic credit has been growing at a rapid pace, and asset 
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1990, the share of foreign assets is higher than the share of foreign liabilities. The 
reverse trend happened since 1990, when the shares of commercial banks' foreign 
liabilities were higher than its foreign assets and the gap between the two also seemed 
to widened. 
Figure 3-5 Bank’s Liabilities and Assets 
 
 Source: International Monetary Fund (1998). 
 
Thus, it seems that there was a tendency to use more foreign debts since the 
Tight Money Policy was implemented by the government. This could provide 
significant pressure toward the exchange rate in the subsequent years to follow if the 
foreign debt was not managed carefully.  
 Indeed, Indonesia seems to be having problem with its debt management. 
Indonesia’s private debt increased to $55.5 billion in 1996 from $44.5 billion in 1995. 
The bulk of the debt was in the form of short-term debt reaching an amount of 62%; 
                                                                                                                                              
prices have often been inflated (IMF 1998). 
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this percentage actually remained constant since 1992. This condition shows the 
vulnerability of Indonesian private sector. 
The flourishing of the banking sector in the previous periods, however, was 
weakened by the low quality of investment flowing from the credit of banks. Most of 
banks and mega-projects in Indonesia were still shadowed by significant leakage and 
inefficiencies due to the 'rent-seekers' and predatory bureaucrats. To some degree it is 
logical that large conglomerates and politico-business families have been best placed to 
take advantage of deregulation because of the capital resources and organizational 
structures they had accumulated within the incubator of state tutelage.  
The inadequate supervision and regulatory measures performed by Bank 
Indonesia (the Central Bank) also seemed to be lagging behind. In other words, 
deregulation was compromised by lack of effective regulation. The big companies such 
as  Golden Key, Kanindo, Bentoel and Mantrusts, all soon to collapse, were high on the 
lists of outstanding debt.96 
 The exercise in financial discipline dramatically raised interest rates and 
restricted access to credit at a time when the big conglomerates and politico-business 
families carried heavy debt exposure, often in the form of short-term loans, exacerbated 
in some cases by the strengthening of the yen. The state banks, however, continued to 
provide access to funds for selected borrowers, often at concessionary rates. 
 The banking sector also faced some problem in its credit expansion. It was 
overly concentrated in the property sector. If in 1993 the total credit to property was 
only Rp 22 trillion with a share of 13.5%, then in the end of 1994 the number has 
jumped to more than 50% reaching Rp 33.5 trillion with a share of 17%. In September 
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1996 the property sector's credit expansion reached 26%, whereas the national credit 
only grew at 16%. All of this would lead to bad debts because the collateral from the 
property sector was basically not liquid.  
 The increased expansion of credit towards the property sector could also be seen 
in the booming of the property sector. The Housing Price Indices showed an increasing 
trend since 1992, where it increased almost 20% in 1993. However, the housing index 
seemed to stagnate in 1996 with only an 8% increase, just the same as the rate of 
inflation.  
Figure 3-6 The Housing Price Indices, 1991-1996 
End of period 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Housing Index 133.74 139.95 163.16 178.57 188.93 198 
Source: Bank Indonesia (BI) statistics at www.bi.go.id. 
 
  The above pressures had significantly weakened the banking sector in terms of 
liquidity. Also, as mentioned before, the higher share of commercial banks' foreign 
liabilities compared to its foreign assets increased the exposure of the domestic banking 
system towards the global macroeconomic condition.  
  
Another important factor in Indonesia was the loose regulation and control by 
the central bank, especially remembering the fact that Indonesia had just began its 
financial deregulation after a long period of financial repression. The banks themselves 
might be less prudent in evaluating and monitoring the credit that has been disbursed, 
especially when the credit was given to their own group of companies. 97 As such, a 
                                                                                                                                              
96Kompas 24 June 1993. 
97 All of these could be labeled the moral hazard problems. 
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triggering (or contagious98) factor of macroeconomic shock99, such as the depreciation 
of the Thai Bath in 1997 could and did bring devastating impact to the Indonesian 
economy which had already been in a condition of weak domestic macroeconomic 
fundamentals100 or vulnerability101. In addition, herd behavior of foreign investors 
probably made the problem worse by increasing capital inflows and outflows to and 
from Indonesia (Nasution 1998). 
In Indonesia many conglomerates had close links with President Soeharto. 
Kasekende and Bhundia (1998) argue that this could give the impression that the debts 
were publicly guaranteed because the political establishment would not allow them to 
fail. This connected lending and politically motivated lending would then further 
worsen the quality of asset portfolios. Financial institutions themselves might have 
consciously committed fraud or might disguise the extent of their financial and liquidity 
problems to the central bank, taking advantage of the asymmetrycal of information 
flow which commonly happens in any financial institution environment. In the end, 
when the problems could not be further hidden, it was much too late for the authority to 
do anything to remedy the situation. 
                                                 
98 Iriana and Sjoholm (2002: 138) suggested that there is an obvious geographical context in the Asian 
crisis, which might suggest that contagion did indeed take place. This is also related with Investor’s 
behaviour in viewing ‘Southeast Asia’ as a single entity. A financial crisis in one country may lead 
investors to reassess other countries’ economic fundamentals and where information asymmetries existed 
it may then induce investors to withdraw their investments to avoid further losses, and thereby result in 
contagion. 
99 Azis and Thorbecke (2002) findings shows that macroeconomic shocks restricted the flow of bank 
credit in Indonesia during the crisis and that these effects were quantitatively important. 
100 The assessment of Indonesia’s macroeconomic fundamentals of course was a controversy. Even in 
1998, ADB (1998) still viewed Indonesia of having “sound macroeconomic fundamentals” and to have a 
“strong economic performance before the crisis”. However, Nasution (1998) argue that “the low rate of 
inflation, high growth of GDP and high rate of growth of non-oil exports, which are often quoted as the 
indicators of sound economic fundamentals, are largely artificial”. 
101 For example “a high level of short-term debts increases the vulnerability to shifts in investors’ 
willingness to facilitate capital as well as to changes in the exchange rates” (Iriana and Sjoholm 2002: 
144). 
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 For the current account balance, we see that since 1991, the trend seemed to be 
upward (Figure 3-7). However, the current account balance seemed to be worsening 
since 1993. Because of this, the official reserves seemed to be decreasing after 1993 
(Figure 3-5). 
Figure 3-7 Indonesia’s Current Account Balance 1975-1996 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (1998). 
 
The worsening of the current account balance was exacerbated by the decrease 
in the plywood's (one of the major export commodities) price index from 274 in 1993 
to only 170 (a 100% decrease) in 1994 and worsened still to 146 in 1996 (Table 3-8). 
The decreasing rate of growth in world trade could have also contributed to the 
worsening current account deficit. In 1996, the growth of world trade in goods was 
almost half of that in 1995. 
Table 3-8 Price indices of plywood, 1993-1996 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Price index of plywood 273.9 169.5 160 146 
Source: Bank Indonesia (BI) statistics at www.bi.go.id. 
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If we examine further the value of export and import since Repelita I, it would 
show that the trade balance of Indonesia would always be positive (surplus). 
Disaggregated further the value of export and imports according to oil/non-oil, then for 
non-oil trade balance, Indonesia would suffer a deficit (except for 1993 and 1994). 
Further disaggregate the non-oil component to manufacture/ non-manufacture, we 
would see that the source of deficit comes from the manufacturing industry, whereas 
for non-manufacturing we would have a surplus (Anwar 1993). It shows that the 
structure of manufacturing industry in Indonesia is basically weak, highly dependent on 
its natural resources. Thus, manufacturing industries in Indonesia are basically 
uncompetitive in the world market, creating yet another pressure towards the current 
account balance. 
Dhanani (2000) calls this phenomenon ‘shallow export-led industrialization’. 
Indeed, despite rapid industrialization that had taken place, especially after 1985, the 
balance of trade in manufacturing was still suffering a deficit from 1978 until the onset 
of the crisis in 1997 (Figure 3-8). This occurred due to the heavy dependence of the 
manufacturing sector on imported components, raw materials and machinery. 
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Figure 3-8 Manufactured Exports and Imports, 1978-99 (USD mill/yr) 
 
Source: Dhanani (2000). 
 
If we examine the FDI flows into Indonesia (Figure 3-9), we see a tremendous 
increase in 1992 and 1995 where the FDI flows had doubled from the previous year. 
We also see a similar trend in current account deficit with FDI flows, which could 
suggest that most of the current account deficit (and also the decreased in reserves) was 
caused (or financed) by the FDI flows. The composition of capital inflows had been 
considered an important factor in a number of currency crises in emerging market 
countries. In both the recent Thai crises and in the 1994–95 Mexican crises, the reliance 
on short-term borrowing to finance large current account deficits was a crucial 
ingredient precipitating the crises.  
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Figure 3-9 Current Account and FDI in Indonesia 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia (BI) statistics at www.bi.go.id. 
 
FDI, in contrast to debt-creating inflows, is often regarded as providing a safer 
and more stable way to finance development because it refers to ownership and control 
of plant, equipment, and infrastructure and therefore funds the growth-creating capacity 
of an economy. On the other hand, short-term foreign borrowing is more likely to be 
used to finance consumption. Furthermore, in the event of a crisis, while investors can 
divest themselves of domestic securities and banks can refuse to roll over loans, owners 
of physical capital cannot find buyers so easily.102 
3.2.1.5 Crisis, Muddling Through and Decentralization (1997-now) 
In 1997 Indonesia faced the worst economic crisis after independence. Many 
analyses have been put forward to explain this crisis. Basically the crisis manifested 
                                                 
102 In practice, however, questions may be raised about the reliability of data that distinguish direct 
investment from other capital flows, and some research has shown that net foreign direct investment 
flows are in fact quite volatile. 
108
itself in the downfall of rupiah exchange rate to the US dollar, followed by a banking 
crisis that further collapsed the investment activities.103  
Up to December 2003, Indonesia’s economy was basically in a condition of 
‘muddling-through’. Macroeconomic policy was highly dependant on a series letter of 
intent set-out by the IMF (IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program-SAP), as Indonesian 
sought IMF help to solve the 1997 economic crisis104.  
After the banking deregulation and the lack of revenues from oil, Indonesia’s 
economy could be said to rely predominantly on the banking sector to finance growth. 
As the financial crisis had effectively destroyed the Indonesian banking sector, the 
growth of the economy and thus recovery were left to the consumption activity rather 
than investment. World Bank (2003: 2) noted that “private consumption remains the 
main source of growth, accounting for 91 percent of GDP growth in 2002 and 83 
percent in the first three quarters of 2003”. As for investment: 
Investment is still sluggish at 20 percent of GDP, some 10 percentage 
points below pre-crisis levels. The composition of Indonesia’s 
investment has been shifting to property investment, which now takes up 
almost 80 percent of the total. In contrast, investment in machinery and 
equipment declined from 23 percent of total in 2000 to 18 percent in the 
first three quarters of 2003, a trend confirmed by the 50 percent decline 
in machinery imports shown in the most recent trade statistics. (World 
Bank 2003) 
 
After the crisis, Indonesia decided to opt for ‘decentralization’. The decision for 
decentralization came about in the background of an unstable political and economic 
landscape. The financial crisis that hit Thailand in the middle of 1997 took its toll on 
                                                 
103 Between 1993 and 1998, Indonesia’s private sector accounted for around three-quarters of the 
country’s total investment, compared to 1980 when it constituted 51 per cent (Hill 1999 cited in Lysaght 
2005). 
104 The IMF policy package to ‘rescue’ Indonesia from the 1997 financial crisis was filled with 
controversy. As Ramli (2002: 1) noted, the “IMF’s misdiagnosis and subsequent policy errors 
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Indonesia in July 1997 when rupiah drastically lost its value against the US dollar. 
President Soeharto then resigned on May 1998, with B.J. Habibie as a replacement. 
Decentralization became a national policy only five months after Habibie assumed the 
presidency (JICA 2001). 
Here, again, we see the dominant role of the President in the decision-making 
process for public policy. Some have argued that the ‘success’ of the enactment of the 
decentralization laws after President Soeharto resigned, was made possible by 
Habibie’s ambition to show the general public as well as Indonesia’s foreign 
counterparts that he was in favor of ‘democracy’ and would not take the same path as 
with his predecessor - President Soeharto (which he often referred to as his ‘political 
guru’). As such the transition towards decentralization was made possible by the strong 
political support of the President. 
In the first years of independence, Indonesia had chosen to take a centralized 
form of governance. The rationale was that a centralized system was necessary for 
national unity and stability. However, in the late 1990s, once again the argument of 
national unity and stability was used but for favoring a decentralized system instead. 
The reason is that because of the pressures from the local regions (that could have 
arisen because of the growing middle-class) to become more independent of their own 
fate and to manage their own people and resources. 
Despite the agreement to decentralize, the central government seems to still 
have considerable control towards the local government. Firstly, the choice of 
‘Kabupaten’ (district/municiplaty, the third tier of government after ‘Province’), though 
it is correct theoretically (because it represent the government that is ‘closer’ to the 
                                                                                                                                              
transformed the crisis into an economic disaster of previously unimaginable proportions ”. 
110
people), it is chosen mostly because with more than 300 kabupatens, each kabupaten 
will have a lower bargaining position compared with the provincial government level. 
Again, the importance of ‘national unity’ is the main consideration here (the DPR that 
drafted the decentralization laws was basically ‘centralized’ as well, with low 
representation from the local government representatives). Secondly, the fact that the 
decentralization laws are ambiguous would require additional regulation infrastructure, 
either in the form of Government Regulation or Presidential Decree. As such, the 
central government and the President would still able to control the decentralization 
process considerably. 
As of January 2001, based on Law No 22/1999 and Law No 25/1999, the 
Indonesia’s government should have already implemented the new policy of regional 
autonomy; the Laws provided the framework for decentralizing authorities once held 
by central government and gave local governments new responsibilities to manage their 
own regions (Abidin 2002). These Decentralization and Special Autonomy Laws also 
devolved from Central Government to Local Governments the authority and 
corresponding responsibility for the delivery of most basic services105, including 
education106. 
The policy reform on decentralization in Indonesia in 1999 is often said to 
follow some sort of ‘big bang’ theory in a sense that it was ambitious107 (directly 
                                                 
105 Introducing Good Local Governance, The Indonesian Experience UNDP, in 
http://www.undp.or.id/programme/governance/intro_glg.pdf. 
106 It literally represents an autonomous system of local government, and leaving central government 
only limited powers like foreign policy, defense, peace and order, judicature, monetary and fiscal 
policies, religion and others (Article 7). Included in “others” are national planning, national 
administration, human resources development, usage of natural resources and high technology, 
conservation of nature and making national standard. (Kimura 1999) 
107 The first of the two decentralization laws (UU 22) decentralized all functions of government except 
defense, religion, justice, foreign affairs, debt and financial management. This is very different from the 
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decentralized down to the Kabupaten level), hastily prepared (only 2 years transition 
period) and it was enacted during a period of a larger political reform in 1998. 
Asia Foundation (2002) cited in Abidin (2002) in assessing the Indonesia’s 
process of decentralization states five general themes that describe the current status 
and directions of decentralization: 
 
1. There is an increasing awareness and appreciation of the importance of people’s 
participation in local governance. 
2. Local government agencies are committed to improving service delivery and are 
feeling the pressure to do so from citizens. 
3. Local governments have coped with the immediate problem of integrating large 
numbers of staff by reorganizing and restructuring agencies and units, without 
downsizing. 
4. Though largely dependent on central government transfers, local governments 
are seeking ways to increase their own sources of income in the form of taxes 
and retributions. Citizens are also demanding more open dialogue and 
consultation about budget allocations. 
5. Local governments are cooperating and sharing information with one another 
and with provincial governments to solve a variety of shared problems. 
 
One of the main problems of decentralization, from the perspective of the 
society is that it could affect public service delivery, like education and health, 
                                                                                                                                              
usual approach. Most countries have specified the assignment to the subnational governments, reserving 
the remainder to the center (Bahl 2003). 
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especially in the local regions that only have limited resources. It is also because the 
central government has not made clear regulations regarding the Minimum Standard of 
Service (Standar Pelayanan Minimum-SPM) for public services. 
Secondly, as it mentioned before, the central government is still having vested 
interests in controlling the LGs. The fact that most LGs are still dependant on the 
transfer from central government (either in the form of DAU, DAK or Revenue 
Sharing), during transitional period most LG policies would still be ‘centralized’ to 
some extent108.  
 
3.3 Main Sources of Growth: Agriculture, Industry or Oil? 
 From the above discussions, we can see that many factors and actors have 
affected Indonesian economic growth. Government has played an important role in the 
Indonesian economy, both directly and indirectly. The direct intervention of 
government tends to happen when they have enough revenues to intervene, which 
usually comes from the oil revenues. The form of intervention usually takes the form in 
the establishments of SOEs, building of infrastructures, subsidies and price 
stabilisation.  
When oil revenues wane, the government must attempt to secure its revenues 
elsewhere. The attempt to deregulate in the 1980s, I would argue, did not come from 
‘noble’ attempts of the government to advance the economy. It was just a simple 
                                                 
108 Under 1997 law, provincial governments are assigned revenue from the motor vehicles’ transfer tax, 
motor vehicles’ registration tax, and fuel tax. Districts get most revenue from land and property taxes, 
but they have no control over rates, and it is administered by and shared with the CG. As of Fiscal 
Balance Law 25/1999, for onshore (up to 12 miles of the coast) oil, 15% of non tax revenues are shared 
with regional governments: 3% to the producing province, 6% to the producing district, and 6% to other 
non-producing districts in the producing province. Proportionate shares distributed are twice that for gas.  
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pragmatic motivation to secure the budget, especially from the tax revenues charged 
from export and industrial activities. That is why, I would argue, that Indonesia’s 
attempt to industrialize was too ‘late’. 
The SOEs, either manufacturing or financial109 based, could have been the 
perfect agents for industrialization, as they often have been labeled the agents of 
development. But the fact that the SOEs were inefficient, they acted more as a 
‘liability’ rather than an ‘asset’ to the domestic economy (Table 3-10). 
Table 3-9 Performance evaluation of Indonesian SOEs’/BUMN (1986 - 1995) 
Performance Rating 1986/1988 1989  1990 1994 1995 
Very sound   
Sound   
Less sound   
Not sound 
19   
13   
20   
49 
32   
21   
16   
32 
39   
19   
16   
27 
85   
   
97 
92   
   
86 
Total 101 101 101 182 178 
Sources: 1986-1990 figures: Mardjana 1993:68; 1994 and 1995 figures: Jakarta Post 25 June 1996, in 
http://www.ciptanet.com/indonesia.html [September 5, 2005]. 
 
Some have argued that the balanced budget has been effective in constraining 
government spending. I would argue on the contrary. As ‘foreign debt and aid’ were 
actually included in the revenue side, and the fact that the expenditure-side of the 
budget have to be ‘balanced’110, the budget has actually provided an incentive for the 
government to borrow abroad and to over-spend on unproductive SOEs and 
investments during the oil-boom period. Later on, this has brought devastating impacts 
that triggered the 1997 financial crisis. 
                                                 
109 Caprio, et. al. (2004) noted that Indonesia had well-known problems with its state-owned banks and 
connected lending among its private banks before the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 
110 An increase in revenues must be accompanied by an increase in spending, a principle known as 
‘dynamically balanced budget’ (‘anggaran berimbang yang dinamis’) 
http://archipelago.pacific.net.id/content/ekonomi/csis/PKKdMDsKEM.html . 
114
Prawiro (2004: xxviii) characterizes economic policy in Indonesia as 
‘pragmatic’, which means “a commitment for a more open attitude towards 
experimentation, rather being dominated by political ideology or economic dogma”. I 
would characterize Indonesian economic policy as ‘short-sighted’ and ‘reactive’. The 
long-term economic policy in Repelita was never used as real planning documents (as 
in the case for the emphasis for agriculture in development planning); it acted more as a 
rhetoric. Instead the government pursued economic policy as ‘problems’ or ‘crisis’ 
arose (like during the deregulation phase in the 1980s), or as ‘fortunes’ come (as in the 
‘oil boom’ period). 
Structurally, the manufacturing industry has been the engine of growth in 
Indonesia. However, the crisis has shown that the agriculture sector was not simply a 
marginalized sector in the growth process. As it turned out, agriculture provided some 
sort of ‘cushion’ during the economic crises, by absorbing labor from the run-down 
manufacturing sector.111 That would explain the relatively stable employment-share of 
agriculture that still dominates in the economy (Table 3-11).  
The relatively dominant role for agriculture in Indonesian economy could be 
explained by two possible reasons. The first is that despite the agriculture sector being 
‘marginalized’ during the growth process, the government policy of ‘food (or rice) 
security’ has been successful to some extent to keep the economy afloat at least above 
the subsistence level. 
The second explanation relates to the concept of dualism in social system 
proposed by Boeke (1954) cited in Subanu (2004). It was possible that Indonesia was 
still dominated by the “indigenous pre-capitalist economic system in which the 
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fulfillment of physical need defines the boundaries of effort, producers only produce as 
much as they need to fulfill their life support resources” (Subanu 2004: 3).  
Panggabean (2004) utilizing data from regional Input-Output table after 1998, 
finds that for provinces outside Java, the key sectors112 are actually agricultural based; 
and also that financial sectors appeared as key sectors in several less-developed 
provinces. However it must be remembered that these results resulted from analyses 
using data after the 1997 financial crisis, where the agricultural sector enjoyed 
favorable terms of trade due to weakening rupiah while on the other hand the industrial 
sectors suffered due to the crumbling banking sector and reduced demand due to the 
crisis. 
                                                                                                                                              
111 For some case studies, refer to Leinbach (2004). 
112 The determination of key sectors was based on forward and backward linkages. 
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Table 3-10 Structural Changes in Indonesian Economy 
Indicators 1965 1975 1985 1995 2000 
  (milllions) 
Population 105.4 135.2 164.6 194.8 203.5
  (billlions of 1999 international dollars) 
Gross Domestic Product 72.8 143.7 280.3 600.5 614.4
       
Share of GDP (percent) 
 Agriculture 58.7 31.7 23.7 17.1 16.9
 Mining, Oil & Gas 2.5 19.7 16.3 8.8 12.9
 Manufacturing 7.6 8.9 13.5 24.1 26.0
 Services 31.2 39.8 46.5 49.9 44.1
       
Share of employment (percent) 
 Agriculture 69.2 61.6 54.7 44.0 45.3
 Manufacturing 6.9 8.4 9.3 12.6 13.0
 Services 23.9 30.1 36.1 43.4 41.8
       
  (1999 international dollars) 
Per capita income 691 1,063 1,703 3,083 3,020
       
  (percent) 
Export as share of GDP n.a. 23.4 21.9 22.6 41.1
Import as share of GDP n.a. 15.7 12.1 20.2 22.2
Sources: Population, GDP, sector shares, employment, exports, and imports from Statistical Yearbook of 
Indonesia, BPS. GDP deflator and international dollar exchange rate from World Bank and IMF. Cited 
in Fuglie (2003). 
 
117
Table 3-11 Trends in Indonesian Agriculture 
 
Sources: Agricultural GDP, shares of Ag GDP, and agricultural trade from BPS. Rice output, livestock 
numbers, rice yield and fertilizer use from FAO. Cropland, irrigated cropland, and agricultural wages 
from van der Eng. Farm numbers and farm size from Agricultural Census (f or census years 1963, 1973, 
1983, and 1993). For agricultural research see Table 8 sources. Cited in Fuglie (2003). 
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
There is still ambiguity of whether manufacturing is really the engine of growth 
in Indonesia. It would be possible that, fueled by the oil boom and FDI, and distorted 
by the rent-seekers (rather then driven by entrepreneurs), manufacturing growth yield 
simply a bubble growth and low-quality growth that would not be sustainable in the 
long-run. 
The true answers to the questions above are out of the scope of the dissertation. 
It would suffice, for now, to understand that agriculture has the equal chance of 





Chapter 4 Education System in Indonesia 
Education System in Indonesia 
 
This chapter examines the education system in Indonesia at the macro level. 
After comprehending the processes of Indonesian economic growth in the previous 
chapter as a background, we need to understand how the education system evolves and 
is related with the economic growth process. This is not to say that education is a sub-
system of economic growth. Education sector has a system of its own, and might have 
different internal variables compared with the factors affecting economic growth.  
Some of the endogenous or exogenous variables in education however, might 
intersect with the endogenous and exogenous variables in the economic growth process. 
The understanding of the mutual variables between the two is the ultimate goal that we 
hope to reach in the end of this dissertation. 
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4.1 Goals, Administration and the Curriculum of the Education 
System in Indonesia  
4.1.1 Before Independence 
The goals, administration and the curriculum of education are highly 
intertwined. The goals of education stated by the government determine the structure of 
the education system, how education is administered, and how the curriculum is 
drafted. It is especially true for Indonesia, where the state acts as the main provider and 
regulator of the education system following independence while concurrently society 
still has limited resources to establish their own education system.  
It is not to say that society did not have the sort of ‘community-based’ schools, 
autonomously founded by themselves. Such schools have been established even before 
the Indonesian independence period. Organization like Muhammadiyah (founded in 
1912), Taman Siswa (founded in 1922) and Boedi Oetomo (founded in 1908) were 
among such organizations apart from the numerous Islamic schools that were widely 
available such as ‘pesantren’ or ‘madrassa’.113  
Yulaelawati (2000) noted: 
Historically, prior to the rule of Europeans, education for people 
throughout the archipelago was relatively simple. Children learned from 
parents or their elders to gain the practical skills needed for survival. 
Cultivating fields, weaving cloth, and building houses, cooking, and 
catching fish are examples of the skills, which had been learned by the 
children without formal instructions. However, very highly specialized 
lessons were given to children of the aristocracy to instruct them in 
music, dancing, religion and traditional leadership. Education mutated 
from domestic practices for peasantry to the more structured padepokan 
(nonreligious learning center) in parallel with court education for royal 
                                                 
113 The pesantren was well established in rural Java by the 17th century and was said to has contributed 
much to the spiritual, cultural, social and economic character of Islamic village life down to the present 
(Geertz 1956: 144 in http://www.encislam.brill.nl/logincheck.asp ). 
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families. In the latter, these systems combined with Islamic elements 
transformed padepokan to become pesantren (Islamic learning center). 
 
A legacy of Dutch rule and Islamic School has left a considerable heritage on 
the education system. While Dutch administered schools had an ‘elite’ and ‘secular’ 
connotation, the Islamic Schools were regarded as ‘traditional/indigenous’, 
‘community-based’, ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ education institution. Indonesian society, 
to some extent, perceived Dutch schools as being better. The Dutch secular schools 
were also viewed to provide more useful skills for their graduates to participate in the 
job market. This was because the traditional Islamic school had no planned curriculum 
and often lacked trained teachers (Lee 1995: 11).  
The main role of Dutch administered schools was to supply the colonial 
administration with indigenous (elite) Indonesians that could manage part of the 
colony, while providing education for the elite Dutch and Europeans.114 Though there 
were some efforts done by the Dutch to provide a more egalitarian education system, 
the majority of indigenous Indonesians remained illiterate and uneducated during 
colonial rule.115  
One of the comprehensive analyses of the characteristics of the Dutch education 
programs identifies six characteristics as follows (Nasution, 1983: 20 cited in Sirozi 
2004: 124): 
1. extremely gradual provision of education for Indonesian children; 
                                                 
114 For a discussion of the education before independence in Indonesia, refer to Lee (1995) chapter 1 and 
Dhakidae (2003) chapter 2. 
115 Approximately in 1871-1892, the drop-out rates were high and only an estimated of 3.4% successfully 
completed elementary schools (Lee 1995: 4). 
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2. emphasis on contradictory dualism between education for the Dutch and 
education for Indonesians; 
3. strict central control; 
4. limitations of the objectives of education for the indigenous people, and the 
use of schools for producing lower class labor; 
5. the principle of concordance which made schools in Indonesia the same as 
those in Netherlands; 
6. lack of any systematic education plan for indigenous people. 
 
The Dutch as one of the main features of its colonial policy introduced formal 
education to Indonesia. It was used as a tool to cultivate and domesticate the “native” 
mind and to recruit personnel for the bureaucracy. Gjelstad (2003: 3) wrote: 
The Dutch as part of the colonial system introduced formal education to 
Indonesia, and it was used as a tool to cultivate and domesticate the 
“native” mind and to recruit personnel to bureaucratic positions. 
4.1.2 During Soekarno’s Presidency 
The early period after independence, the development of Indonesian education 
system would be determined by its historical heritage and the state’s policy towards it, 
as such the construction of the education system would depends on the views of the 
elites rather than on the views of the society at large, augmented by the fact that the 
majority of Indonesians were poor.116   
                                                 
116 The condition of Indonesians before independence could be described by a dialogue spoken by a 
Dutch Officer around 1919, as the Officer said: “the Javanese (one of the major tribes in Indonesia at that 
time) are dirty, the Javanese are stupid, the Javanese are lazy…in short the Javanese or Indonesians are 
one rotten nation in itself” (Dhakidae 2003: 77).  
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After gaining independence, the new government aspired to provide an 
egalitarian education system for all Indonesians (Kartono 1997: 83). The system of 
education was standardized and administered by the central government. Despite the 
acknowledgement that the state has the ultimate responsibility in managing education, 
the important role of the private school was also realized (Lee 1995: 39). While the 
education system should be standardized and centralized, it still has to accommodate 
the diversity of the Indonesian people. 
As a consequence, the courses on religion and local dialects were included and 
to be regarded as compulsory in the national curriculum of education. The content of 
the curriculum was also relatively ‘secular’ and ‘nationalist’. To accommodate the 
aspiration of the Islamic educational organization, separate religious schools were setup 
administered by the Ministry of Religion. 
After independence, the education system in Indonesia was governed by the 
Law no 4/1950 about the School Teaching and Learning117, by Law no 2/1989 
regarding the National Education System that would later on was revised in 2003 
(Tilaar 2003).  
According to the Law 12/1954, the characteristics of education in Indonesia 
were ‘nationalistic’ and ‘democratic’. The meaning of ‘nationalistic’ seems to be 
related to the notion that the education in Indonesia must be based on Indonesia’s 
‘indigenous’ culture (and probably also due the fact that Indonesian language was used 
as the medium of instruction). While the meaning of ‘democratic’118 relates more with 
                                                 
117 According to Abdul Malik Fadjar, the former Minister of Education in the 2001-2004 period, Law 
4/1950 was never formalized, and was replaced later by the Law 12/1954. 
http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/a/abdul-malik-fadjar/index.shtml  
118 For a discussion on the relation of education and democracy by Indonesian scholar, refer to Kartono 
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‘freedom’ and ‘liberation’; that no children would be denied of his/her right for 
education; and that the private sector would be given a wide role to play.119 
In practice, however, the implementation of Law 12/1954 was basically full of 
indoctrination, such that it only provided one-sided view of ideology from the 
administration in power. During Soekarno’s presidency, religious content in school was 
fairly limited and seen as being ‘marginalized’ (Mastuhu 2001: 21). This could be seen 
as a reflection of the political condition at that time, as socialist movement has gained 
considerable position in national politics under Soekarno.120 In addition, Yulaelawati 
(2000) noted that “the system functioned to inculcate particular values and beliefs thus; 
the development of science and technology was given less emphasis”. 
 
4.1.3 During Soeharto’s Presidency 
The goals of the education system, as stated in the Laws no 4 and no 2 were 
surprisingly similar with the Malaysian goal of national unity. The only difference with 
Malaysia is that education is to be considered as one of the rights of Indonesian citizen 
as it being stated in article 31 of Indonesian 1945 constitution and also in the 
constitution preamble (Tilaar 2003: 42). 
Based on the National Education Law No. 2 of 1989 on National System of 
Education, Article 3: 
 
                                                                                                                                              
(1997) that devoted the whole Chapter VIII in discussing this issue. 
119 http://www.moj.gov-rdtl.org/tlaw/IndonesianLaw/uu/Uu195412.htm. Also stated in Mastuhu (2003: 
21). 
120 Soekarno was labelled by Gjelstad (2003: 6) as “an important mediator of a kind of indigenous 
socialism”. 
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[the] National Education is intended to develop the ability and to 
improve the quality of life and the dignity of Indonesian man in an effort 
to realize the national development objectives” (Department of 
Education and Culture (DEC) 1991:  4 in Yualelawati 2000).  
 
The aim of national education is expressed in Article 4 as:  
The National Education is aimed at elevating the intellectual life of the 
nation and to develop the complete Indonesian man, i.e., one who is 
devout and God fearing, with high morals, possessing knowledge and 
skills, who is physically and mentally healthy, who is of stable 
personality, independent and has a deep sense of responsibility towards 
the society and the nation (National Education Law No. 2 of 1989, 
Article 4, DEC 1991, p. 4 in Yualelawati 2000). 
 
It is also interesting to note that only in 1989 did the Soeharto government issue 
a new law to manage the education sector. This means that only after 24 years Soeharto 
saw the need to change the existing regulation on education. Probably it confirmed the 
low priority that the Soeharto administration put on education matters. 
Law No. 2/1989 defines most of the components of Indonesian Education 
System during Soeharto. The Ministry of National Education administers the general 
primary schools, junior secondary schools and senior secondary schools, while the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs administers Islamic education institutions like Madrasah 
Ibtidaiyah (MI; equivalent to primary school), Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MT; equivalent 
to junior secondary school) and Madrasah Aliyah (MA; equivalent to senior secondary 
school) (Hartono and Ehrmann 2001: 4). These Islamic Schools also use the national 
curriculum of the ‘secular’ schools, in addition of their own religious curriculum 
administered by the Ministry of Religious Affair. Other ministries have some schools 
under their jurisdiction as well, though it only constitutes a small amount of numbers 
(for details refer to Table 4-1). 
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Table 4-1 Number of Schools, Pupils/Students, and Teachers by Level of Education and Ministry Academic Year : 1994/1995 
    
PS Level JSS Level SSS Level HE No. Ministry 
Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers Schools Students Teachers 
1 Education & 
Culture 
149,464 26,200,023 1,172,640 19,442 6,392,417 392,588 11,495 4,042,442 316,479 1,236 2,229,796 150,607 
2 Religious Affair 24,232 3,521,836 138,931 8,129 1,353,229 99,306 3,051 414,766 51,847 265 314,692 19,251 
3 Health - - - 8 976 106 210 34,126 6,964 ... ... ... 
4 Agriculture - - - 10 1,240 157 127 27,278 2,573 ... ... ... 
5 Industry - - - 2 152 25 9 3,564 364 ... ... ... 
6 Transportation - - - - - - 5 590 76 ... ... ... 
7 Social Affair - - - 7 644 97 2 882 136 ... ... ... 
8 Defence and 
Security 
- - - - - - 3 489 83 ... ... ... 
9 Others - - - 4 508 42 14 2,884 375 ... ... ... 
Total 173,696 29,721,859 1,311,571 27,602 7,749,166 492,321 14,916 4,527,021 378,897 1,501 2,544,488 169,858 
Source: Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), Ministry of Religious Affair (MORA),Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
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Both educational policy in Malaysia and Indonesia are highly centralized. In 
Malaysia, it started with the Razak Report in 1956 that provided the foundation for the 
present education system in Malaysia. There had only been minimal modifications at 
the periphery. Musa (2003: 67) asserts that “the core assumption of Razak Report is 
that Malaysians should have a uniform system of schooling with a common curriculum 
to foster national unity”. As such, education in Malaysia is a federal responsibility and 
highly centralized with the MOE controlling every detail of the system, including 
curriculum and syllabus. Following the NEP, there are special privileges given to the 
indigenous Malays, such as a quota for a place in local universities.   
The country’s educational goals are manifested in the Malaysian National 
Education Philosophy (NEP) which states that:  
Education in Malaysia is an on-going effort towards further developing 
the potential of individuals in a holistic and integrated manner so as to 
produce individuals who are intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and 
physically balanced and harmonious, based on a firm belief in and 
devotion to God. Such an effort is designed to produce Malaysian 
citizens who are knowledgeable and competent, who possess high moral 
standards, and who are responsible and capable of achieving a high level 
of personal well-being, as well as being able to contribute to the 
betterment of the family, the society and the nation at large.121 
 
The goal of ‘national unity’ in Malaysian education system, or ‘nationalism’, is also 
attached to the Indonesian education system.  
If in Malaysia the education policy is being guided by the NEP in terms of 
affirmative action, in Indonesia the education policy is also being subverted by the 
political motives of the Government. To ease some demands in the rural areas and other 
                                                 
121 Malaysia, Ministry of Education (2004). 
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regional governments, the Central Government has provided some off-budget measures 
to help local governments in handling the poverty problems in the form of INPRES 
Grants; it was a funding mechanism system which allowed direct grants to be made by 
the central government to the local government in two important fields: education (SD 
INPRES, the expansion of primary school) and health services (PUSKESMAS). The 
criteria for receiving the grants, however, are arbitrary and are being abused for 
political reasons to encourage endorsement for the ruling party.  
Other political motives in the education policy are also apparent when the post 
of Minister of Education and Culture in Indonesia in 1984 was headed by Dr Nugroho 
Notosusanto, a historian and a military general who previously headed the Army 
History Center in 1965. Previously when Notosusanto headed the Army History Center 
he had written about the G30S/PKI coup (Nugroho Notosusanto, The Coup Attempt of 
the September in Indonesia. Jakarta: Dept. Defence and Security, 1970). Having 
received my primary and secondary education in the 1980s I recall how the curriculum 
was being bombarded by history lessons about the G30S coup (based on the 
Government version at that time), under different course-titles but yet with similar 
contents. The alternative version of the G30S coup was never highlighted until recently. 
In 1983, a four hour movie about G30S was made that endorsed the intervention of 
Soeharto in taking over the power from Soekarno. During its premier show, every 
elementary student –including myself- was required to watch the movie during school 
time. Since then, every year on the 30th of September, the movie would be aired on all 
national TV. This tradition has only being halted after Soeharto’s resignation in 1998.   
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Indeed, Education has always been subverted by political motives of the state. 
Education (as represented by the schools), in this sense, could be viewed as a 
representation or miniature of political landscape in a respective country or society122. 
In addition education could be used as a tool for assessing or forecasting the possible 
structure of a society in 12-15 years ahead. 
The curriculum of education in Indonesia has evolved through these years, with 
little improvement.123 Additionally, major education policies, such as CBSA (‘Cara 
Belajar Siswa Aktif’) system has been implemented since Pelita II, link and match 
system (Pelita I, IV and VI) also has been widely documented124. The core content of 
the basic education (primary and secondary level) curriculum in 1994 consisted of: 
Pancasila (state ideology), religion, civic education, Indonesian language, reading and 
writing, mathematics (including arithmetic), introduction to sciences and technology, 
geography, national and general history, handicraft and art, physical and health 
education, drawing, English, and local content areas.  
MOEC (1996) noted that these subjects “..are not the names of subject matter, 
but more in terms of studies to form personality and elements of ability which are 
taught and enhanced through basic education. More than one element may be joined in 
one subject matter or, the other way round, one element may be divided into more than 
one subject.”125 The detailed hourly unit of each subject is given in Table 4-2. 
                                                 
122 Angus (1986: 8) quoted Sirozi (2004: 135) says that ‘the very notion of ‘education’… is itself both a 
political construct’. 
123 Eman (2004) noted that after independence Indonesia has reformed its education curriculum in the 
following years: 1961, 1964, 1968, 1975, 1984, and 1994 (added by the 1999 supplement). The newest 
curriculum was drafted in 2004 and is called Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi or KBK (competency 
based curriculum). http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/cetak/0704/19/0308.htm  
124 http://www.republika.co.id/suplemen/cetak_detail.asp?mid=1&id=176479&kat_id=105&kat_id1=151  
125 http://www.ibe.unesco.org/International/Databanks/Dossiers/rindones.htm  
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Table 4-2 Structure of Study Program for Basic Education Curriculum 
(Primary School and Junior Secondary School), 1994 Curriculum 
  Primary School JS School 
No Subject Matter I II III IV V VI I II III 
1 Pancasila Education 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2 Religion 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 Indonesian Language 10 10 10 8 8 8 6 6 6 
4 Mathemathics 10 10 10 8 8 8 6 6 6 
5 Sciences -  3 6 6 6 6 6 6 
6 Social Sciences -  3 5 5 5 6 6 6 
7 Handicraft and Arts 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
8 Health and Sport 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
9 English - - - - - - 4 4 4 
10 Local Content 2 2 4 5 7 7 6 6 6 
 Total 30 30 38 40 42 42 42 42 42 
 
Note: School hours: Grades I and II SD = 30 minutes; Grades III to VI SD = 40 minutes; Grades I (VII) 
to III (IX) SMP = 45 minutes. 
 
As for General Senior Secondary Education (or High School) it consisted of 
general and specific programs. The specific teaching program is implemented only in 
the 3rd grade. The detailed information of the GSE curriculum is given in table 4-3. 
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Table 4-3 Structure of Study Program for General Senior Secondary School, 
1994 Curiculum 
Grade I Grade II
No Subject Matter Language Sciences Social
A. General
1 Pancasila Education 2 2 2 2 2
2 Religion 2 2 2 2 2
3 Indonesian Language and Literature 5 5 3 3 3
4 The General and National History 2 2 2 2 2
5 English 4 4 5 5 5
6 Health and Sport 2 2 (2) (2) (2)
7 Mathemathics 6 6
8 Sciences
a. Physics 5 5
b. Biology 4 4
c. Chemistry 3 3
9 Social Sciences
a. Economics 3 3
b. Sociology - 2
c. Geography 2 2
10 Arts 2 -
Sub Total 42 42 14(16) 14(16) 14(16)
Grade I Grade II
No Subject Matter Language Sciences Social
A. Specialist
Language
1 Indonesian Language and Literature - - 8 - -
2 English - - 6 - -
3 Foreign Language/s*) - - 9 - -
4 History of Culture - - 5 - -
Sciences
1 Physics - - - 7 -
2 Biology - - - 7 -
3 Chemistry - - - 6 -
4 Mathematics - - - 8 -
Social Sciences
1 Economics - - - - 10
2 Sociology - - - - 6
3 Civics - - - - 6
4 Anthropology - - - - 6
Sub Total 28 28 28
Total 42 42 42 42 42
Remarks:
AH=45 minutes
*) Implemented in extra curricular activities to be in line with extra academic time available.











Looking at the school curriculum above, it could be generalized that the 
education system in Indonesia is relatively ‘secular126’. The primary school curriculum 
described above, represent some features of Indonesian politics. Firstly it represent the 
fact that religion classes, while it only consists of 7% in PS curriculum and 5% in JS 
school, are still considered important by the state. The clash between Soeharto and the 
PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in 1965 might encourage the government to 
maintain the teaching of religion in its school.127 Also, during the Soekarno 
administration the teaching of religion was considered unimportant and was not 
required for graduation128, while in Soeharto’s it was necessary to achieve ‘pass’ grade 
in religion classes in order to graduate.129 
Secondly, the curriculum represents the government goal of achieving ‘national 
unity’. The classes on ‘Bahasa Indonesia’ (Indonesian Language) consisted of 1/3 of 
the curriculum for primary-1 (P-1) and P-2. The development of Bahasa Indonesia as a 
national language has been emphasized since the revision of curriculum in 1964 
(Yulaelawati 2000) and it is probably related to the goal of national unity. 
The local content in Indonesia’s curriculum of national education is low. The 
Indonesian national education system is heavily centralized due to the ‘national unity’ 
objective. Yulaelawati (2000) wrote that “All curricula of all types and levels of 
                                                 
126 Federman et. al. (xxxx: 4-5) stated that “While most schools (in Indonesia) are secular, some private 
and publicly funded schools have a largely Islamic curriculum. 
127 For an interesting discussion on the clash between Soeharto and the PKI,  refer to Dhakidae (2003: 
200-225). 
128 Soekarno was the strong proponent of NASAKOM (Nationalist-Religion-Communist) idea; he 
wanted to combine the power of nationalism, communism and religion as the people’s power. 
129 Nevertheless, Dhakidae (2003) wrote that “the New Order could be considered as a battlefield 
between religion and the state” (translated, p.xxxiv). 
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education should contain (1) Pancasila education, (2) religious education, and (3) civics 
education”. Not until 1990s that the central government allows some local content in 
the education system, as it represented by the 1994 curriculum. Some of the national 
and local content of the curriculum are described in table 4-4.  
Table 4-4 Indonesia: National Curriculum versus Local Content Curriculum 
in the 1990s 
National Curriculum (80%) Local Content Curriculum (20%) 
Pancasila and civic education Agriculture 
Religion (Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, 
Hinduism, Budhism) 
Environmental education 
Indonesian Language Computer and information 
Reading and Writing Local culture – dance, local language, 
traditional games, etc. 
Mathematics (Arithmetic) English (PS) 
Introduction to science and technology  
Geography  
National and World History  
Handicraft and arts  
Sports and health education  
Drawing  
English language (JSS)  
Source: Ibrahim (1998) in Yeom, et.al. (2002). 
 
As such some consider the 1989 Education Law as a landmark change in light 
of the recent 1994 education reform. Yulalelawati (2000) wrote: 
First, it extends basic education from six years to nine years of schooling 
at the primary and lower secondary schools. Second, it delegates from 
central government to regional offices the design of the local curriculum 
content (LCC). Third, it allows teachers to have a more flexible 
adjustment of the national curriculum to the local situations and contexts. 
Fourth, the head-teachers are given more options to select supplementary 
textbooks for their schools; fifth, local heterocultural preservation and 
development are highly encouraged. Moreover, the teaching of English 
at the primary schools is now permitted, particularly for schools in the 
tourism and urban areas 
 
The tension between ‘local content’ and ‘national unity’ has existed since the 
beginning of independence; this tension was reflected in the slogan of ‘Bhinneka 
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Tunggal Ika’ (Unity in Diversity). The dominance of national content in the education 
curriculum again could be seen as the reflection and miniature of the dominance of 
Central Government over Local Government (the provincial and district level) as it 
demonstrated more clearly by the financial domination of the Central Government 
through the Central Government’s Budget. Some of these issues will be discussed in 
detail in the following discussion regarding decentralization. 
4.1.4 Reform and Decentralization in Education 
Reforms in the education sector usually took the form of decentralized financial 
responsibility and decision-making from central to local government or school levels in 
order to gain direct and broaden participation and or feedback from the society. This 
decentralization has provided possibilities for broadening public participation, by 
establishing community participation and other partnerships (like NGOs), as well as 
greater flexibility and improved access to educational services. Unfortunately, it has 
often been accompanied by declining budget resources at the municipal level, as well as 
changing structural conditions and patterns of social dialogue and participation.  
In decentralized systems, challenges include the capacity to finance and manage 
at local levels and to build linkages and effective partnerships between the various 
institutions concerned and at different governance levels130.  
In 2003, a new law on the national education system was passed. The new law, 
despite one of its mission to ‘empower society participation in the provision of 
                                                 
130 International Labor Organization, Sectoral Activities Programme, The Impact of Decentralization and 
Privatization on Municipal Services, Report for discussion at the Joint Meeting on the Impact of 
Decentralization and Privatization on Municipal Services Geneva, 15-19 October 2001 International 
Labor Office Geneva. 
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education based on the autonomy principle’131 however, remains vague and does not 
specifically address issues on education decentralization issues. The law does refer to 
Law no. 22/1999 and 25/1999 with respect to regional autonomy. 
The law does not explicitly state the division of rights and responsibilities 
between the central and local government. Chapter 4, article 11, only refers to ‘shared 
responsibilities’ between central and local government to provide education services 
and to guarantee education provisions for citizens aged 7 to 15 years old. While article 
10 mentions the ‘shared rights’ between central and local government in directing, 
guiding, assisting, and controlling the education provisions according with the existing 
regulations, the law does not point to any particular regulations. 
As it is common with any law (Undang-Undang) in Indonesia, the law usually 
represents a very general policy direction, and needs further regulations so as to be 
effectively implemented. The regulations for implementation usually take the form of 
Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) or Presidential Decree (Keputusan 
Presiden) that is drafted by the Government without needing any approval from the 
Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-DPR).  
As such, considerable discretion and policy space are still available for central 
government for making its maneuver and authority. In article 11 Law 22/1999, the local 
government is said to be responsible for education policy in its own localities. With 
Local Government being subjected to education provisions, the financing of education, 
especially primary and secondary education, would be dependent on the ability of local 
government in generating its own revenues besides the revenues they are entitled to 
from the central government. 
                                                 
131 Law 20/2003, explanation chapter. 
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Looking at the condition before decentralization in 1996, Provincial 
Governments’ PAD varied between 6 to 60% with an average of 25%. Almost 70% of 
revenues came from central government in the form of shared revenues and grants 
(table 4-5). 

















DI Aceh 17.82 10.45 62.37 9.36 100.00 
Sumatera Utara 25.52 6.29 63.05 5.14 100.00 
Sumatera Barat 36.12 8.38 44.14 11.36 100.00 
Riau 34.63 24.06 24.81 16.50 100.00 
Jambi 25.54 11.31 50.02 13.14 100.00 
Sumatera Selatan 32.32 19.36 36.10 12.22 100.00 
Bengkulu 20.50 5.41 65.17 8.92 100.00 
Lampung 36.93 5.15 49.69 8.23 100.00 
DKI Jakarta 60.13 13.04 12.93 13.90 100.00 
Jawa Barat 32.94 3.57 58.54 4.95 100.00 
Jawa Tengah 21.93 2.15 71.63 4.29 100.00 
DI Yogyakarta 25.07 2.36 66.91 5.66 100.00 
Jawa Timur 29.72 2.97 59.76 7.73 100.00 
Kalimantan Barat 23.57 15.61 56.01 4.81 100.00 
Kalimantan Tengah 6.49 23.09 65.29 5.13 100.00 
Kalimantan Selatan 24.43 21.42 48.28 5.87 100.00 
Kalimantan Timur 24.81 34.55 29.06 11.57 100.00 
Sulawesi Utara 20.96 10.81 66.08 2.16 100.00 
Sulawesi Tengah 9.51 4.68 83.64 2.17 100.00 
Sulawesi Selatan 38.74 13.08 37.29 10.89 100.00 
Sulawesi Tenggara 12.64 10.45 72.35 4.56 100.00 
Bali 52.30 4.55 27.84 15.31 100.00 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 23.91 5.24 64.59 6.25 100.00 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 24.02 4.94 65.52 5.51 100.00 
Maluku 12.47 15.39 66.91 5.23 100.00 
Irian Jaya 7.48 32.36 42.15 18.01 100.00 
Timor Timur 8.96 4.68 82.40 3.95 100.00 
Average 25.53 11.67 54.54 8.26 100.00 
Source: LPEM-FEUI in Simanjuntak (2000) cited in Ismail (2001). 
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Looking from the central government budget (APBN) point of view, in 2002 
more than 25% of APBN has been transferred to local government (figure 4-1). This 
figure is actually quite reasonable, as Bahl (2003) stated that the predicted level of 
fiscal decentralization for Indonesia is around 25 percent. 
Figure 4-1 Central Government Budget: Transfers and Central Government 
Expenditures, % and Rp trillion 
 
Source: APBN 2000, 2001, 2002 in Sidik (2002). 
  
Indonesian Parliament has recently reacted to the condition of low education 
financing by enacting a law (UU NO.20/2003 article 49) that education expenditure 
should be at minimum 20% from the Central and Local Government budget. Even then, 
according to the Finance Minister, the above objective would only be attainable in 
2009132. 
                                                 
132 Media Indonesia, News Daily, 27 January 2004. 
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For Local Government, in 2001, from the data of 357 provincial, kabupaten and 
city budgets, the percentage of education budget has reached up to 28.30 percent. In 
2002, the figures slightly declined to 27.3 percent. In 2003, the figure has reached 
37.8% of the total routine expenditures in the local regions (Vidyattama 2004). 
One of the critical issues in decentralization is that the large variations in local 
government fiscal ability would negatively affect the quality of public service 
provisions in the respective local government. Some regions have allocated more than 
50% from total expenditures for education, but others only spent 13.40 % of the total 
budget in 2002. That is why the notion of ‘minimum standard of service’ is very 
important to prevent the decay of public service quality. 
With respect to Laws 22 & 25/1999, the central government has issued the 
Government Regulation (PP) 105/2000 as the regulation infrastructure to implement the 
decentralization Laws. PP 105/2000 uses the concept of ‘performance budget’ (article 
8) as a guideline for local government in structuring their budget. Further more, article 
20 required the local government budget to contain the expected ‘service standard’ and 
‘activities’ unit cost’. However, looking at the current local government budgets, 
neither one of those requirements is fulfilled. One of the reasons cited by local 
government officials was that they were still waiting for further instruction from the 
central government in meeting the requirements (in the form of Presidential Decree). 
With 171,000 public primary schools (1.4 million teachers) and 31,000 
secondary schools (0.68 million teachers) that are now under the direct responsibility of 
local governments, the quality of education provisions in each local government could 
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be expected to be directly related with the capabilities of local financing (Kaiser 2004). 
The scheme of education financing in post-decentralization era is given in figure 4-2. 
Figure 4-2 Post-Decentralization Multiple Flows 
 
Source: WB Education Sector Review 2004 in Kaiser (2004). 
Notes: MoRA=Ministry of Religiuous Affairs (Departemen Agama), MoE=Ministry of 
Education, Bappenas=The Agency for National Development and Planning (Badan 
Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional). 
 
Preliminary reports from the Ministry of Education (MOE) in 2003 stated that 
the fiscal imbalance for primary education was estimated to reach around Rp 25 billion 
p.a., or an increase of 20% from the previous year’s budget on education. While for 
Junior Secondary School (SMP) the same level of Rp 25 billion p.a. is also expected, or 
a two-fold increase in expenditure for junior secondary education expenditures 
(Depdiknas 2003).  
It must be remembered that education outcomes are determined by more than 
the availability and quality of schooling. Many factors determine outcomes on both the 
demand and the supply side, linked at many levels. The demand for education is 
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determined by individuals and households weighing the benefits and costs of their 
choices and the constraints they face. The supply of services that affect education 
outcomes starts with global technological knowledge and extends even to whether 
teachers report for work (Filmer 2003). 
Figure 4-3 The Determinants of Demand and Supply for Education 
 
Source: Adapted from Filmer (2003). 
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4.2 Access and Quality of Education 
The numbers of schools increased quite fast during the Soeharto administration, 
especially at the primary level. It is considered part of the Government effort to 
promote the rural areas by building public infrastructure. Darja, et.al. (2004: 6) noted 
that: 
One of the first such massive projects was the SD Inpres project. It was 
launched in 1973 with the aim of providing equal access to primary-level 
education to all Indonesian school-age children. To achieve this 
objective, the project built more schools in places where there had been 
relatively less school prior to 1973. Specifically, the number of schools 
constructed in each district in 1973-1975 was proportional to the number 
of primary school age children not enrolled in school in 1972. It was the 
largest infrastructure project at the time it was launched, absorbing 12 
percent of the regional development budget in 1973 and increasing 
steadily to reach 28 percent in 1979. Between 1973 and 1979, 61,807 
new primary school buildings were constructed, which represented about 
222 new schools and 666 new teachers per district. This project had 
roughly doubled the number of primary schools in Indonesia. 
 
Additional information on the Inpres program is provided in the table 4-7. 
Table 4-6 Background Information on the INPRES Program 
INPRES schools constructed (1973–1974 to 1978–1979)  222 
INPRES schools constructed per 1000 children (1973–1974 to 
1978–1979)  
2.34 
Number of teachers in 1973–1974  1,530 
Number of teachers in 1978–1979  2,082 
Number of schools in 1973–1974  219 
Fraction of the population attending schooling 1971 (Census)  0.174 
Enrollment rate in primary school in 1973 (Ministry of Education 
and Culture)  
0.68 
Source: Sources: IFLS, SUPAS, SUSENAS, INPRES instruction, Census (1971), 
Ministry of Education and Culture in Duflo (2001). 
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The expansive construction of schools133 had made possible the increase of 
enrolment at the primary level.134 The primary gross enrolment rate had started to 
increase since 1976. This expansion was made possible by the windfall profit from the 
oil revenues, that were channeled through the Central Government’s expenditures on 
regional development (the real value of regional development expenditures more than 
doubled between 1973 and 1980) (Duflo, 2001: 797). 
Figure 4-4 Gross enrolment rates from 1971 to 1997 by school level 
 
Source: Lanjouw (2001). 
 
The effort of the government to achieve a universal basic primary education has 
been widely documented and acknowledged. The building of educational infrastructure 
was, of course, necessary to build a new ‘Indonesian Man’135, as Gjelstad (2003: 3) 
noted: 
                                                 
133 However, the maintainance of the school building seems to be lagging behind. Some schools in 
remote areas, such as Irian Jaya, was never been renovated since the 1970s. 
http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/a/abdul-malik-fadjar/index.shtml  
134 The expansion was made possible from the windfall profit from oil revenue that started to accumulate 
since 1974 (Dhakidae 2003: 282). 
135 One of the goals of Indonesian education based on the law was to build a new Indonesian Man. 
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The actual building of these “new” Indonesian men required a huge 
infrastructure in terms of physical buildings, parental motivation, and 
teacher training. 
 
The dominance of public school in the primary level, however, was not 
extended to the junior-secondary and upper level. In 1994/1995, the number of private 
Junior Secondary School (JSS) was 55% of the total JSS school in Indonesia. The 
percentage of private school tends to move upward as we move to upper level of 
education. In Senior High School (SHS), the percentage of private school was 73%, 
while at the university level, around 96% of universities were private. 
  
                                                                                                                                              
(National Education Law No. 2 of 1989). 
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Table 4-7 Number of Educational Institutions/ Academic Year : 1994/1995 






A.  Ministry of Education and Culture 
1  Kindergaten (KG) 71 40,435  40,506 
2  Special School (SS) 23 621  644 
3  Primary School (PS) 139,189 10,275  149,464 
4  Junior Secondary School (JSS) 8,768 10,674  19,442 
Senior Secondary School (SSS) 3,103 8,392  11,495 
a. General Senior Secondary School (GSSS) 2,398 5,337  7,735 
b. Economics Senior Secondary School (ESSS) 340 1,671  2,011 
c. Home Economics Senior Secondary School (HESSS) 86 81  167 
d. Other Vocational Senior Secondary School (OVSSS) 62 168  230 
e. Technical Senior Secondary School (TSSS) 153 944  1,097 
f. Agriculture Technical Senior Secondary School (ATSSS) 45 153  198 
5  
g. Other Technical Senior Secondary School (OTSSS) 19 38  57 
Higher Education (HE) 52 1,159  1,211 
a. University 31 248  279 
b. Institute 14 47  61 
c. School Of Higher Learning 4 476  480 
d. Academy 2 380  382 
6  
e. Polytechnic 1 8  9 
B Ministry of Religious Affair 
1  Islamic Primary School (IPS) 607 23,625  24,232 
2  Islamic Junior Secondary School (IJSS) 582 7,547  8,129 
3  Islamic Senior Secondary School (ISSS) 350 2,701  3,051 
4  Islamic Higher Education (IHE) 14 251  265 
 Source: MOEC, Ministry of Religious Affair, Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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Both the Government of Malaysia and Indonesia, provided free elementary 
education. Malaysia provides 11 years of free schooling (6 primary and 5 secondary) 
but it is not compulsory. Though it is provided ‘free’ (as no tuition fee is required) 
parents would still have to spend some money for books, uniforms, transportation and 
other non-tuition expenditures (Musa 2003: 69). The situation was similar in Indonesia.   
Even though primary education in Indonesia has been compulsory and free 
since 1977/78, Pangestu and Oey-Gardiner (1992) stressed that there are children who 
still cannot afford to go to school. The reason was that their parents simply cannot 
afford to purchase the needed uniforms, school supplies and other school materials. 
Other reasons for non-attendance were that parents still do not realize the importance of 
education. Furthermore, the distance to school being too far and parents needed their 
children to help out in their work. The rate of school drop-outs by educational level has 
also increased since 1984. The high percentage of drop-outs was due to lack of funds. 
While growth in terms of the number of schools and the wide coverage in itself was 
impressive, such achievements was negated as less priority was given to maintain the 
quality of education, i.e. in terms of educational performance and standards. In general, 
the performance of pupils in the rural areas of Indonesia was poorer than that of urban 
pupils, indicating the difference in the quality of instruction (Pangestu and Oey-
Gardiner 1992: 62). 
To conclude, despite the successful effort of the Government of Indonesia 
(GOI) to expand educational access and quality at the primary level, the situation has 
not been complementary in the upper level. The expansions on the upper level were 
basically left to the private sector. 
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There were more private schools at the Junior Secondary School and the upper 
level. However, to deny the GOI contribution at the above primary school level would 
also be misleading.136 Most of these private schools have actually benefited from the 
availability of human resources at the public school, as most public schools’ teachers 
usually teach at the private school to further increase their limited income. As most 
teachers are civil servants, their payrolls were coming out from the GOI budget. So at 
least in this respect the GOI has provided some kind of ‘positive externalities’.  
Thus despite the quite high value of enrollment rates in the Junior Secondary 
age group of 80% in 1998/99, only 66% of the poorest quintile of the society were able 
to study at the Junior Secondary School; the enrollment dropped further to only 29% 
for the Senior Secondary age group. Based on this, one assumes that as the education 
ladder went up to higher level, a more ‘elitist’ pattern would appear on the education 
enrollment value.  
Indeed, the bulk of government spending was directed towards primary school 
(refer to Table 4-8), even some considered this as not enough to provide quality 
education services for the people. As the World Bank (2003) noted: 
[Indonesia] … has seen great gains in primary and lower secondary 
enrollment as a result of strong political will, but educational quality 
remains very low. The school year in Grades 3-6 is among the longest in 
the world (over 1400 hours annually for single shift classrooms), but the 
potential impact of this extraordinary effort is lost in part because the 
school year in Grades 1 and 2 is among the shortest in the world (under 
500 hours annually in most cases). Government is increasing the intake 
level of teachers to the equivalent of a bachelors’ degree, but 
significantly decreasing the average salary level. And finally, it does a 
good job of providing fee waivers for poor children but has ceased to 
                                                 
136 Bray (2002: 10) even considered that Private versus Public Education as ‘ False Dichotomy’. He 
noted that “In Cambodia, 60 percent of the resources for public primary education are provided directly 
by households rather than indirectly via the State, while in Indonesia, 69 percent of the resources of 
private primary schools are provided by the Government” 
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provide free textbooks, meaning that these children often attend school 
under very disadvantaged circumstances.  
Table 4-8 Total Yearly Expenditures on Education by Source of Funds and 
Level of Schooling, 1995-96 (in billions of rupiahs) 
Education system and school 
spending 
























Primary (SD) 29,448 5,508 537 6,044 1,285 7,329 34% 
Junior Secondary 
(SMP) 
8,403 1,925 860 2,785 886 3,671 17% 
Senior Secondary 
(SMA) 
4,616 1,714 803 2,517 769 3,286 15% 




 1,279  1,279  1,279 6% 
Totals 45,177 11,963 6,093 18,056 3,593 21,649 100% 
% Distribution by Source of Funds 
Source of total 
spending 
55% 28% 83% 17% 100%   
Source of school 
system spending 
66% 34% 100%     
Source: Government budget documents, nation-wide surveys, national economic survey; quoted Clark 
(1998). 
Table 4-9 Age-Specific Enrolment Ratios in Junior and Senior Secondary 
Age Group by Quintile Expenditures 






94.1 93.9 94.4 95.4 95.1 95.2 
Poorest quintile 88.3 89.9 90.1 90.3 91.8 91.4 91.8 





68.9 72.4 73.2 75.8 77.5 77.2 79.1 
Poorest quintile 51.6 55.8 57.4 60.3 62.7 63.3 66.3 








45.3 44.6 47.6 48.6 49.3 51.2 
Poorest quintile 18.2 20.8 20.7 22.5 25.6 25.6 29.1 
Richest quintile 69.5 71.3 70.3 74.2 72.9 75.4 75.0 
Source:  BPS, special tabulations from Susenas 1993-1999. For the years 1993-1998, taken from Oey-
Gardiner, 2000, quoted in Hartono, Djoko and David Ehrmann (2001). 
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Despite the fact that parents still have to bear some costs of schooling, both 
Malaysia and Indonesia have succeeded in increasing its primary enrollment ratio. 
However in terms of secondary education enrolment, Malaysia and Indonesia still lags 
behind the more industrialized countries of Asia, such as Singapore and Korea (Table 
4-10). This could be that as students become older, the ‘opportunity cost’ for them to 
go to school went up, because during secondary school the students actually could get a 
job which could help their family for additional income, especially for poor families.  
  In addition, the quality and access of education was better at the urban 
compared with the rural areas. More than 20% of children in the age of 13 have to leave 
school in the rural areas, compared with only around 10% in their urban counterparts. 
Practically no students in the age of 18 in the rural areas could afford to continue with 
higher education, compared with almost 20% in their urban counterpart (Figure 4-5). 
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Figure 4-5 School Attendance by Location, 2002-03 
 
Source: UNICEF (2005). 
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Table 4-10 School enrollment, (% gross) 












Indonesia  Primary 71.5 83.0 113.7 116.0 114.5  
 Secondary 9.0 18.0 35.3 46.4 45.3  
 Tertiary 1.0 na 5.3 9.2 10.5  
Korea  Primary 97.5 105.0 104.3 100.6 99.3  
 Secondary 31.0 49.0 84.2 92.0 96.0  
 Tertiary 6.0 na 24.3 38.6 48.1  
Malaysia  Primary 93.0 89.0 97.2 95.8 100.5  
 Secondary 23.5 38.0 50.5 57.2 58.2  
 Tertiary 2.0 na 5.0 7.2 10.0  
Philippines  Primary 104.0 107.5 109.2 110.4 111.5  
 Secondary 33.5 50.0 65.3 70.6 76.8  
 Tertiary 19.0 na 24.6 27.4 28.6  
Singapore  Primary 108.0 107.5 108.8 104.4 102.7  
 Secondary 38.5 49.0 57.5 68.8 67.0  
 Tertiary 10.0 na 10.7 18.6 28.7  
Thai  Primary 80.5 83.0 97.7 98.0 92.5  
 Secondary 13.5 21.5 30.2 28.6 45.0  
 Tertiary 2.0 na 16.8 16.2 19.3  
Source: World Bank, WDI CD-ROM.  
The gross enrollment ratio, however, only mentions half the story. It does not 
take into account the dropout rate. Looking at other indicator of education, mean years 
of schooling, the difference between Malaysia and Indonesia started to materialize. In 
2000, Indonesia’s mean years of schooling (5 years) constituted only half of Malaysia’s 
figure (Table 4-11). This could reflect the highest dropout rate in Indonesia compared 
with Malaysia.  
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Table 4-11 Literacy rates and mean years of schooling in Southeast Asia 
Mean years of schooling Country Adult literacy rate
1999 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Singapore 92.1 7.5 8.5 9 9.5 
Malaysia 87.0 6.3 8 9.2 9.4 
Thailand 95.3 4.1 4.4 5.6 6.5 
Philippines 95.1 4.8 6.5 7.3 8.2 
Indonesia 86.3 2.9 3.7 4.0 5.0 
Vietnam 93.1 n.a. n.a. 3.8 n.a. 
Laos 47.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Cambodia 68.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Myanmar 84.4 1.4 1.6 2.5 2.8 
Source: UNESCO, in Sjöholm (2002).   
 
4.3 Financing of Education 
In ASEAN countries, Malaysia constantly has the highest public education 
expenditures with a share of above 4% followed by Singapore. According to the survey 
of Malaysia’s university graduates, the Malaysian government was actually the largest 
employer of university graduates, with 70% of employed graduates working for the 
government and statuary bodies (56.9% and 13.3% respectively). In contrast, only 
29.8% of employed graduates (or 19.5% of all graduates) worked for private firms or 
were self-employed (Mehmet and Yip 1986).  
Ariff and Yeoh (1992: 43) stated that Malaysian society has always attached a 
premium on higher education, although it was biased towards academic and 
professional pursuits, with technical and vocational training being relegated to the back 
seat. This was presumably due to the social status attached to white-collar jobs and to 
the fact that vocational jobs were not financially as rewarding.  
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Malaysia has indeed put strong emphasis on education. As Musa (2003: 4) 
noted:  
A measure of the importance of education is reflected by the fact that the 
ministry has always been regarded as very senior and prestigious. The 
first minister of education was no less than the deputy prime minister 
himself, Tun Razak. Every prime minister except the first had been in 
charge of that portfolio. The ministry consistently gets the largest budget 
allocation; in the latest (2003) it received a whopping 27% of the total 
outlay.  
 
While on the other hand, government expenditure for education in Indonesia 
was low (only slightly above 1% of GDP) compared with Malaysia, and even with 
other countries as shown in Table 4-13. In terms of total government expenditures, 
Malaysia ranked 3rd, after Singapore and Philippines, with a percentage of 15.4% in 
1996. Indonesia probably ranked the lowest among other Southeast Asian countries; 
with only 8% of total government expenditures spent on education in 1996 (refer to 
Table 4-14). Not until recently that the Indonesian Parliament reacted to the condition 
by enacting law (UU NO.20/2003 article 49) that education expenditure should be at 
minimum 20% from the Central Government budget. Even then, according to the 
Finance Minister, the above objective would only be attainable in 2009137.  
                                                 
137 Media Indonesia, 27 January 2004. 
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Table 4-12 Government Expenditure: Public education expenditure as a % 
of GDP 
 1960  1965  1970  1975  1980-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-98  
Brunei Darussalam  ..  ..  ..  2.0 1.7 4.7  3.9  4.4 
Cambodia  3.4  3.7 5.8 ..     4.2 
Indonesia  ..  ..  2.6 2.7 1.8 0.9  1.3  1.4 
Lao People's Dem Rep  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.4 0.9  2.4  2.3 
Malaysia  ..  4.1 4.0 5.7 6.2 5.9  4.8  4.8 
Myanmar  2.2  2.7 3.1 1.7 1.9 2.0  1.2   
Philippines  2.2  2.4 2.7 2.0 1.7 2.5  2.7  3.4 
Singapore  3.1  4.4 3.2 2.9 3.9 3.5  3.3   
Thailand  ..  2.4 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.4  3.8  4.7 
Viet Nam  .. ..  .. ..   2.0  2.4  2.9 
Asia (excluding Middle 
East)  
..  3.9 3.6 4.9 4.9 4.3  3.4  3.5 
Central America &          
Caribbean  ..  2.6 3.1 4.1 4.2 3.4  4.1   
Developed Countries  ..  5.0 5.6 6.1 5.7 5.2  4.9  4.8 
Developing Countries  ..  ..  2.8 ..  3.5 3.2  3.4   
High Income Countries  ..  5.0 5.5 6.0 5.7 5.1  4.8  4.7 
Low Income Countries  ..  2.6 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.4  3.3  3.2 
Middle East & North          
Africa  ..  4.0 3.8 ..  4.9 4.8  4.7   
Middle Income Countries  ..  ..  ..  ..    3.7   
World  ..  3.5 3.7 3.8 4.1 3.9  4.4  4.6 




Table 4-13 Educational expenditures in Southeast Asia 
 GDP/capita 
(PPP US$) 
Public expenditures on 
education as a percent of 
GNP 
Public expenditures on 
education as a share of total 
government expenditures 
Country 1999 1986 1990 1996 1986 1990 1996 
Singapore 20,767 3.9 3.0 3.0 11.5 18.2 23.4 
Malaysia 8,209 6.9 5.5 5.2 18.8 18.3 15.4 
Thailand 6,132 3.4 3.6 4.8 17.9 20.0 n.a. 
Philippines 3,805 2.1 2.9 3.2 11.2 10.1 17.6 
Indonesia 2,857 0.9 1 1.4 4.3 n.a. 7.9 
Vietnam 1,860 n.a. 2.1 2.9 n.a. 7.5 n.a. 
Laos 1,471 0.5 2.5 2.5 6.6 n.a. 10.3 
Cambodia 1,361 n.a. n.a. 2.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Myanmar 1,027 1.9 n.a. 1.2 n.a. n.a. 14.4 
Japan 24,898 n.a. 3.6 3.6 n.a. 10.4 9.9 
Hong 
Kong 
22,090 2.5 2.8 2.9 19.8 17.4 17.0 
South 
Korea 
15,712 3.8 3.5 3.7 n.a. n.a. 17.5 
China 3,617 2.3 2.3 2.3 11.1 12.8 12.2 
Source: UNESCO, in Sjöholm (2002).   
 
 Considering the low expenditures that Indonesia had on education could signal 
two aspects. Firstly it could mean that Indonesia had a low quality of education. 
However, the empirical evidence on this premise does not fully explain this. Some 
would say that pouring money into education would not solve the problem of low 
quality, as without proper system and control, the money would be just wasted due to 
corrupt practices.138 World Bank (2001: 9) has noted that “Research over the past 
decade has consistently found that education spending is necessary but not sufficient 
for educational progress”. 
                                                 
138 For some example on the recent case of corruption relating with education grants from international 
donor communities refer to Baines (2004).    
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Excessive spending on education can also be damaging to the society, such that 
it could lead to a phenomenon known as ‘education fever’139 as recently happened in 
the Republic of Korea (ROK). The ‘education fever’ has also been part of the Korean 
top political agenda, even requiring the President of ROK himself to announce that his 
government would “free young people from extra-curricular activities and relieve 
parents from the heavy monetary burden of private tutoring” (Yi 2002: 2 quoted in 
Bray 2003: 60).  
 Nevertheless, some empirical research do suggest that the increase in 
expenditures, would contribute to improvements in education quality (see Figure 4-4, 
especially for the developed economies such as Korea, most probably in order to 
achieve the status of ‘knowledge economy’)140. 
The high expenditures on education, as such, should be interpreted carefully. 
The dynamics of the employment supply and demand process in developing countries 
tends to expand educational spending beyond the socially optimum level. In most 
developing countries, wages in the modern sector are much higher in the traditional 
sector, which creates a very strong demand for jobs in the former. Entry into the 
modern sector depends initially on the level of completed education, creating, in turn, 
an equally strong demand for education. At the same time rapid population growth over 
a long period produce more workers that can be absorbed by the economy. Under such 
conditions, employers tend to select workers according to educational level, with, for 
                                                 
139 Education fever can be narrowly defined as “parental zeal or passion for providing their children with 
better chances for admission into prestigious universities”(Lee 2005: 99). 
140 OECD (2000 :9) noted thar “Many Asian economies – including Korea, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
Malaysia, Thailand and China – have weathered the financial crisis of 1997-98 only to face the challenge 
of developing into knowledge-based economies in order to remain competitive. For a comparison of 
Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s attempt to pursue a knowledge society refer to Evers (2003). 
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example, by selecting workers who have completed primary education filling jobs that 
can be performed satisfactorily by those with no primary schooling. As a consequence, 
individual workers safeguard their positions by acquiring a higher level of education, 
which in turn increases the demand for each level of education (Lee 1996 : 149-150).  
Figure 4-6 Average Years of Schooling by Public Spending on Education 
 
Source: Tan et al, 2001: Enhancing Human Development in the HIPC/PRSP Context in World Bank 
(2001). 
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Figure 4-7 Relationship Between Average Performance (Reading, Maths, 
Science) and Average Spending Per Student 
 
Source: PISA report, OECD, 2001a, Figure 3.7b, p.91 in World Bank (2001). 
 
4.4 Indonesia’s Family Life Survey (IFLS) Data Analysis141 
The National Examination (EBTANAS)142 score (total and score on math) will 
be used to assess the quality of education in the provinces covered by the IFLS survey 
for primary (Sekolah Dasar-SD), junior secondary (Sekolah Menengah Pertama-SMP), 
and senior-secondary (Sekolah Menegah Atas-SMA) level. One apparent tendency is 
that the score on Math tend to decrease as the level of education increases. 
                                                 
141 For a short description on the IFLS data,  refer to the appendix. 
142 EBTANAS an acronym for Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional (could be translated literally as 
‘National Final Exam’) was a national examination system for students as a requirement for graduation 
in the primary (SD), junior secondary (SMP) and senior secondary (SMA) level of schooling. 
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The highest score occurred in Yogyakarta (Central Java) and the lowest is in 
Palembang (Sumatra). In general, the EBTANAS score is higher in the Java region, 
compared with Sumatra and Eastern region. 
Table 4-14 EBTANAS Score 
  Sumatra (west) Java (central) Eastern 
SD Mathematics score 5.505 6.184 5.415 
 Total score 30.515 32.546 29.575 
SMP Mathematics score 4.58 5.096 4.2325 
 Total score 32.21 34.776 32.07 
SMA Mathematics score 4.2825 4.588 3.7625 
 Total score 32.1925 32.858 31.1825 
Source: Calculated from IFLS by the author. 
 
In terms of education expense incurred by students in primary level, registration 
fees and tuition fees (SPP) are the two main components of cost of schooling. In terms 
of education expenses, again the Java region has the highest level of education 
expenses. A complete description of the school costs in the elementary and secondary 
schooling is given in Table 4-15 to 4-17. 
Table 4-15 Education Expense Incurred by Students 1997, SD 
 Sumatra (west) Java (central)  Eastern 
Sum of income Principal  461,025 493,931 506,031
New student fees: Registration 11,077 24,174 11,666 
New student fees: SPP/POMG etc  23,264 33,456 18,784 
New student fees: Tests  1,203 4,511 3,651 
Continue student fees: Registration 1,019 883 52 
Continue student fees: SPP/POMG etc 24,103 1,698,906 18,817 
Continue student fees: Tests  1,796 4,962 4,512 
Supplies: Books, writing materials 20,822 42,592 16,207 
Supplies: Uniforms  17,404 27,685 11,765 
EBTANAS  4,347 12,185 2,186 
Extra-curricular activities  2,519 2,055 4,918 
Magazines  557 1,408 433 
Other  669 856 2 
Irregular contribution 10,000 68,397 608 
Source: Calculated from IFLS by the author. 
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Table 4-16 Education Expense Incurred by Students 1997, SMP 
 Sumatra (west) Java (central)  Eastern 
Sum of income Principal  445,059 480,246 460,460
New student fees:     
Registration 17,128 64,932 18,348 
New student fees:     
SPP/POMG etc  41,615 75,408 39,848 
New student fees: Tests  5,545 10,853 4,137 
Continue student fees:     
Registration 2,967 5,279 786 
Continue student fees:     
SPP/POMG etc  39,986 2,073,914 37,394 
Continue student fees:     
Tests  6,124 11,207 3,883 
Supplies: Books, writing materials 50,910 74,957 31,201 
Supplies: Uniforms  30,896 50,609 21,417 
EBTANAS  12,169 2,104,239 7,823 
Extra-curricular activities  4,945 4,580 1,501 
Magazines  2,761 1,214 345 
Other  366 389 0 
Irregular contribution 2,433 20,462,712 14,535 
Source: Calculated from IFLS by the author. 
Table 4-17 Education Expense Incurred by Students 1997, SMA 
 Sumatra (west) Java (central)  Eastern 
Sum of income Principal  479,161 505,201 541,956 
New student fees: Registration 31,672 125,681 39,211 
New student fees: SPP/POMG etc  82,782 140,158 75,028 
New student fees: Tests  10,329 16,292 7,210 
Continue student fees: Registration 4,202 10,244 5,952 
Continue student fees: SPP/POMG etc 5,766,530 138,243 10,489,134
Continue student fees: Tests  12,613 17,442 10,681 
Supplies: Books, writing materials  55,994 78,106 41,694 
Supplies: Uniforms  52,222 64,296 34,410 
EBTANAS  21,453 31,006 15,702 
Extra-curricular activities  6,526 8,555 3,175 
Magazines  776 1,287 172 
Other  402 13,326 860 
Irregular contribution  24,334 38,802,885 15,000 
Source: Calculated from IFLS by the author. 
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For household expenses, registration fee, school fee, and transport costs 
represent the main expenses for schooling. Again the Java region represents the region 
with the largest household expenses for schooling. 
Table 4-18 Household Expenses for Schooling, 1997 
 Sumatra (west) Java (central) Eastern  
Registration fee  83,889 228,736 87,304 
School fee  115,807 277,155 104,044 
Exam fees  23,725 55,755 31,432 
Books/school supplies  63,094 92,465 51,902 
Uniform/sport fees  44,492 41,079 37,889 
Transport costs  127,901 194,857 120,725 
Housing/food costs  162,590 354,048 165,500 
Special course costs  83,900 120,518 84,827 
Other school expenses 32,699 68,355 12,397 
Source: Calculated from IFLS by the author. 
 
The share of household expenditure on education in Indonesia is actually quite 
low, with only 14% as the highest share of education expenditures. The regions with 
the highest figure are Jakarta and Yogyakarta, while the lowest are South Sulawesi and 
South Kalimantan. 
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Table 4-19 Share of Education Expenditures from Total Household 
Expenditures 
Region  Total Expenditures Education expenditures  %  
North Sumatra  4,372,668 410,231  9.38%  
West Sumatra  5,213,702 455,441  8.74%  
South Sumatra  4,918,186 374,603  7.62%  
Lampung  3,905,356 267,517  6.85%  
Jakarta  8,686,899 1,170,920  13.48% 
West Java  5,040,520 461,242  9.15%  
Central Java  4,552,758 360,458  7.92%  
Yogyakarta  3,833,343 429,325  11.20% 
East Java  2,867,998 248,453  8.66%  
Bali  4,467,371 298,918  6.69%  
West Nusa Tenggara  3,575,751 295,681  8.27%  
South Kalimantan  4,449,171 273,716  6.15%  
South Sulawesi  3,894,349 197,130  5.06%  
Source: Calculated from IFLS by the author. 
 
4.5 Education and Employment during the Structural 
Transformation 
After receiving a boost from the SD Inpres program, the educational sector in 
Indonesia was dampened by the economic downturn resulting from the drop in oil price 
in 1986/87. It seems that ‘oil’ affects many of the development progress of the 
Indonesian nation. The impact was mostly felt at the lower secondary level, as the 
primary level still benefited from the ‘left-over’ from the SD Inpres program. The 
economic downturn, sadly, has greatly affected the poor families whose children 
attended the secondary level and those attending the private school (Jones, G.W., 
Hagul, P. and Damayanti 2000: 2-3). 
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Figure 4-8 The drop in Gross Enrollment Rate (%) started in 1986/87 
 
Source: Jones, G.W., Hagul, P. and Damayanti (2000). 
 
Jones et.al. (2000: 3) wrote: 
Government educational expenditures fell, both as a per cent of GDP - 
from 4.13 percent in 1985 to about 2.6 per cent in the years 1989-91 and 
as a share of total government spending. The public subsidy of schooling 
declined substantially, and schools reacted by asking parents to pay 
higher fees…These put lower secondary education out of reach of many 
poor families, and this was exacerbated by the fall in some household 
incomes over the period between 1989 and 1993. 
 
Additionally, Lewin and Caillods (2001: Chapter 1) quoted in Jones (2003: 6) 
wrote: 
For countries which aspire to take full advantage of the opportunities of 
economic growth afforded by globalization, and to avoid its adverse side 
effects, then, expansion of lower secondary education has become 
crucial. Primary schooling alone cannot provide the insights, skills and 
competencies needed. (underline emphasized added) 
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It seems that the expansion of lower secondary education is seen to be crucial in 
order for the economic growth in Indonesia to continue. It is interesting to note the 
underlined words in the above quote. It represents a widely believed dogmatic view that 
globalization (a.k.a. free international trade143) is the way out for underdeveloped 
countries to break out from its current devastating conditions. The far-reaching 
influence and domination of globalization (which is gained through capitalism) above 
national agenda and perspectives has its own problematic issue. It could make the 
domestic school lose its own ‘national identity’ and merely creating schools as one 
among other institutions to serve the needs of capitalism or the business world. Figure 
4-9 describes the channels through which globalization could penetrate into the 
domestic schools. 
                                                 
143 The principle of free-trade following the comparative-advantage paradigm has been the major 
principle governing the current world order. The Economist magazine wrote in 7 December 1996: “'Free 
trade', wrote Richard Cobden in 1857, 'is God's diplomacy, and there is no other certain way of uniting 
people in the bonds of peace.' Few politicians since Cobden have thought of themselves as missionaries 
for free trade. Yet now, an odd thing is happening: most of the world's governments claim to be exactly 
that.” 
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Figure 4-9 Links between the Global Level and the Individual Level 
 
Source: Okuma-Nyström (2004). 
The education and skills of workers is actually a valuable input in the economic 
and industrialization development. As a country becomes industrialized, it would need 
an upgraded skills and education from its workers. Lall (1998) provided the direct 
linkage between human capital and industrial development patterns in figure 4-10.  
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Figure 4-10 Human Capital and Industrial Development Patterns 
Level/Pattern of Industrial Development Human Capital Profiles 
  Skills Technological Capabilities 
    
 
Low levels, mainly 
simple assembly and 




Literacy simple technical 
and managerial traning 
practically no in-firm 
traning exept informal on 
job learning. 
Ability to master assembly 
technologies copy simple 
designs repair machines, 
but many activites operate 
well below world best 
practice levels of technical 
efficiency. 
    
 
Intermedite level, with 
export-oriented activities 
in light industry, some 




Good secondary & 
technical schooling and 
management financial 
traning. Low base of 
engineering and scientific 
skills. In-house training 
mainly by export-oriented 





maintenance in export 
oriented industries. In 
others, capability to 
undertake minor 
adaptations to processes 




    
 
Deep industrial structure 
but mainly imward-
oriented, technological 
lags in many activities 
 
 Broad but often low quality 
schooling, vocational and 
industrial training. Broad 
engineering base In-house 
training lapping. Training 
institute de-linked from 
industry. Management and 
marketing skills weak. 
SMEs have some modern 
skills. 
Process mastery of capital 
and skill intensive 
technologies, but with 
ineffiencies. Considerable 
backward linkages, 
significant adaptation of 
imported technologies. 
Little innovation, low 
linkages with universities 
and technology institutions 
    
 
Advanced and deep 
industrial structure, with 
many world-class 
activities, own design & 
technology base 
 
 Excellent quality schooling 
and Industrial Training. 
High levels of university 
trained managers, 
engineers and scientists. 
Training institutes 
responsive to industrial 
needs. Large investments 
in formal and informal in-
firm training SMEs have 
high skill levels and 
competence. 
Ability to monitor,  import 
and adapt state of art 
advanced technologies. 
Good design and 
development capabilities in 
sophisticated technologies. 





  Source: Lall (1998).  
  
The human capital factor becomes much more important as we have mentioned 
above how the economic growth in Malaysia and Indonesia is actually foreign-
investment driven as both countries liberalize and perform a massive deregulation 
effort in the 1980s. As Monge-Naranjo (2002: 5) noted that there is a “strong, positive 
relationship between the schooling (general human capital) of the countries with the 
amount of FDI that the country ends up attracting”. 
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To further assess the impact of education on economic growth in Indonesia, it is 
necessary to look at the changes in employment structure and poverty. A smoother 
transition from rural to industrial structure would require a concurrent transformation in 
the education and skills of labor inputs. Although education increases skills, the impact 
on the income of the poor depends on whether their particular skills were valued within 
the economy (Hunter 1994). A concurrent transformation both in the industrial and 
employment structure would ensure a more equitable growth.   
In Malaysia, the employment restructuring pursued by the NEP basically 
succeeded. The number of Bumiputera (Malays and other indigenous people) working 
in the industrial sector in Peninsular Malaysia increased dramatically from 173,000 in 
1970 to 918,000 in 1990. Poverty eradication was also impressive144. Urban poverty 
has been virtually eliminated and rural poverty is shrinking rapidly in Malaysia mainly 
because of growing opportunities for non-agricultural work. (Snodgrass 1995: 10)    
Though Indonesia managed to cut the poverty level in half from 1976 to 1981, 
significant difficulties started to develop in 1990 (refer to Table 4-20)- the reduction 
level in poverty has been slow since then. While poverty reduction had never been 
explicitly identified as a development objective in Soeharto era, during the first Long 
Term Development Planning (Pembangunan Jangka Panjang-PJP) PJP-I/PELITA I – 
PELITA V (1970 to 1994), this was not the case in PELITA VI/PJP-II. For the first 
time, the government set explicit targets for reduction and eventual total elimination of 
poverty by the end of PELITA VII (2004).  
                                                 
144 However Guan (2000: 19) noted that because inequality was predominantly historically constructed in 
ethnic terms, poverty eradication policy became identified primarily with rural Malay poverty. This has 
led to the formulation and implementation of poverty eradication programs that largely only benefited the 
rural Malay poor. The non-Malay poor hence were largely neglected in the government poverty 
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Table 4-20 Indonesia: Economic Growth and Poverty Condition in Indonesia 
Prior to the 1997 Crisis 
Number of Poor People 













1976  10.0 38.8 44.2 40.4 54.2 40.1  
1981 4.68 9.3 28.1 31.1 26.5 40.6 26.9 (2.64) 
1984 4.55 9.3 23.1 25.7 21.2 35.0 21.6 (1.77) 
1985 2.02 9.7 20.1 20.3 16.4 30.0 17.4 (4.20) 
1990 7.2 9.4 16.7 17.8 14.3 27.2 15.08 (0.46) 
1993 6.5 8.8 13.4 17.2 13.8 25.9 13.67 (0.47) 
1996 7.9 6.9 10.1 15.7 12.6 22.6 11.39 (0.76) 
Source: Tjiptoherijanto (1997) in Canada-Southeast Asia Project Team (2000).  
  
While for employment transformation, despite the shift towards manufacturing 
industries, agriculture still remained a vital source of employment in Indonesia (refer to 
Figure 4-11). Throughout the 1980s agriculture continued to employ over 50% of the 
population. Only by the end of the 1980s, that agriculture's share began to fall – from 
55% in 1985 to 50% in 1990 and to 44% by the late 1990s – supported with the rise of 
labor-intensive manufacturing industry.145 Even in the manufacturing level, the share of 
employment generally absorbed by the SMEs rather than the big firm. 
                                                  
                                                                                                                                              
eradication policies and were left to fend by themselves.  
145 Indonesia Human Development Report 2001, Chapter 3, UNDP. 
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Figure 4-11 Indonesia: Employment by sector 
 
Source: Irawan et al (2000) in UNDP (2001). 
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Table 4-21 The Distribution of Employment Shares Across Plant Sizes 
 
Notes: a/source: 1992 United States Census of Manufacturing, unpublished Census Bureau calculations, 
b/source: INEGI (1995), c/source: Steel (1993), d/source: Little et al (1987, Table 6.5), e/source: 1988 
Census of Manufacturing, Republic of Korea, calculations of Bee-Yan Aw, f/source: Chen (1997, table 
2.4), g/source: Liedholm and Mead (1987), quoted in Tybout (2000). 
 
 While for the working population, even in 1996, the majority of labor force only 
received primary level (or below) education. The urban location generally has a better 
human capital quality in terms of formal education received than the rural areas (refer 
to Table 4-22). It seems this could point out the ‘dualism’ (traditional versus modern, 
primitive versus developed) that also existed in the Indonesian labor force, as well as it 
has existed in the Indonesian economy. Additionally, the wage received by the 
agriculture sector seems to be the lowest among other sectors (Table 4-23). Again, this 
notion has reinforced the ‘dualism’ phenomenon in the labor market. 
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Table 4-22 Percentages of Working Population by Level of Education, 
Location (Urban & Rural), and Sex (M/F), 1986 and 1996 
Urban Rural Total 
1986 1996 1986 1996 1986 1996 
 
M F M F M F M F M F M F  
1 No Schooling  6.0  17.1  2.3  7.4  15.2  29.8  9.1  18.9  13.2  27.7  6.8  15.1  
2 Primary School Drop-
out  
15.3  21.7  9.5  13.6  33.2  34.4  23.0  27.0  29.3  32.3  18.4  23.0  
3 Primary School  31.2  28.6  28.0  30.0  38.1  29.1  44.9  40.3  36.6  29.0  39.2  37.2  
4 Junior High School 8.0  9.4  8.4  13.9  7.5  3.6  12.2  7.7  8.1  5.0  14.3  9.5  
5 Senior High School 24.5  17.6  33.0  27.2  5.3  2.8  9.6  5.9  9.5  5.3  17.5  12.3  
6 Community College/ 
University  
5.1  3.1  8.8  7.9  0.7  0.3  1.2 0.7  3.3  0.7  3.8  2.9  
Total (1000 person) 9082  4526 7832 9820 3236 22371 3515 22892 41441  26897  52990 32712 
Note: M = Male F = Female, Adapted from: Baharsjah, Justika S., 1997. Proceedings of Workshop on 
Women Empowerment, Through Agribusiness Development in Rural Areas Indonesian Agronomist 
Association  Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989, 1997 quoted in Sulaiman and Gasim (1998). 
 
Table 4-23 Labor Wage Average (Rp/month) in Indonesia 1980-2002 
1980 1985 1990   
  
  
  min max min max min max 
1997 2002 
1 Agriculture  17,606 191,411 38,688 320,979 100,590 758,043 106,535 294,679 
2 Mining  60,069 448,725 95,296 690,147 218,241 1,979,561 296,630 na 
3 Manufacturing 
or Industry  




21,050 231,719 60,901 517,672 105,751 683,794 300,667 na 
5 Construction  29,105 370,994 53,129 635,598 221,240 1,188,131 209,975 549,261 
6 Trading 42,112 361,254 90,117 724,383 227,611 1,442,426 208,823 582,515 
  Finance na Na na na na na 431,704 1,062,307 
7 Transportation 41,972 382,665 85,724 612,592 133,671 1,047,077 262,169 723,109 
8 Services  33,270 322,330 71,597 441,213 157,585 1,121,810 237,624 785,904 
 Others na Na na na na na 230,607 953,386 
Source: Ministry of Labor, GOI (1992: 37-38, 2003: 165). 
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
The evolutionary process of the education sector in Indonesia seems to follow 
the pattern of the political nature of the state. In Indonesia, the education sector seems 
to be marginalized and only being subverted by political motives of the state. Political 
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support is crucial in developing a vibrant and strong education sector. As such the 
state’s interest on developing the education sector seems to depend on the political 
willingnes of the state and the amount of budget available. The nature and type of 
state’s policy in education also depends on the developmental paradigm of the national 
government. When Soeharto took over power, his ‘developmental state’ paradigm 
created a rather secular system of education despite the existence of strong religious 
traditional schooling in the society. Also Soeharto’s effort in eradicating poverty has 
gives a ‘windfall profit’ for primary education, as it being developed marveolusly 







Chapter 5 Education Role in the Macroeconomics of 
Growth in Indonesia 
Role of Education in the Macroeconomics of 
Growth in Indonesia 
 
The direct impact of education would be related with the labor sector146. Simple 
Solow neoclassical growth model, like Y=f(K,L) or more specifically the Cobb-
Douglas production function147 has been widely used to asses the quality of growth, 
whether it was simply an ‘input-driven’ growth, where economic growth was simply a 
process of accumulation of factors of production (capital and labor), or whether it was a 
‘productivity-driven’ growth, where growth resulted from ‘total factor productivity’, 
from ‘augmented-labor’ or ‘augmented-capital’.  
Paul R. Krugman, an economist from Stanford University, was one of the 
scholars that uses the ‘total factor productivity’ framework in analyzing the so-called 
‘East-Asian miracle’. Contrary to the popular opinion at that time, Krugman, by 
referring to Alwyn Young’s work, stated that the fantastic growth of East Asia was 
simply due to the massive input that it received, Krugman (1994: 76) wrote: 
                                                 
146 Gary S. Becker (1991) concept of ‘human capital’ also (at least at the beginning) only relates with 
‘education’ in terms of ‘training’ of the labor force. 
147 Where Y=Output or Gross Domestic Product, K=Capital, L=Labor. This model is also considered as a 
supply-side model of growth. 
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…the remarkable record of East Asian growth has been matched by input 
growth so rapid that Asian economic growth, incredibly, ceases to be a 
mystery. 
 
In analyzing Soviet growth, Krugman (1994: 63) wrote that: 
The rapid growth in output could be fully explained by rapid growth in 
inputs: expansion of employment, increases in education levels, and, 
above all, massive investment in physical capital. Once those inputs were 
taken into account, the growth in output was unsurprising--or, to put it 
differently, the big surprise about Soviet growth was that when closely 
examined it posed no mystery. 
 
Krugman also mentions the dualism of economies in East Asia (following 
Arthur Lewis148 concept of dualism), where the release of labor (partially) employed in 
agriculture basically provides and analogous with an increase in the labor force. This is 
pointing to the signs of an unbalanced-growth pattern.149 
The Solow growth model and Krugman’s article also points to the work of 
Edward F. Denison (1962) on growth accounting, and more recently on the work of 
Pierre van der Eng (1994, 1999). 
As such this chapter would attempt to assess the role of education using the 
method used by the scholars mentioned above. One of the reasons in applying the 
above method compared with others is that the method proposed by the scholars 
(except for those proposed by Gary S. Becker and Robert Solow to some extent) is 
relatively simple and yet provide a relatively powerful and convincing argument.150 
                                                 
148 In the Lewis Model it is implicitly assumed that the labor force in the rural sector is homogenous and 
that rural-urban migration was not influenced by the prevailing socio cultural structure of the economy 
(Dubey, et.al. 2004). 
149 Similar conclusion regarding the unbalanced-growth property of Indonesia also reached by Temple 
(2001). 
150 Following the ‘Ockham’s razor’ and ‘Galileo’s knife’ principle (Calne 1999: 28). 
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In this chapter, the basic Solow model will be applied to the Indonesian case, 
using national aggregate data. Firstly, we will consider the simple two factor model of 
growth consisting of capital (K) and labor (L). Secondly, in order to assess the direct 
relationship of education (through the workforce) we will use a three factor model of 
growth by adding the human capital (H) factor. 
Additional focus is given to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or Solow Residual, 
because education or human capital is perceived to produce positive (social) 
externalities that most probably provides a significant component of TFP in growth 
models. As Marshall (1920) quoted in Lange and Topel (forthcoming) noted: 
Marshall emphasized the social benefits of valuable ideas, which are 
public goods and, he implies, are more likely to be produced by the 
highly educated.  “..[F]or one new idea, such as Bessemer’s chief 
invention, adds as much to England’s productive power as the labor of a 
hundred thousand men.  …All that is spent …[in educating the masses] 
would be well paid for if it called out one more Newton or Darwin, 
Shakespeare, or Beethoven.” Principles of Economics, 8th Edition, 
(1920). 
 
Of course, because of the rather weak links and immeasurable nature of human 
capital, some scholars like Spence (1974) quoted in Lange and Topel (forthcoming) 
which considers schooling to act only ‘as a signal of private information about 
individual productivities, for which employers are willing to pay, though it does not 
raise anyone’s productivity’.   
5.1 Limitations of the Model 
Firstly, a major problem with highly aggregated economic data is that it masks 
the magnitude and even the nature of the allocational changes going on. However, if we 
would like to capture the externalities of each factor of production and the overall 
performance of the economy the aggregation is unavoidable. As such, a longer time 
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series is required to give a more reliable estimation. In addition a longer time series 
would also enable us to asses the long-run effect of education and capital to growth.  
If we only focus on certain time period, it is possible that because a factor of 
production has not reached its diminishing return, it would have higher productivity. By 
focusing more on a longer time period we could asses whether an economy has shifted 
its production function to avoid diminishing return (an increase in technical progress or 
TFP), or remain on the same production function such that diminishing return would 
occur in the end. 
Secondly, the use of Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate the separate 
contributions of the three sources to output growth has certain limitation, even if the 
correct method has been used to obtain α, β and γ. That is, the contribution of technical 
progress is obtained only as a residual. In cases where technical progress is estimated in 
this way to contribute to output growth, this is clearly not a satisfactory method of 
arriving at its contribution, especially as the estimate will also incorporate errors in the 
measurement of capital and labor (Lim 1996: 56-57).  
Thirdly, the direction of causation is not clear because there are good reasons 
for believing that it goes from growth to education (e.g. the wealthier the country the 
more it can afford or appreciate education) or that the causation flows in both 
directions. 
Fourthly, this study uses formal education as a measure of human capital151, it 
would then exclude the measurement of learning-by-doing process and other training or 
informal education. 
                                                 
151 Leeuwen (2004) call this as the ‘educational stock’ approach. 
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Finally the classic problem of data measurement is always unavoidable. The 
measurement of capital stock and human capital poses weakness in the accuracy and 
largely depends on the method used to calculate the investment, depreciation rate, and 
education level.  
5.2 Two Factors of Production Growth Model Applied to Indonesia 
The model that is going to be used is basically a two-factor neo-classical model 
of economic growth, with the general form of Y=f(K,L). The structural form of the 
model could be formulated below:  
βα LAKY =          (1) 
To simplify the estimation method, equation (1) could be turned into natural log 
function (or growth function, where “d(lnx)=dx/x”) = : 
LKAY lnlnlnln βα ++=        (2) 




















Equation 2 then could be estimated, following that we have the data for Y 
(GDP), K (capital), L (labor) and H (human capital); with α and β as production 
elasticities of physical capital and labor. The constant A could be viewed as Solow 
residual152. Y is output measured by GDP, and K is capital and L is labor measured by 
                                                 
152 This ‘Solow residual’ often to be referred as ‘Total Factor Productivity’ and is said to be related with 
the level of technology, research, knowledge and institutions (Eicher, et. al., forthcoming).  
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the number of people worked in the period t. All of the data is taken from van der 
Eng.153 
Table 5-1 GDP, Labor and Capital Stock data, 1952-2002 
Year GDP*  Employment ** Capital stock*** Year GDP  Employment  Capital stock 
1952 19,647 32,584 29,034 1980 72,550 51,553 151,896 
53 20,624 33,016 31,581 81 77,537 53,016 165,975 
54 21,910 33,184 33,893 82 74,684 54,523 181,942 
1955 22,511 33,135 36,231 83 77,676 56,362 200,495 
56 22,811 33,529 38,684 84 83,037 58,266 219,687 
57 24,368 34,044 41,206 1985 85,082 60,238 236,707 
58 23,490 34,619 43,614 86 90,080 62,279 253,625 
59 24,500 35,298 46,021 87 94,518 64,393 271,495 
1960 25,539 35,990 47,474 88 99,935 66,582 291,697 
61 27,214 36,727 49,903 89 108,924 68,850 315,176 
62 27,184 37,159 52,023 1990 118,607 71,570 342,750 
63 26,143 37,597 53,440 91 124,599 74,013 374,047 
64 27,108 38,039 55,109 92 137,962 76,286 406,312 
1965 27,379 38,485 56,886 93 147,448 78,634 440,548 
66 27,383 38,940 59,004 94 158,169 81,057 479,985 
67 26,766 39,395 60,521 1995 170,540 83,560 525,364 
68 29,376 39,855 62,948 96 183,191 86,144 577,669 
69 32,992 40,327 65,644 97 191,069 88,496 634,786 
1970 36,465 40,767 69,497 98 166,134 89,117 668,998 
71 38,461 41,261 74,276 99 166,499 89,743 697,830 
72 42,814 42,255 79,609 2000 174,322 90,373 731,324 
73 49,166 43,308 85,361 01 179,557 91,008 767,753 
74 51,648 44,389 92,151 02 185,732 91,647 803,620 
1975 51,657 45,499 99,298     
76 56,208 46,638 108,318     
77 60,591 47,808 117,623     
78 63,356 49,010 128,133     
79 66,804 50,243 139,830     
Note: *Gross Domestic Product (1983 reference market prices, billion rupiahs), **Labor (000), 





The procedure of selecting the model could also followed a more pragmatic 
approach, focusing more on ‘data fit’ rather than purely statistical or ‘stochastic’ 
                                                 
153 http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/people/info.asp?Surname=van%20der%20Eng&Firstname=Pierre 
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principles154. The focus here then, is whether the values of α and β are ‘reasonable’ 
considering the Indonesian economy narrative presented in the previous chapter. One of 
the main features of Indonesian economy was its dependence on FDI and thus capital. 
In addition, as a labor surplus economy, it would be safe to assume that labor was not a 
constraint for the Indonesian economy to develop.  
Using equation (1), the result of the regression estimation is not statistically 
robust as shown in the box below. Remembering the fact that ‘modern’ economic 
growth in Indonesia could be said to start in 1965 after the country stabilized and able 
to attract FDI; and also to the 1997 economic crisis that has caused a structural shift in 
Indonesia’s GDP growth, we apply equation (1) for Indonesian data in the period of 
1965-1997 and yet still get the following insignificant results, with only a capital 
coefficient having a significant t-statistic. 
                                                 
154 Indeed, as Tryfos (2004) notes, “the stochastic method dominates the analysis of business and 
economic relationships in academia and practice” (p.1), and criticise it by saying that “the very large 
majority of applications a stochastic model rests on no other grounds than faith” (p.14). Tryfos (2004) 
also argues that the limitations of stochastic model are many and that alternatives to the stochastic model 
do indeed exist. He proposes to still use the existing regression model without referring to much to the 
‘statistical’ significance or stochastic properties, but with an objective to ‘approximate the variable as 
closely as possible” (p.14), or referred as “the fitting method”.  
179
Box 5-1 Regression estimation result, eq.1 (1965-1997) 
Dependent Variable: Y 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/12/07   Time: 12:14 
Sample: 1965 1997 
Included observations: 33 
Estimation settings: tol= 0.00010, derivs=analytic 
Initial Values: C(1)=0.00314, C(2)=-0.15352, C(3)=2.39441 
Convergence achieved after 643 iterations 
Y=C(1)*(K^C(2))*(L^C(3)) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 441.9669 1559.930 0.283325 0.7789 
C(2) 0.665914 0.226221 2.943641 0.0062 
C(3) 0.223861 0.610828 0.366487 0.7166 
R-squared 0.989864     Mean dependent var 8.35E+13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989189     S.D. dependent var 4.74E+13 
S.E. of regression 4.93E+12     Akaike info criterion 61.37856 
Sum squared resid 7.30E+26     Schwarz criterion 61.51461 
Log likelihood -1009.746     Durbin-Watson stat 0.272943 
 
Applying equation (2) for Indonesian data in the period of 1965-1997 we would 
get the following result. 
Box 5-2 Regression estimation result, eq.2 (1965-1997) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(Y) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/12/07   Time: 07:08 
Sample: 1965 1997 
Included observations: 33 
LOG(Y)=C(1)+C(2)*LOG(K)+C(3)*LOG(L) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 17.45857 4.575420 3.815731 0.0006 
C(2) 1.342649 0.251687 5.334597 0.0000 
C(3) -1.658143 0.715537 -2.317342 0.0275 
R-squared 0.981199     Mean dependent var 31.89616 
Adjusted R-squared 0.979945     S.D. dependent var 0.586315 
S.E. of regression 0.083031     Akaike info criterion -2.052708 
Sum squared resid 0.206822     Schwarz criterion -1.916662 
Log likelihood 36.86969     Durbin-Watson stat 0.249216 
 
The regression estimation gives the value of α and β equals to 1.34 and -1.66, 
with all coefficients to be considered statistically sgnificant. The value of 
α= 1.34 means that a 1% growth of capital would result in 1.34% growth in output. 
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While a value of β= -1.66 means that a 1% growth of labor would result in a reduction 
of output growth in the magnitude of 1.66%. 
Using GDP per labor instead of GDP, and applied the Indonesian data to the 
model using the following equation155: 
α)/()/( LKALY =          (3) 
and 
)/ln(ln)/ln( LKALY α+=         (4) 
we would get the following result respectively: 
Box 5-3 Regression estimation result, eq.3 (1952-2002) 
Dependent Variable: Y/L 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/12/07   Time: 12:26 
Sample: 1952 2002 
Included observations: 51 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
(Y/L)=C(1)*((K/L)^C(2)) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 375.9077 122.5391 3.067656 0.0035 
C(2) 0.543250 0.021327 25.47200 0.0000 
R-squared 0.938920     Mean dependent var 1242098. 
Adjusted R-squared 0.937674     S.D. dependent var 496984.7 
S.E. of regression 124073.5     Akaike info criterion 26.33356 
Sum squared resid 7.54E+11     Schwarz criterion 26.40932 
Log likelihood -669.5058     Durbin-Watson stat 0.259021 
 
                                                 
155 This procedure of  ‘normalizing’ the production function was also done by Pritchett (1999). 
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Box 5-4 Regression estimation result, eq.4 (1952-2002) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(Y/L) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/12/07   Time: 12:40 
Sample: 1952 2002 
Included observations: 51 
LOG(Y/L)=C(1)+C(2)*LOG(K/L) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 5.118179 0.297996 17.17536 0.0000 
C(2) 0.596825 0.020118 29.66569 0.0000 
R-squared 0.947258     Mean dependent var 13.94924 
Adjusted R-squared 0.946182     S.D. dependent var 0.417987 
S.E. of regression 0.096968     Akaike info criterion -1.790450 
Sum squared resid 0.460735     Schwarz criterion -1.714692 
Log likelihood 47.65648     Durbin-Watson stat 0.206011 
 
The value of α (and β) that also could be considered as the fraction of the 
economy's output that accrues to capital (labor) or the elasticity of changes in capital 
(capital) affecting output is expected to be around 30% for capital and 70% for labor(in 
advanced economies). This figure was in line using national income data for the 
developed economy such as the US156, however, less true if not contrary with the 
statistical data available from the East Asian countries. As Soon and Ong (2001: 3) 
noted: 
Thailand (the only developing country in Asia to publish GDP using the 
income approach) has, as expected, the lowest remuneration share of 
29.9 % (in 1998). The remuneration shares of the Asian NIES are, in 
general, lower than that of the developed countries, which reflect the 
competitiveness of their wage structures. Singapore’s remuneration share 
(in 2000) of 42% of GDP is only slightly below Korea’s share of 43% (in 
1999). Industrial economies in the OECD have relatively high 
remuneration shares: US (58%), Japan (57%), UK (54%), Canada (53%) 
and France (53%). 
 
                                                 
156 In the US from 1958 to 1996 labor's share of aggregate value-added remained between 65 and 70 
percent (Figure 1, Young 2005 quoted in Zuleta and Young 2005).   
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Figure 5-1 Remuneration (wage) share of GDP, various years 
 
Source: Soon and Ong (2001)  
 
As a consequence, the profit share of most East Asian countries are indeed high, 
as depicted in Figure 5-2, with Thailand reaching around 60%. 
183
 Figure 5-2 Profit (capital) share of GDP, various years 
 
Source: Soon and Ong (2001) 
 
Looking at the Indonesian national data, the share of total wage in national 
income ranges around 30% for the period 1976-2003157, which is actually similar with 
other East Asian figures (table 5-2). 
                                                 
157 Zuleta and Young (2005 :3) regarded this relative stability of aggregate labor's share “constitutes one 
of the great macroeconomic ratios”.  
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1976 20224 148.4 31.51 13.76 2.03 47.3 7019.32 35 
1977 24859 163.7 31.16 15.07 2.08 48.31 7908.347 32 
1978 29743.4 180.6 31.97 17.69 2.12 51.78 9351.468 31 
1979 41877.5 228.8 31.9 17.47 2.3 51.67 11822.096 28 
1980 59426.3 289.9 31.83 17.42 2.31 51.56 14947.244 25 
1981 70647.5 367.4 35.09 17.1 2.4 54.59 20056.366 28 
1982 77624.5 465.5 38.69 16.43 2.69 57.81 26910.555 35 
1983 93122.7 526.1 40.29 16.04 2.99 59.32 31208.252 34 
1984 107833.6 594.6 41.95 15.77 3.15 60.87 36193.302 34 
1985 116329.5 672 43.68 15.46 3.32 62.46 41973.12 36 
1986 123186.5 759.4 50.76 14.02 3.56 68.34 51897.396 42 
1987 149740.7 820.7 51.71 14.89 3.8 70.4 57777.28 39 
1988 170480.7 856.1 53.4 15.19 3.93 72.52 62084.372 36 
1989 200568.6 926 53.64 15.73 4.06 73.43 67996.18 34 
1990 234654.6 1076.1 54.77 16.91 4.17 75.85 81622.185 35 
1991 273439.5 1219.8 54.05 18.03 4.34 76.42 93217.116 34 
1992 311778.9 1391.4 55.5 18.61 4.41 78.52 109252.728 35 
1993 362325.5 1721.9 54.74 20.01 4.44 79.19 136357.261 38 
1994 419945.8 1888.1 54.97 22.65 4.42 82.04 154899.724 37 
1995 499375.8 2259.9 55.2 24.21 4.49 83.9 189605.61 38 
1996 585133.9 2485.3 56.75 24.41 4.55 85.71 213015.063 36 
1997 689650.6 2888.8 56.56 25.76 4.51 86.83 250834.504 36 
1998 1050088.9 3387 58.87 24.24 4.57 87.68 296972.16 28 
1999 1208278 4163.4 59.43 24.81 4.57 88.81 369751.554 31 
2000 1389769.5 5162.4 60.15 25.16 4.51 89.82 463686.768 33 
2001 1684280.5 6371.9 64.23 22.08 4.5 90.81 578632.239 34 
2002 1897799.9 7197.2 63.81 23.44 4.4 91.65 659623.38 35 
2003 2086757.7 8070.3 64.25 22.43 4.11 90.79 732702.537 35 
Source: Calculated from data from the Central Agency of Statistics. 
 
Other estimation by Sigit (2004) yields higher albeit similar estimates for 
employment income share in Indonesia, as can be seen in Table 5-3. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 1975    115.6     45522.8   5263.0   12870.1    40.89  
 1976    134.4    1.1626   47306.2   6358.5   15884.3    40.03  
 1977    156.3    1.1626   49089.6   7671.1   19695.1    38.95  
 1978    181.7    1.1626   50940.3   9254.6   22955.9    40.31  
 1979    211.2    1.1626   52860.8   11165.1   33754.8    33.08  
 1980    245.6    1.1626   54856.6   13470.6   48217.9    27.94  
 1981    285.5    1.1626   56831.4   16224.7   57916.9    28.01  
 1982    331.9    1.1626   58875.1   19541.2   64171.0    30.45  
 1983    385.9    1.1626   60788.5   23456.9   77622.8    30.22  
 1984    448.6    1.1626   62764.2   28157.3   90712.0    31.04  
 1985    521.6    1.1626   64816.7   33806.2   98781.6    34.22  
 1986  606.4    1.1626   66864.9   40545.1   105516.6    38.43  
 1987    705.0    1.1626   68977.8   48627.3   128261.8    37.91  
 1988    819.6    1.1626   71157.5   58320.5   148641.6    39.24  
 1989    950.2    1.1594   73424.9   69771.5   176413.3    39.55  
 1990    1069.0    1.1250   75412.9   80615.2   208193.7    38.72  
 1991    1286.7    1.2037   76943.8   99002.5   244190.5    40.54  
 1992    1421.0    1.1044   78518.4   111578.0   281379.2    39.65  
 1993    1532.4    1.0784   80323.0   123089.7   329775.9    37.33  
 1994    1781.6    1.1626   82038.1   146159.7   377354.3    39.15  
 1995    2115.1    1.1872   83842.9   177340.1   454514.1    39.02  
 1996    2511.1    1.1872   85701.8   215208.1   532630.8    40.40  
 1997    2773.3    1.1044   87004.5   241293.0   624337.1    38.65  
 1998    2773.3    1.0000   85843.8   238074.1   951385.9    25.02  
Notes: column 2 in thousand rupiah; columns 3 and 7 in %; columns 4 in thousand persons; columns 5 
and 6 in billion rupiah. 
Source: Sigit (2004)       
       
Additionally, we must remember that the figures of wage share in the above 
table probably represents an ‘under-estimated’ in terms of shadow-price or real terms. 
Most of the workers in Indonesia are categorized as ‘self-employed’ mostly worked in 
the informal sector, these workers tend to receive lower or even zero nominal wages 
compared with their counterparts in the formal sector and to work fewer hours.  
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Another point to take into consideration is that α and β are, technically 
speaking, a product of two entities158. Calculating the marginal product of capital from 
the equation Y=AKα Lβ    
MPK = dY/dK = α * A * K(α−1) * Lβ = (α/K)* {A * Kα * Lβ} 
MPK = (α/K)* Y = α ∗ (Y/K), so 
α = MPK ∗ Κ/Y        (5) 
Using the same derivation,  
β = MPL ∗ L/Y       (6) 
While we could define national income (GDP) as the sum of income from labor 
(W=wages) and rent from capital (R=rent) in the form of  
Y = K * (R/P) + L * (W/P)  
In a competitive economy, based on the marginal productivity theory of 
distribution, the factors of production (capital and labor) are paid according to the value 
of their marginal product159, where MPK= R/P and MPL=W/P, defining r = R/P and w = 
W/P then we have 
 
α = r ∗ Κ/Y        (7) 
and,  
                                                 
158 According to some the Solow model is inextricably linked to the assumption of constant returns to 
scale. It is because there is a close link between the GDP accounting identity and the production function. 
If the production function happens to exhibit constant returns to scale and the inputs are paid the value of 
their marginal products, the value of output equals the sum of the input values. This condition of 
"product exhaustion" are based on Euler's Theorem, and it implies that the value shares, sK and sL, sum 
to one. (Hulten 2000: 10-11). 
159 Böhm-Bawerk (1959 [1881]) quoted in Murphy (2004) called this as "naive productivity theory" of 
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β = w ∗ L/Y       (8) 
Or, we could proceed with Y = K*MPK + L*MPL , where MPK = α ∗ (Y/K) and 
MPL = β ∗ (Y/L) we would get: 
Y = K*α ∗ (Y/K) + L*α ∗ (Y/L) =  α ∗ Y + β ∗ Y  (9) 
In short, whether β would equal the share of labor income in national income 
would depend on how close is w equals to MPL. In our result, β or MPL ∗ L/Y is less 
than w∗ L/Y calculated from the national income data that would suggest that w<MPL, 
which could indicate that labor are receiving income lower than their productivity. The 
lower wage could also indicate that the process of adverse selection is happening 
probably caused by the imperfect information and the heterogeneous quality of labor. 
 In general, wage differences occur because jobs are heterogeneous, workers are 
heterogeneous, and labor markets are imperfect (probably in terms of information) and 
segmented. Heterogeneous or segmented jobs require different types and degrees of 
skill, and heterogeneous workers posses such different skills.  
As an economy become industrialized, its previously relatively homogenous 
agricultural output of food at subsistence level evolved into a vibrant, dynamic and 
heterogeneous economy. These ‘heterogeneity’ of outputs could be expected to bring 
considerable changes in the structure of labor market as well. As Galenson (1992) 
noted: 
The relationships between economic development and the exploration 
and structure of labor markets have not been explored thoroughly. In part 
this is due to problems of measurement, but there are also difficulties 
stemming from the heterogeneity of the forces that affect labor market. 
For example, the political background and social characteristics of a 
                                                                                                                                              
interest. 
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country have an important influence on the manner in which its people 
work, and this in turn affects productivity. 
 
5.3 Three Factors of Production Growth Model Applied to Indonesia 
The previous section has provided us with the following points to further our 
study. Firstly, regarding the period that is going to be used, it is better to exclude the 
years after the 1997 crisis, since it would distort our estimation result. The second is 
that the use of GDP per labor instead of total GDP as the measure of economic growth 
would provide us with better result, because it focuses our attention towards 
productivity, which we could regard as the ultimate source of growth, rather than 
towards aggregate output. 
The third is that it was necessary to differentiate the ‘labor’ input in our 
estimated function to take into consideration the heterogeneity of labor, that most 
probably occur as a result of the different ‘quality’ or skill of the labor force due to the 
education or training that they have received. This is mostly related with the objective 
of this research to look at the direct impact of education towards economic growth. 
The problem of homogeneity actually also occurs in terms of capital. However, 
as we could assume that capital with higher productivity and quality would cost more 
and thus being reflected in its price, the problem of aggregation in capital is somewhat 
less serious compared with labor.  
Even then, one important point regarding the ‘source’ of capital is worth 
mentioning. It is important because, as we learn in the previous 1997 crisis, the lack of 
“indigenous” capital160 coupled with free mobility of capital has brought devastating 
                                                 
160 This is one characteristic where ‘human capital’ might be regarded as to be more stable and thus 
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impact to the Indonesian economy. Looking at Table 5-5, in terms of number of 
conglomerate groups, “indigenous” companies accounted only for 7-9% for the 1988-
1996 period. 
Table 5-4 Anatomy of the Top 300 Indonesian Conglomerates, 1988-1996 
Item  1988  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996  
Number of Groups  
Year of Establishment  
Before 1946  13  13 13 13 13 12 12 11  10  
1946-1968  125  125  123  120  118 122 122 120  120  
1969 Forward  162  162  164  167  169 166 166 169  170  
Ethnicity           
Mixed  86  83 80 76 76 71 69 71  68  
Nonindigenous  193  196  196  199  198 201 205 204  204  
Indigenous * 21(7)  21(7) 24(8) 25(8) 26(9) 28(9) 26(9) 25(8)  28(9)  
Political 
Affiliation  
         
Nonofficial  260  259  260  260  262 263 262 260  259  
Official-
Related  40  41 41 40 38 37 38 40  41  
Origin           
Family  176  175  171  174  172 171 172 177  175  
Nonfamily  124  125  129  126  128 129 128 123  125  
Sales (Rp trillion)  
Year of Establishment  
Before 1946  9.4  12.3  13.3  15.8  20.4  21.9  25.2  30.1  33.4  
1946-1968  31.2  36.8  43.2  49.7  59.1  73.1  86.1  103.0  116.4  
1969 Forward  23.2  28.4  33.6  40.0  46.5  52.1  59.8  68.9  77.4  
Ethnicity           
Mixed  12.8  15.1  17.6  18.7  21.2  22.8  25.2  29.0  31.1  
Nonindigenous  38.6  46.4  54.4  64.5  76.7  87.3  101.5 120.9  137.4  
Indigenous  12.4  16.0  18.0  22.3  28.1  37.0  44.4  52.1  58.7  
Political Affiliation  
Nonofficial  48.9  58.4  58.4  80.7  95.6  114.3 134.2 159.1  179.8  
Official-
Related  14.9  19.1  31.7  24.8  30.4  32.8  36.9  42.9  47.4  
Origin           
Family  35.0  42.6  49.1  57.2  68.4  77.4  89.5  106.3  120.4  
Nonfamily  28.8  34.9  41.0  48.3  57.6  69.7  81.6  95.7  106.8  
Note: *(..) = percentage of total 
Source: Indonesian Business Data Centre, Conglomeration Indonesia 1997 in Husnan (2001). 
 
                                                                                                                                              
beneficial compared with its ‘physical capital’ counterparts. 
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The inclusion of other factors of production other than capital (K) and labor (L) 
has become a long tradition in empirical models of growth. The Table 5-6 merely offers 
some work that has been done using an ‘extended’ Solow growth model. 
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Table 5-5 Some examples of the structural form of Solow (extended) growth 
models 
Author Structural and Estimation Form 
Solow (1956) in 
Gross (2001) 
y = A kα 
Roemer (1994: 2) Y=Y( K, L, H, E+F; t)  
H is measured in government expenditure and enrollment (p.7). 
g(Y)=σkg(K) + σLg(L) + σHg(H) + σMg(E+F) + τ 
Dewan and Hussein 
(2001: 23-25) 





Ht reflects the educational level of the workforce as well as its health 
and nutritional status (p.23). 
Lucas (1988), 
Mankiw et al. (1992) 
in Gross (2001). 
y = kα hα−1 




They use income per worker rather than the more usual measure of 
economic growth, income per person, as do recent contributions by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997a). 








Author Structural and Estimation Form 
 
May give indications of the effects of changes in the quality of 
factor inputs on TFP.  
 
 
Aiyar and Daalgard 
(2005: 84)  
 
where y = Y / L, k = K / L, and h = H / L; αK and αH refer to the share 





Collins (2003: 6)  
 
 
Smolny (2002; 307) 
 
where HK is human capital per worker and U is an indicator 
of the business cycle, factor utilization. 




Cihan and Dutta 
(2004)  
Crafts (1999: 147) 
 







O’Callaghan (2002)  
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Author Structural and Estimation Form 
 
Sianesi and Van 





h ≡ H / L is the stock of human capital per worker (say, average 
years of schooling in the labor force). 
 
 
Avila and Evenson 
(2004)  
 
van Leeuwen (2004) 
  
Astorga, et. al. 
(2003)  
 











Source: Compiled by author. 
Generally, the inclusion of human capital in the growth models was done by 
using the educational attainment of the labor force as one of the variables. Others like 
McMahon (1999) included gross enrolment rate as a proxy for educational investment 
expenditures. 
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The variable human capital161 (H) could be defined as the aggregate years of 
education received for labor, and would be defined as follows: 
H= 66543210 LhLLLLLL ++++++ = ∑ iiLh  
where: 
L0 = number of laborers who did not received any education. 
L1 = number of laborers who did not complete elementary school . 
L2 = number of laborers who passed elementary school (Sekolah Dasar/SD). 
L3 = number of laborers who passed junior high school (Sekolah Menengah 
Pertama/SMP). 
L4 = number of laborers who passed senior high school (Sekolah Menengah 
Atsa/SMA). 
L5 = number of laborers who passed college (Akademi/D3). 
L6 = number of laborers who passed University education (Universitas). 
L = total number of laborers. 
hi = respective weight attached to each level of education. 
  
                                                 
161 Alternative measurement of human capital coud be seen in Chen and Dahlman (2004). Human capital 
is usually measured in terms of indexes, usually based on the census data that measure the percentage of 
the population who have at least achieved a given level of education that is widely used by labor 
economists (Coulombe and Tremblay 1998). 
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Table 5-6 Labor classification based on the level of education received (in thousands) 
Year L0 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L 
1969 16,003 14,086 3,934 1,503 956 52 26 36,560 
1970 13,167 16,762 4,446 1,571 1,032 61 31 37,070 
1971 15,981 17,382 5,033 1,641 1,115 70 39 41,261 
1972 14,656 18,014 5,677 1,715 1,204 82 48 41,396 
1973 15,008 17,748 6,415 1,792 1,300 95 59 42,417 
1974 15,147 17,621 7,249 1,873 1,405 110 72 43,477 
1975 15,331 17,361 8,191 1,957 1,517 128 89 44,573 
1976 15,413 17,104 9,256 2,045 1,638 148 109 45,714 
1977 12,965 16,851 12,821 2,198 1,768 172 123 46,898 
1978 16,570 19,144 11,288 2,532 1,897 199 151 51,780 
1979 13,998 19,026 10,877 2,500 2,961 231 186 49,780 
1980 17,273 17,617 10,439 2,470 2,964 240 188 51,192 
1981 15,972 16,499 12,527 2,836 3,088 250 188 51,360 
1982 14,898 17,951 14,692 3,206 3,217 260 190 54,413 
1983 29,672 17,930 10,204 2,492 2,771 216 192 63,476 
1984 25,349 19,513 12,322 3,292 4,141 362 255 65,234 
1985 19,427 21,097 16,819 4,217 4,708 456 317 67,043 
1986 12,917 20,830 22,954 5,402 5,356 574 305 68,338 
1987 12,383 20,889 24,085 5,932 5,950 698 464 70,402 
1988 12,351 20,947 25,371 6,387 6,376 642 444 72,518 
1989 11,968 20,574 26,195 6,487 6,966 739 497 73,425 
1990 11,306 20,240 27,952 7,294 7,682 815 562 75,851 
1991 10,269 18,807 29,008 8,351 8,445 863 680 76,423 
1992 10,429 19,770 29,164 8,504 8,976 928 747 78,518 
1993 9,291 19,176 29,904 9,435 11,057 1,146 1,024 81,032 
1994 9,840 19,439 29,746 8,608 9,651 1,004 911 79,201 
1995 9,683 19,618 26,732 9,014 12,194 1,323 1,546 80,110 
1996 8,537 17,283 32,947 10,685 13,284 1,483 1,483 85,702 
1997 8,469 18,799 30,843 11,589 14,089 1,488 1,775 87,050 
Source: Cental Agency of Statistics. 
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Table 5-7 Labor classification based on the level of education received (in 
percentage of total labor) 
Year L0 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L 
1969 43.8 38.5 10.8 4.1 2.6 0.1 0.1 100 
1970 35.5 45.2 12.0 4.2 2.8 0.2 0.1 100 
1971 38.7 42.1 12.2 4.0 2.7 0.2 0.1 100 
1972 35.4 43.5 13.7 4.1 2.9 0.2 0.1 100 
1973 35.4 41.8 15.1 4.2 3.1 0.2 0.1 100 
1974 34.8 40.5 16.7 4.3 3.2 0.3 0.2 100 
1975 34.4 39.0 18.4 4.4 3.4 0.3 0.2 100 
1976 33.7 37.4 20.3 4.5 3.6 0.3 0.2 100 
1977 27.7 35.9 27.3 4.7 3.8 0.4 0.3 100 
1978 32.0 37.0 21.8 4.9 3.7 0.4 0.3 100 
1979 28.1 38.2 21.9 5.0 6.0 0.5 0.4 100 
1980 33.7 34.4 20.4 4.8 5.8 0.5 0.4 100 
1981 31.1 32.1 24.4 5.5 6.0 0.5 0.4 100 
1982 27.4 33.0 27.0 5.9 5.9 0.5 0.4 100 
1983 46.8 28.3 16.1 3.9 4.4 0.3 0.3 100 
1984 38.9 29.9 18.9 5.1 6.4 0.6 0.4 100 
1985 29.0 31.5 25.1 6.3 7.0 0.7 0.5 100 
1986 18.9 30.5 33.6 7.9 7.8 0.8 0.5 100 
1987 17.6 29.7 34.2 8.4 8.5 1.0 0.7 100 
1988 17.0 28.9 35.0 8.8 8.8 0.9 0.6 100 
1989 16.3 28.0 35.7 8.8 9.5 1.0 0.7 100 
1990 14.9 26.7 36.9 9.6 10.1 1.1 0.7 100 
1991 13.4 24.6 38.0 10.9 11.1 1.1 0.9 100 
1992 13.3 25.2 37.1 10.8 11.4 1.2 1.0 100 
1993 11.5 23.7 36.9 11.6 13.6 1.4 1.3 100 
1994 12.4 24.5 37.6 10.9 12.2 1.3 1.2 100 
1995 12.1 24.5 33.4 11.3 15.2 1.7 1.9 100 
1996 10.0 20.2 38.4 12.5 15.5 1.7 1.7 100 
1997 9.7 21.6 35.4 13.3 16.2 1.7 2.0 100 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
In determining the constants ‘h’, the most straight-forward measures would the 
respective years spent on pursuing the respective level of education. In our case, the 
value could be determined as: 
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Table 5-8 Value of weight, ‘hi’, in calculating H 
Constant Description Value 
h0 No schooling 0 
h1 Did not complete elementary school 3 
h2 Passes elementary school 6 
h3 Passes junior high school 9 
h4 Passes senior high school 12 
h5 Passes college 15 
h6 Passes University education 17 
 
By applying the value of ‘h’ based from the above table, we are actually 
indexing labor in terms of its education level. We are implicitly assuming that workers 
which have more education are more skilled and productive compared those who are 
less educated.  
The type of model applied is to use GDP per worker. As such, we would have 
the following equation (following Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992 in Davies 2002; and 
Akinlo 2003): 
γα )/()/()/( LHLKALY =        (10) 
and 
)/ln()/ln(ln)/ln( LHLKALY γα ++=      (11) 
One of the drawbacks of this equation was that it reduces the coefficients such 
that we could not assess the contribution of labor. However, in other perspective, this 
reduction in coefficient also increases the strength of the equation because it increases 
the degrees of freedom. 
Applying the data to the following equation, we could not get a statistically 
significant result from both of the equations. 
 
198
Despite the contention that the evaluation of the models would not be based on 
statistical characteristics and would be guided by a more ‘pragmatic’ and ‘data fit’ 
objective in mind, we must acknowledge that the weak significance162 in terms of 
statistical properties of human capital coefficient (γ). As such, the re-examination of the 
human captal ‘H’ indicator is warranted. The H is previously measured in terms of the 
total number of schooling years for total labor in the economy. 
The ‘weight’ attached to each level of education represented by ‘h’, actually 
could be further examined. In terms of workers who do not graduate elementary school, 
it is doubtful that they would gain significant skills compared to workers who never 
received schooling. 
This could probably indicate some measurement problems in the human capital 
indicator used, or simply to say that human capital just do not have strong relations 
with economic growth. The most possible culprit for this lack of significance is the 
‘zero’ weight applied to labor with no-schooling. As the majorities of labor in 
Indonesia receive no schooling or do not graduate from elementary school then the 
index is very sensitive to the weight given for the elementary school graduates/non 
graduates.  Since the beginning of development in 1949 almost 44% of labor received 
no education and most probably illiterate. Not after 1985, 36 years later, did the 
percentage of labor without schooling drop below 20%163. If we attach a zero 
                                                 
162 A P of 5% or less is the generally accepted point at which to reject the null hypothesis. With a P value 
of 5% (or .05) there is only a 5% chance that results we are seeing would have come up in a random 
distribution, so we can say with a 95% probability of being correct that the variable is having some 
effect, assuming the model is specified correctly.  
http://dss.princeton.edu/online_help/analysis/interpreting_regression.htm#ptse  
163 Even then, the percentage of labor who did not complete elementary school remains high, and still 
reached 21% of the labor force in 1997. 
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coefficient to this group of workers, it would be the same as simply saying that they are 
not contributing anything to the growth process.164  
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that indicator H that we use provide us 
with a ‘meaningful’ characteristic, because at the same time it represents the average 
level of education received by the labor force.165 
Other scholars (like Barro and Lee 1993) have suggested to use the ‘wage rate’ 
(the average market return) as the index for labor quality instead of formal education166. 
To make this statement clearer, let us try to convert the previous value of h into an 
index based on the workers that have passed elementary level or have received 6 years 
of education. The transformation is given in Table 5-9. 
                                                 
164 To some extent, this was also probably true, because of the low-skill that these workers have, they 
would tend to work fewer hours and yield fewer outputs than their counterparts. 
165 For some examples on alternatives measurement of human capital, refer to Bosworth, et. al. (1995), 
Van Leeuwen (2004) and Stroombergen et. al. (2002).  
166 However, Barro and Lee (1993) [quote in Coulombe and Tremblay (1998)] acknowledge that “such 
approach might introduce a bias since, on the one hand, the level of education is likely to be positively 
correlated with individual skills and, on the other hand, market returns of education exclude external 
benefits generated by human capital”. 
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Table 5-9 The value of hi as an index of labor quality 
Constant Description Value Index (h2=1.00)
h0 No schooling (No School) 0 n.a. 
h1 Did not complete elementary school (Not finish 
ES) 
3 0.50 
h2 Passed elementary school (ES) 6 1.00 
h3 Passed junior high school (JHS) 9 1.50 
h4 Passed senior high school (SHS) 12 2.00 
h5 Passed college (DIPI/II/III) 15 2.50 
h6 Passed University education (Univ) 17 2.83 
 
Based on the above tables, as we put value of h2=6 and h3=9, we are implicitly 
saying that workers with junior high school level of education is actually 1.5 times 
more productive than its counterpart that receives elementary level of education167.  As 
such as, we could assume that their difference in salary would also in the magnitude of 
1.5 times. 
We could convert the following wage data in table 5-10 and 5-11, categorized 
according to the level of education, into the same index described above.  
                                                 
167 Wo¨ ßmann (2003) raises the same critics on the schooling measurement of human capital. 
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Table 5-10 Average wages and salaries by education of employees, 1986-2000 
(rupiah) 
Year    No school    Not finish ES   ES   JHS SHS DIP I/II/III Univ  Total   
 1989   37,730 46,211 59,575 91,847 111,291 153,888 208,120 77,164 
 1990   42,194 50,784 64,865 104,776 126,354 184,104 251,680 89,676 
 1991   51,821 61,387 74,501 110,204 139,938 204,873 272,500 101,651 
 1992   56,121 64,791 90,372 119,582 156,797 236,165 295,246 115,951 
 1993   65,039 74,682 101,393 160,425 200,331 270,794 355,650 143,493 
 1994   72,577 93,823 113,232 159,807 207,732 323,143 396,041 157,343 
 1996   92,110 122,432 145,735 198,029 259,862 376,086 487,463 207,108 
 1997   101,478 135,422 173,368 226,805 305,651 416,349 543,759 240,732 
 1998   120,650 160,883 199,395 261,565 351,859 482,387 610,807 282,251 
 1999   162,105 191,721 239,708 328,590 441,086 595,635 701,651 346,950 
 2000   206,206 232,009 286,264 363,817 511,645 659,740 935,328 430,197 
Source: calculated from Hananto (2004). 
 
Table 5-11 Average wages and salaries by education of employees, 1986-2000 
(rupiah), as an index of wage salary of workers with elementary education 
Year   No school   Not finish ES  ES JHS SHS DIP I/II/III Univ  Total  
1989 0.63332 0.77568 1 1.5417 1.86807 2.5831 3.49341 1.29524 
1990 0.65049 0.78292 1 1.61529 1.94795 2.83826 3.88006 1.3825 
1991 0.69557 0.82398 1 1.47923 1.87833 2.74993 3.65767 1.36442 
1992 0.621 0.71694 1 1.32321 1.73501 2.61325 3.26701 1.28304 
1993 0.64145 0.73656 1 1.58221 1.97579 2.67074 3.50764 1.41522 
1994 0.64096 0.82859 1 1.41132 1.83457 2.85381 3.49761 1.38956 
1996 0.63204 0.8401 1 1.35883 1.78311 2.58062 3.34486 1.42113 
1997 0.58533 0.78112 1 1.30823 1.76302 2.40153 3.13644 1.38856 
1998 0.60508 0.80686 1 1.31179 1.76463 2.41925 3.0633 1.41554 
1999 0.67626 0.79981 1 1.37079 1.8401 2.48483 2.92711 1.44739 
2000 0.72034 0.81047 1 1.27091 1.78732 2.30466 3.26736 1.5028 
average 0.64562 0.79118 1 1.41578 1.83435 2.59091 3.3675 1.3914 
Source: calculated from table 5-12. 
 
Looking at the ‘weight’ or ‘index’ calculated from the wage figures and 
educational level, we see a relatively large discrepancy between the two variables, as 
depicted in Table 5-12. 
202
Table 5-12 Comparison of human capital index based on the level of 
education and wage ratio 
Constant Description Index based 




Index based on the 
wage ratio (hw) 
hw-hi 
h0 No schooling 0 0.645622 0.645622
h1 Did not complete 
elementary school 
0.50 0.791184 0.291184
h2 Passed elementary school 1.00 1 0 
h3 Passed junior high school 1.50 1.415775 -0.08423 
h4 Passed senior high school 2.00 1.834355 -0.16565 
h5 Passed college 2.50 2.590907 0.090907
h6 Passed University education 2.83 3.367497 0.537497
 
From Table 5-12, our index of h, shows the occurance of large discrepancy in 
the ‘no-schooling’ and ‘university education’ category. This provides strong argument 
for changing the value of ‘zero’ in h0.  
Based on that we could construct a new measurement of human capital H2. The 
new index of H2 would be counted by multiplying the wage index by 6 (because the 
index was based on the wage rate of elementary school graduates, with a 6-year level of 
education). However, even after adjusting the human capital measurement, we still 
failed to get a statistically significant results from equation (10) and (11). 
Finally, Bosworth and Collins (2003) provide an alternative for measuring the 
impact of Human Capital on growth using the following equation168: 
γα )()( LHAKY =        (12) 
Dividing both sides of the equation by Labor (L) we would get: 
γα )()/()/( HLKALY =      (13) 
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and 
)ln()/ln(ln)/ln( HLKALY γα ++=    (14) 
The regression results for equation (13) and (14) by using indicators of Human 
Capital H1 and H2 are given below. 
Box 5-5 Regression estimation result, eq.13, H1 (1969-1997) 
Dependent Variable: Y/L 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/13/07   Time: 22:00 
Sample: 1969 1997 
Included observations: 29 
Convergence achieved after 218 iterations 
(Y/L)=C(1)*((K/L)^C(2))*((H1)^C(3)) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 87.39345 136.0522 0.642352 0.5263 
C(2) 0.916572 0.122575 7.477655 0.0000 
C(3) -0.284631 0.095804 -2.970970 0.0063 
R-squared 0.940793     Mean dependent var 1.42E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.936239     S.D. dependent var 3.55E+08 
S.E. of regression 89742466     Akaike info criterion 39.56048 
Sum squared resid 2.09E+17     Schwarz criterion 39.70193 
Log likelihood -570.6270     Durbin-Watson stat 0.456037 
 
Box 5-6 Regression estimation result, eq.14, H1 (1969-1997) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(Y/L) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/13/07   Time: 22:01 
Sample: 1969 1997 
Included observations: 29 
LOG(Y/L)=C(1)+C(2)*LOG(K/L)+C(3)*LOG(H1) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 5.604865 1.971433 2.843041 0.0086 
C(2) 0.834688 0.152232 5.482994 0.0000 
C(3) -0.231255 0.114686 -2.016422 0.0542 
R-squared 0.918287     Mean dependent var 21.04762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.912001     S.D. dependent var 0.239253 
S.E. of regression 0.070973     Akaike info criterion -2.355327 
Sum squared resid 0.130968     Schwarz criterion -2.213882 
Log likelihood 37.15224     Durbin-Watson stat 0.417966 
 
                                                                                                                                              
168 In this equation, human capital is assumed to be embedded in labor; or vice versa. 
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Box 5-7 Regression estimation result, eq.13, H2 (1969-1997) 
Dependent Variable: Y/L 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/13/07   Time: 22:15 
Sample: 1969 1997 
Included observations: 29 
Convergence achieved after 158 iterations 
(Y/L)=C(1)*((K/L)^C(2))*((H2)^C(3)) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 9105.261 4378.101 2.079728 0.0476 
C(2) 1.124617 0.106772 10.53288 0.0000 
C(3) -0.648746 0.120259 -5.394563 0.0000 
R-squared 0.962553     Mean dependent var 1.42E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.959672     S.D. dependent var 3.55E+08 
S.E. of regression 71371331     Akaike info criterion 39.10239 
Sum squared resid 1.32E+17     Schwarz criterion 39.24383 
Log likelihood -563.9846     Durbin-Watson stat 0.593493 
 
Box 5-8 Regression estimation result, eq.14, H2 (1969-1997) 
Dependent Variable: LOG(Y/L) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/13/07   Time: 22:15 
Sample: 1969 1997 
Included observations: 29 
LOG(Y/L)=C(1)+C(2)*LOG(K/L)+C(3)*LOG(H2) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 9.196711 0.574627 16.00467 0.0000 
C(2) 1.101039 0.137773 7.991707 0.0000 
C(3) -0.626526 0.149552 -4.189346 0.0003 
R-squared 0.943588     Mean dependent var 21.04762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.939248     S.D. dependent var 0.239253 
S.E. of regression 0.058971     Akaike info criterion -2.725857 
Sum squared resid 0.090416     Schwarz criterion -2.584413 
Log likelihood 42.52493     Durbin-Watson stat 0.455204 
 
If we look at the results, the coefficients on human capital would be higher if we 
use the H1 indicator (where labor with no schooling has the value of zero) compared 
with H2 indicator. This would probably indicate that unskilled labor would pose a 
burden to the overall economy rather than acted as an input for production. 
The H measure of human capital divided by the labor force is actually equal to 
the mean years of education received by the labor force, which is very low, even 
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compared with the figures of working-age population in for OECD countries in the 
1970s (refer to Figure 5-3). 
Figure 5-3 Average Years of Education of the Working-Age Population in 
OECD Countries, 1970 And 1998 
 
Note: 1. Average number of years of education in the population aged 15-64 years, based on data on 
level of education attained and assumptions about the number of years of education implied by different 
levels of education attainment. 2. West Germany in 1970. 3. 1990 instead of 1998 for Japan. 
Source: OECD (2000). 
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5.4 Interpreting the Human Capital coefficient: the Elasticity of 
Output With respect To Human Capital 
The coefficient α and γ in the equations represent the elasticity of output with 
respect to capital and human capital respectively. Generally, it represents the 
percentage of output change if there were an increase in capital, labor or human capital. 
We will analyze the different coefficients individually. 
5.4.1 Coefficient on Capital (α) 
The coefficient estimates from the regression results have the values ranging 
from 0.54 to 1.34. Other authors has calculated α, and generally agreed that α for 
developing countries should be greater than the common value for developed countries 
of 0.3169, for example Senhadji (1999) estimates that α of Indonesia is 0.49, Bosworth 
and Collins (1996) assume that α is 0.35, while Kim and Lau (1994) obtained capital 
elasticities in excess of 0.4 for the Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). 
Looking at the high share of capital in determining Indonesian economic 
growth, it would be important to acknowledge the high import density of capital. A 
large portion of the capital is imported, which necessitates the availability of foreign 
exchange. Fortunately for Indonesia, the availability of oil reserves has provided the 
much-needed foreign exchange for the development to proceed. Figure 5-4 shows the 
share of capital goods in total imports in Indonesia and Thailand. 
                                                 
169 Maddison (1987) estimates that α is 0.3 for industrial countries. Englander and Gurney (1994) found 
for the business sector of the OECD countries capital shares that varied between 0.30 and 0.35, while 
World Bank study on Malaysia (2004) uses 0.30  (as cited in Marks 2004). 
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Figure 5-4 Share of capital goods in total imports entering Indonesia and 
Thailand, 1960-2001 (ratio of capital goods imports per person employed 
(Thailand = 1.0)) 
 
Note: Capital goods refer to all products classified as category 7 in the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC, 2nd revision), i.e. machinery and transport 
equipment. 
Source: UN 1960-2001 as cited in Frankema and Lindblad (2005). 
5.4.2 Coefficient on Human Capital (γ) 
The negative value of human capital coefficient says that an additional input of 
human capital would reduce the growth of output by certain percentage points. ‘γ' with 
a value of -1 (negative), meaning that a 1 percent increase in labor growth, would lead 
to a decrease of output growth per capita; which means that the adition of human 
capital would just becoming a burden to the economy rather than acted as a productive 
input of production. The low or negative value of human capital coefficient was 
acknowledged by other scholars, as described in Table 5-13. 
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Table 5-13 Some results on Human Capital coefficients 
Author  Model  Human Capital 
(HK) Variable  
Technique  Coefficient 
Mankiw, Romer 
& Weil 1992  
Augmented Solow, 
Steady state  
Secondary 
enrollment  
Cross-section OLS  0.28  
Barro and Lee 
1992  
Reduced form  Log of Barro-
Lee HK  
Cross-section OLS  0.057  
Barro and Lee 
1992  
Reduced form  Log of Barro-
Lee HK  
Pooled panel  0.021  






WDR 1991  Augmented Solow, 




annual data  
Ed<3 yrs: 0.09 
Ed>3 yrs: 0.04  
Benhabib-
Spiegel, 1992  
Augmented Solow, 
production function  
Kyriacou HK, 
change  
Cross-section  -0.021  
Lau et al., 1991  Augmented Solow, 
production function  





Judson 1993  Augmented Solow, 
production function  
Judson HK, 
growth rate  
Panel GLS  0.098  
Source: Judson (1995). 
 
 The low and negatrive value on human capital reiterates the low contribution of 
human capital on economic growth in Indonesia. In our equation, labor and human 
capital are embedded, as such the coefficient on human capital also to some extent 
represents the value of labor contribution to growth as well. As most of the laborers in 
Indonesia have a low level of education, and since this condition would affect the value 
of human capital in our equations, it might have pointed out the message that 
‘unskilled’ labor would have little to contribute in the growth process.  
The low or negative labor coefficient might point out to the ‘jobless growth’ or 
the ‘low output elasticity of demand for labor’, especially in the growth leading sector 
like manufacturing. 
Indeed, the growth of manufacturing value added has proven to have low 
elasticities of labor; meaning that the increase in manufacturing value added does not 
absorb ‘sufficient’ labor or create enough employment; this would also indicate the 
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high nature of capital intensity in the manufacturing sector. This in turn could lead to 
the lack of ‘pro-poor’ growth. As shown in Table 5-14, Indonesia’s elasticity of 
employment indeed dropped from 0.93% p.a. in 1981-92 to only 0.25% p.a., even much 
lower than the 1971-80 figure of 0.45% p.a.. Although other East Asian neighboring 
countries in 1981-92 also have similar figures with Indonesia (with the exception of the 
Philippines), at the same time Indonesia also faced a severe dropped in labor 
productivity, from 8% growth p.a. in 1971-80 to only 0.9% p.a. in 1981-92. 
Table 5-14 Average Annual Percent Growth Rates in Output, Employment, 
Earnings,  Productivity and Output Elasticity of Employment in 
Manufacturing in Selected ESEA Countries 
Real Value Added  Employment  Real Earnings   Country  
71-80 81-92 92-97 71-80 81-92 92-97 71-80 81-92 92-97 
Korea  16.71 11.93 8.11 11.61 5.8 2.3 10.56 8.05 5.44 
Indonesia  14.56 12.09 10.35 6.49 11.19 2.55 4.3 4.72 7.87 
Malaysia 11.48 10.62 12.81 10.28 4.22 3.05 2.61 2.11 4.35 
Thailand 10.28 10.22 8.18 6.87 5.42 1.8 0.16 6.19 3.01 
Philippines  5.93 0.9 4.47 11.13 -0.45 2.81 -3.34 5.88 -0.86 
Labor Productivity  Output Elasticity of Employment   Country  
71-80 81-92  71-80 81-92 92-97    
Korea  5.1 6.13  0.69 0.49 0.28    
Indonesia  8.07 0.9  0.45 0.93 0.25    
Malaysia  1.2 6.4  0.9 0.4 0.24    
Thailand  3.41 4.79  0.67 0.53 0.22    
Philippines  -5.19 1.34  1.88 -0.5 0.63    
Source: Khan, Azizur Rahman (2001). 
5.5 Measuring Total Factor Productivity 
Another advantage of using the Solow model is that we could get the measure 
of Total Factor Productivity growth. Since what we are interested is in the ‘growth’ 
level of TFP, what matters is the Solow model growth equation, the equations that have 
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the natural log form. The values of TFP that we obtained from the equation estimations 
are always positive with large values. 
We did not put variable time (‘t’) into the equation because we argue that 
including the time variable actually does not have solid theoretical foundations. The 
argument of putting ‘t’ in the equation was basically so that the coefficient would 
represent the average TFP growth per year. However, by putting the time variable we 
would also implicitly assume that GDP per worker would also depend on variable t, 
which is not strongly supported by the theory. Therefore, we would rather define the 
‘constant’ as the TFP growth for the 29 years of observation (where ln A= dA/A170).  
 All of our equations give positive and significant results for TFP growth. In a 
way, our TFP growth estimation would refute the Krugman and Young hypothesis that 
most East Asian growth was merely ‘input-driven’ without any increase in productivity. 
Several scholars, like van der Eng (2001) have also calculated TFP using a simpler 
method and came out with a conclusion that TFP have contributed 39% of Indonesia’s 
GDP growth from 1967-97 (table 5-15). 
                                                 
170 ‘A’ also could be defined as the general measure of efficiency (including technology and institutions) 
(Frankema and Lindblad 2005). 
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Table 5-15 Contribution of key inputs and total factor productivity to GDP 
growth, 1940-97 
Capital Stock GDP Contribution to GDP Growth 
 Labor force (millions) (bln 1983 rupiah) Labor and capital 
Total factor 
productivity 
1940 26.7 45.6 22.8   
1967 32.6 60.5 26.8   
1997 88.3 634.8 208.9   
Average annual growth   
1940-67 0.7% 2.8% 1.2% 115% -15% 
1967-97 2.7% 8.1% 7.1% 61% 39% 
Source: van der Eng (2001). Note: labor and capital contribution to GDP growth 
calculated assuming income shares of, respectively, 70 and 30 percent in GDP, TFP is 
residual.   
 
Indeed, despite its dismal growth performance since the 1997 economic crisis, 
Indonesia has still been regarded as one of the ‘miracles’, as stated by Durlauf, Johnson 
and Temple (2005) and as shown in Table 5-16. As such, though probably the 
economic performance of Indonesia was not as good as its East Asian neighbors, it is 
more plausible to regard that an existence of TFP increment has indeed existed. 
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Table 5-16 Fifteen Growth Miracles Economies, 1960-2000 
Country  Growth 1960-2000 Factor increase* 
Taiwan  6.25 11.3 
Botswana  6.07 10.6 
Hong Kong  5.67 9.09 
Korea, Republic of  5.41 8.24 
Singapore  5.09 7.29 
Thailand  4.50 5.83 
Cyprus  4.30 5.39 
Japan  4.13 5.04 
Ireland 4.10 5.00 
China  3.99 4.77 
Romania 3.91 4.63 
Mauritius 3.88 4.58 
Malaysia 3.82 4.48 
Portugal  3.48 3.93 
Indonesia 3.34 3.72 
Note: * the ratio of GDP per worker in 2000 to that in 1960. 
Source: Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2004). 
 
The source of increment in TFP could be narrowed down into two main sources, 
from labor and capital. Looking at the simple proxy for capital and labor productivity 
as GDP/Capital171 and GDP/worker respectively, we would get Figure 5-5. Looking at 
the trend, it is more reasonable to expect that the source of TFP growth would be 
coming from labor, since capital productivity has been declining since 1973, while 
labor productivity has been steadily increasing since 1965 and has only halted after 
1997. 
For the low productivity of capital in Indonesia, van der Eng (2005: 9) noted: 
The ratio of capital stock and GDP indicated that the increase in GFCS 
(Gross Fixed Capital Formation) during 1990-97 was so substantial, that 
the productive capacity most likely expanded to levels that were 
unsustainable, contributing to the economies woes that engulfed the 
country during and after the 1997-98 monetary crisis. 
                                                 
171 The common practice is to use the Capital-Output ratio, instead of the Output-Capital ratio that is used 
here. However, since our goal is to compare the capital and labor productivity, the Output-Capital ratio 
was chosen instead. 
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As such, the high coefficient of capital estimated from our equation should be 
interpreted carefully. Capital might have a large role to play in the development 
process, but in order for it to be sustainable, it needs an adequate human capital intact 
to absorb the level of technology and blend that technology into the domestic economy. 
Otherwise, the technology would also remain to be ‘foreignly’ owned, such that when 
huge capital flight occurs, the technology -along with the capital- left the domestic 
economy in a devastating condition. 






















































5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Capital seems to have a pivotal role for Indonesia’s economic growth. It must 
be remembered, however, that the quality of data would surely affect the estimation 
results in this chapter. On the other hand, the coffecients on human capital shows weak 
if not negative correlation with respect to growth. The limitations of aggregate data on 
the quality and quantity education, and the undisputable fact that most of the laborers in 
Indonesia only received primary education or less must also be kept in mind in 
interpretating the results. The results show the need to explore qualitative evidence to 
assess the relationship between education and growth.  
The fact that most capital is and were ‘imported’ should be emphasised, since 
that would mean that most of the factors of production were not embedded within the 
domestic economy and the people. 
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Chapter 6 Education and Income at the Household 
Level 
Education and Income at the Household 
Level 
 
The macro analysis is useful to analyze at the aggregate level. However, we 
would lose many insights by relying too much on aggregated data. This is especially 
true for a diverse economy and regions like Indonesia. After discussing the macro 
aspect of education relationship with growth, as discussed in the previous chapter, we 
now turn to the micro analysis of education and income growth. 
One way to analyze the impact of education on income growth is by using a 
well-known Mincer equation, based on his work in 1974. Mincer equation shows the 
relationship of wage income with their educational attainment level at the individual or 
worker level, i.e. the rate of return to education or schooling. 
According to Leuween (2005) the measurement of the rate of return is important 
because it reflects the capacity of a country “to import, implement, and develop new 
technologies which is seen in some work on growth theories as the basis of long-run 
economic growth” (p.1).  On the other hand, by relating it with the previous chapter, 
the rate of return to education affects also the Total Factor Productivity growth. 
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Some of the rates of return to education are provided in the table below. 
Table 6-1 Returns to Education in Selected Countries 
Country/Sample 
period 
Returns to Each Additional Year 
of Schooling Study 
Australia 5.1% (males); 5.2% (females) Trostel, Walker & Woolley (2001) 
China/2000 6.40% Brauw and Rozelle (2002) 
Great Britain 12.7% (males); 13% (females) Trostel, Walker & Woolley (2001) 
Hong Kong / 1981 6.10% Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Indonesia / 1995 6.80% Duflo (2001) 
Italy / 1995 4.80% Brunello (2000) 
Japan 7.5% (males); 9.4% (females) Trostel, Walker & Woolley (2001) 
Korea / 1986 13.50% Ryoo, Nam & Carnoy (1993)
Malaysia / 1988-89 11.30% Schafgans (2000) 
Philippines 11.3% (males); 19.2% (females) Trostel, Walker & Woolley (2001) 
Singapore / 1998 13.10% Sakellariou (2001) 
Taiwan 8,00% Liu, Hammitt & Lin (2000) 
Thailand / 1989 11.50% Patrinos (1995) 
United Kingdom / 
1995 5.5% (males); 9.7% (females) Chevalier & Walker (1999) 
United States 7.4% (males); 9.6% (females) Trostel, Walker & Woolley (2001) 
Regions   
Sub-saharan Africa 11.7% Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) 
Asia 9.9%  
Latin America/ 
Carribean 12.00%  
Source: Low, et. al. (2004). 
 
General Mincer equation could be defined as: 
ln Wt = wt = β0 + β1*HCt + β2*expt + β3*expt2 + εt  
The wage rate is defined as wt, ‘HC’ is measured as mean years of schooling, 
‘exp’ is ‘experience’ and usually proxied by the age. In the Mincer equation, we do not 
have the problem of measuring the labor without schooling, since the human capital 
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aspect of this kind of labor would be captured by the experience variable represented by 
the age level. 
Variable β1 shows how the human capital variable (measured as years of 
schooling) affected the growth in wage, or simply known as the 'return for schooling'.  
Parameter β1  “designates the marginal effect of schooling in percentage on log wages 
(as opposed to the internal rate of return)” – it is “a percentage wage increase per 
additional year of schooling” (Belzil 2005: 4). The same would apply to β2 and β3.  
This chapter would attempt to analyze the Mincer equation by using two census 
data, the Sakernas (National Labor Force Survey) 1976 data and the Sakernas 1997 
data. The survey is being conducted once a year in August since 2001172. Additional 
insight will be provided by other census data or other secondary data where applicable. 
6.1 Analysis of Sakernas 1976 Census Data 
 Applying the model to the Sakernas 1976 census data at the national level we 
would get the following result for the parameters in Box 6-1. Variable ‘HC’ refers to 
‘schooling’, while ‘age’ refers to ‘experience’, and ‘X2’ refers to the quadrat of ‘age’. 
Box 6-1 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, National Level 
                                        Analysis of Variance 
                                           Sum of         Mean 
                  Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                  Model            3   3385.99551   1128.66517     2207.160       0.0001 
                  Error        12935   6614.51090      0.51137 
                  C Total      12938  10000.50641 
 
                      Root MSE       0.71510     R-square       0.3386 
                      Dep Mean       4.89153     Adj R-sq       0.3384 
                      C.V.          14.61911 
 
                                        Parameter Estimates 
 
                                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
                Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
                INTERCEP   1      2.583368    0.04417474        58.481        0.0001 
                HC         1      0.104855    0.00155901        67.258        0.0001 
                EXP        1      0.078957    0.00241552        32.687        0.0001 
                EXP2          1     -0.000787    0.00003100       -25.371        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
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A value of 0.10 in β1 would mean that an additional year of schooling would 
increase the monthly income of workers by 10%173. It must be remembered that this 
Mincer equation is only able to explain 34% of the variation in income growth (as 
shown by the value of R2). In turn a value of β2 would mean that an additional year of 
experience would  increase the monthly income of workers by 7%. 
Another way of calculating the return to schooling is to calculate the mean 
(average) income from each worker based on their educational qualifications and then 
compare the difference of income with other workers with different educational 
qualifications (i.e. elementary, secondary, senior secondary, etc.). Using the same 
restricted data from Sakernas 1976, we would get the following result. The result was 
similar with the Mincer regression, with the additional fact that return to tertiary level 
was higher than other level of education. 
                                                                                                                                              
172 For a detailed description on Sakernas and other census data on Indonesia,  read BPS (2004). 
173 A study by Raut and Tran (1998) calculate the Mincer equation by using the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) 1997 data and found that the return to education was 9.4%,   
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Table 6-2 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, National Level 




Age Return to 
Schooling 
No schooling 1,997 96.38 0 43.3325  
Not complete elementary 3,154 134.02 3 34.68421 13% 
Elementary school 3,734 180.37 6 33.79646 12% 
Junior secondary 1,732 252.84 9 33.54503 13% 
Senior Secondary 1,895 301.01 12 32 6% 
College graduates 303 478.44 15 35.57426 20% 
Universty Graduates 160 745.4 17 37.20625 28% 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The summary of the 1976 census data used in the Mincer equation is given in 
Table 6-3. 
Table 6-3 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, National 
Level 
Variable N MIN MAX MEAN STD 
Average monthly wage 12,939 1 12,250 197.44 276.71 
Human Capital (years of schooling) 12,975 - 17 5.97 4.19 
Age 12,975 10 99 35.27 12.62 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Running the model based on urban and rural areas we would get the following 
result in box 6-2. 
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Box 6-2 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, Urban Level 
                                        Analysis of Variance 
 
                                           Sum of         Mean 
                  Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                  Model            3   3325.71449   1108.57150     2156.368       0.0001 
                  Error        12425   6387.59220      0.51409 
                  C Total      12428   9713.30670 
 
                      Root MSE       0.71700     R-square       0.3424 
                      Dep Mean       4.89923     Adj R-sq       0.3422 
                      C.V.          14.63500 
 
                                        Parameter Estimates 
 
                                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
                Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
                INTERCEP   1      2.573160    0.04524322        56.874        0.0001 
                HC         1      0.105392    0.00158155        66.639        0.0001 
                EXP        1      0.079484    0.00247554        32.108        0.0001 
                EXP2       1     -0.000792    0.00003179       -24.913        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
Box 6-3 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, Rural Level 
                                        Analysis of Variance 
 
                                           Sum of         Mean 
                  Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                  Model            3     53.44986     17.81662       41.917       0.0001 
                  Error          506    215.07137      0.42504 
                  C Total        509    268.52123 
 
                      Root MSE       0.65195     R-square       0.1991 
                      Dep Mean       4.70397     Adj R-sq       0.1943 
                      C.V.          13.85964 
 
                                        Parameter Estimates 
 
                                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
                Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
                INTERCEP   1      2.874252    0.19804347        14.513        0.0001 
                HC         1      0.069317    0.00987430         7.020        0.0001 
                EXP        1      0.070009    0.01068558         6.552        0.0001 
                EXP2        1     -0.000710    0.00013566        -5.233        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The characteristics of urban-rural data is given below: 
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Table 6-4 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, Urban and 
Rural Level 






N 12,429.00 12,465.00 12,465.00 
MIN 1.00 - 10.00 
MAX 12,250.00 17.00 99.00 
MEAN 199.79 6.00 35.26 
URBAN 
STD 281.36 4.23 12.61 
N 510.00 510.00 510.00 
MIN 5.00 - 13.00 
MAX 750.00 12.00 83.00 
MEAN 140.13 5.12 35.43 
RURAL 
 
STD 99.87 3.01 12.70 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
It seems that the return for schooling in rural areas is lower than their urban 
counterpart, 7% compared with 11%. The same applies to the experience parameter (as 
shown by the age level (‘exp’)). In rural areas, experience affected the workers’ income 
more than schooling did. 
Urban areas have higher average wages way above their rural counterparts, 
more than twice as high. The mean years of education in urban areas also a little bit 
higher, 6 years (elementary education) compared with 5 years in the rural sector. 
Another way of measuring the difference in return for education for urban and 
rural areas is by inserting a dummy variable in the engel function. Doing just that, with 
D=1 for rural and D=0 for urban, we would get the following result. The coefficient for 
rural dummy variable has a value of -0.23; meaning that a rural environment lowered 
the return on schooling by 0.23. 
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Box 6-4 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, Dummy Variable 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: LNW 
 
                                      Analysis of Variance 
 
                                         Sum of         Mean 
                Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                Model            4   3661.47046    915.36762     1742.966       0.0001 
                Error        13338   7004.82544      0.52518 
                C Total      13342  10666.29590 
 
                    Root MSE       0.72469     R-square       0.3433 
                    Dep Mean       4.86817     Adj R-sq       0.3431 
                    C.V.          14.88633 
 
                                      Parameter Estimates 
 
                               Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
              Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
              INTERCEP   1      2.553388    0.04445949        57.432        0.0001 
              HC         1      0.108229    0.00156430        69.187        0.0001 
              EXP        1      0.078862    0.00241655        32.634        0.0001 
              EXP2       1     -0.000783    0.00003091       -25.332        0.0001 
              D          1     -0.225623    0.02856825        -7.898        0.0001 
 
Computing the return to schooling using categories of the education level being 
completed, we would get similar result of the Mincer regression, given in Tables 6-5 
and 6-6. What is apparent was that the Census data was highly biased towards urban 
areas, and also the fact that no worker with a college or university education was 
captured in the sample of 1976 census data. 
Table 6-5 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, Urban Level 




AGE Return to 
Schooling
No schooling 1946 96.33 0 43.28314  
Not complete 
elementary 
2989 134.28 3 34.65373 13% 
Elementary school 3521 183.02 6 33.82874 12% 
Junior secondary 1687 254.92 9 33.52697 13% 
Senior Secondary 1859 302.46 12 31.90802 6% 
College graduates 303 478.44 15 35.57426 19% 
Universty Graduates 160 745.4 17 37.20625 28% 
Source: calculated by author. 
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Table 6-6 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1976 Census Data, Rural Level 




AGE Return to 
Schooling 
No schooling 51 98.31 0 45.21569  
Not complete 
elementary 
165 129.25 3 35.23636 10% 
Elementary school 213 136.67 6 33.26291 2% 
Junior secondary 45 175.09 9 34.22222 9% 
Senior Secondary 36 226.06 12 36.75 10% 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Computing the regression model at the provincial level we would see that 
generally the Java island has better human capital coefficients compared with other 
island. It seems that all provinces in the island of Java have returns to schooling at 10% 
or higher, while generally the outer province recorded lower return to schooling. As the 
island of Java is more urbanized than the outer island, this might further lead to the 
assessment that returns to schooling in urban areas are better than their rural 
counterpart. 
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1 = D. I Aceh 0.10 0.07 0.00 
2 = Sumatera Utara 0.07 0.08 0.00 
3 = Sumatera Barat 0.10 0.06 0.00 
4 = Riau 0.13 0.10 0.00 
5 = Jambi 0.07 0.03 0.00 
6 = Sumatera Selatan 0.12 0.06 0.00 
7 = Bengkulu 0.03 0.09 0.00 
8 = Lampung 0.04 0.08 0.00 
9 = DKI Jakarta 0.10 0.06 0.00 
10= Jawa Barat 0.11 0.06 0.00 
11= Jawa Tengah 0.10 0.07 0.00 
12= Jawa Tengah 0.11 0.09 0.00 
13= Jawa Timur 0.12 0.08 0.00 
14= Bali 0.09 0.10 0.00 
15= NTB 0.15 0.10 0.00 
16= NTT 0.02 0.16 0.00 
17= Kalimantan Barat 0.06 0.10 0.00 
18= Kalimantan Tengah 0.01 0.09 0.00 
19= Kalimantan Selatan 0.05 0.10 0.00 
20= Kalimantan Timur 0.03 0.08 0.00 
21= Sulawesi Utara 0.14 0.11 0.00 
22= Sulawesi Tengah 0.07 0.05 0.00 
23= Sulawesi Selatan 0.08 0.08 0.00 
24= Sulawesi Tenggara 0.07 0.15 0.00 
25= Maluku 0.07 0.09 0.00 
26= Irian Jaya 0.08 0.04 0.00 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The characteristics of the provincial data are given in Table 6-8. 
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Table 6-8 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, Provincial 
Level 






1 = D. I Aceh 159.00 209.38 6.48 37.81 
2 = Sumatera Utara 640.00 179.75 6.76 34.35 
3 = Sumatera Barat 321.00 173.03 5.77 37.46 
4 = Riau 232.00 438.06 6.80 35.03 
5 = Jambi 172.00 166.24 5.06 34.40 
6 = Sumatera Selatan 216.00 220.69 6.68 35.61 
7 = Bengkulu 32.00 149.78 5.25 35.25 
8 = Lampung 104.00 192.93 5.87 36.61 
9 = DKI Jakarta 2010.00 295.84 6.57 34.27 
10= Jawa Barat 1645.00 176.33 6.20 35.01 
11= Jawa Tengah 2201.00 141.58 5.30 36.62 
12= Jawa Tengah 364.00 129.60 5.52 36.90 
13= Jawa Timur 2129.00 149.76 5.38 36.03 
14= Bali 636.00 152.20 5.44 32.91 
15= NTB 86.00 195.44 5.97 36.55 
16= NTT 26.00 255.23 10.54 31.81 
17= Kalimantan Barat 164.00 219.97 5.08 34.56 
18= Kalimantan Tengah 119.00 212.79 6.20 34.18 
19= Kalimantan Selatan 198.00 210.74 5.80 33.79 
20= Kalimantan Timur 187.00 342.56 7.33 36.27 
21= Sulawesi Utara 173.00 98.23 4.91 32.29 
22= Sulawesi Tengah 202.00 204.11 6.41 34.70 
23= Sulawesi Selatan 356.00 194.34 5.63 34.56 
24= Sulawesi Tenggara 57.00 293.21 5.96 37.74 
25= Maluku 288.00 278.97 7.49 36.96 
26= Irian Jaya 258.00 311.78 8.01 30.53 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Dividing the data based on the ISIC174 (International Standard of Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities) sectors, we would get the following result: 
                                                 
174 For some reference on ISIC, a good starting point is provided in 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/international/support/user_guides/unido/isic_guide.asp .  
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Table 6-9 Return to Schooling based on Sakernas 1976 data, ISIC Level 
ISIC HUMAN CAPITAL AGE X2 
 0. Activities not Adequately Defined 0.13 0.18 0.00 
 1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 0.11 0.04 0.00 
 2. Mining and Quarrying 0.23 0.17 0.00 
 3. Manufacturing 0.12 0.09 0.00 
 4. Electricity, Gas and Water 0.09 0.06 0.00 
 5. Construction 0.08 0.07 0.00 
 6. Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels 0.11 0.06 0.00 
 7. Transport, Storage and Communication 0.09 0.06 0.00 
 8. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 0.09 0.19 0.00 
 9. Community, Social and Personal Services 0.11 0.09 0.00 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
It seems that the highest return to schooling occurred in mining sector (23%), 
and the lowest is in the construction sector (8%). However the sample on mining sector 
was only 204 (N=204) with a very high wage average of Rp 1.3 million per month. The 
agricultural sector received the lowest wage average compared with other sectors. The 
respective characteristics of data based on ISIC categories are given in Table 6-10. 
Table 6-10 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, ISIC Level 





0. Activities not Adequately Defined 52 0.40% 295.00 5.75 31.35 
1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing 
614 4.73% 101.98 3.65 34.07 
2. Mining and Quarrying 46 0.35% 1306.17 9.89 36.02 
3. Manufacturing 1,794 13.83% 166.24 5.53 32.02 
4. Electricity, Gas and Water 37 0.29% 303.73 9.51 33.14 
5. Construction 639 4.92% 197.38 5.40 33.78 
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade and 
Restaurants and Hotels 
3,702 28.53% 195.14 4.61 38.32 
7. Transport, Storage and 
Communication 
1,200 9.25% 201.92 5.71 33.53 
8. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services 
92 0.71% 350.67 10.57 32.54 
9. Community, Social and Personal 
Services 
4,799 36.99% 207.22 7.47 35.02 
Source: calculated by author. 
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Looking at the characteristics of the Sakernas data based on economic activities 
(ISIC), the majority of workers actually worked in Trade (29%) and Manufacturing 
(14%). This could actually represent the fact that most agricultural workers are not paid 
or that people are working part-time in the agricultural sector. 
As the Mincer equation is using a log-form, we must exclude workers that have 
zero wages in our calculation. To give a complete picture the table below represent the 
whole sample of Sakernas 1976, grouped based on ISIC occupation categories. 
Table 6-11 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, ISIC Level, 
Unrestricted sample 





0. Activities not Adequately Defined 22,136 57.42% 0.24 4.93 26.12
1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 3,053 7.92% 20.48 3.42 35.68
2. Mining and Quarrying 46 0.12% 1306.17 9.89 36.02
3. Manufacturing 1,939 5.03% 153.80 5.54 31.58
4. Electricity, Gas and Water 37 0.10% 303.73 9.51 33.14
5. Construction 644 1.67% 195.85 5.39 33.72
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade and Restaurants and Hotels 4,465 11.58% 161.78 4.73 36.70
7. Transport, Storage and Communication 1,211 3.14% 200.09 5.73 33.50
8. Financing, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services 95 0.25% 339.60 10.65 32.67
9. Community, Social and Personal Services 4,922 12.77% 202.04 7.43 34.81
Source: calculated by author. 
 
From Table 6-11 it is apparent that the wages in agriculture were further 
dragged down, despite its already receiving the lowest wage. Level of wage in 
manufacturing was more than 7 times of agriculture, reflecting that most of agricultural 
workers were actually unpaid or family labor. However, in the level of household, 
agriculture sector actually has a relatively moderate level of income, as shown in Table 
6-12. It shows that agricultural workers tend to group together in larger sized 
households in order to support their family income and to compensate for the low 
individual worker’s income. 
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Table 6-12 Household Income Based on the Main Economic Sector, 1976 
Economic Sectors (B1CR8K9) N N (%) Monthly Income
1 Agriculture 1712.00 16% 483,314 
2 Industry/small business 959.00 9% 551,794 
3 Trade 2219.00 21% 526,429 
4 Transportation 777.00 7% 284,831 
5 Service 1344.00 13% 401,361 
6 Other businesses 491.00 5% 650,695 
7 Government 1840.00 17% 261,589 
8 Income transfer 1206.00 11% 24,642 
 10548.00   
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Another possible method of clustering would be dividing them based on the 
ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) classification. We then 
obtained the following result of Mincer regressions in Table 6-13. 




0/1 Professional, technical and related workers 0.09 0.16 0.00 
2 Administrative and managerial workers 0.05 0.06 0.00 
3 Clerical and related workers 0.08 0.13 0.00 
4 Sales workers 0.11 0.07 0.00 
5 Service workers 0.10 0.05 0.00 
6 Agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry 
workers, fishermen and hunters 
0.11 0.04 0.00 
7/8/9 Production and related workers, transport 
equipment operators and laborers 
0.09 0.09 0.00 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Looking at the ISCO classification, the highest return to schooling occurred in 
agriculture, as well as in sales and service workers. The value of return to schooling 
still ranges between 9%-10%, which was relatively high compared with other countries. 
The respective characteristics of data based on ISCO categories are given in Table 6-
14. Again, agriculture remains at the bottom of average wages compared with other 
sector. 
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Table 6-14 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, based on 
ISCO categories 





0/1 Professional, technical and related workers 1212.00 312.02 10.78 35.27
2 Administrative and managerial workers 80.00 845.84 11.01 42.55
3 Clerical and related workers 1743.00 291.95 9.88 34.96
4 Sales workers 3515.00 200.43 4.40 38.98
5 Service workers 1881.00 116.60 4.02 33.54
6 Agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry 
workers, fishermen and hunters 
607.00 101.31 3.59 34.23
7/8/9 Production and related workers, transport 
equipment operators and laborers 
3937.00 158.90 5.35 32.93
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Another category was set up by Central Agency of Statistics (CAS) that also 
includes the category of family employed workers as ‘worker’s statuses’. The results of 
Mincer equation by using the respective categories are reported in Table 6-15. 
Table 6-15 Return to Schooling based on Sakernas 1976 data, based on 
Worker’s Status 
Worker’s Status HUMAN CAPITAL AGE AGE2 
1 = Labor/Employee 0.11 0.08 0.00 
2 = Single business ownership 0.10 0.07 0.00 
3 = Business establishment hiring other worker(s) 0.12 0.07 0.00 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The respective characteristics of data based on CBS categories are given in 
Table 6-16. 
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Table 6-16 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1976 Sakernas, based on 
Worker’s Status 





1 = Labor/Employee 8,788 (68%) 194.90 6.75 33.06 
2 = Single business ownership 3,183 (25%) 163.06 4.06 39.27 
3 = Business establishment hiring other 
worker(s) 
969 (7%) 333.36 5.20 42.40 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Based on table 6-16, 68% of workers are employees, while 25% constitute as 
single business ownership while the rest (7%) are business establishment hiring other 
worker(s). Interestingly enough, those who are employees have higher education 
compared with the other two categories. This could point to the low entreprenual spirit 
of workers in Indonesia despite their higher level of education. 
6.1.1 Unemployment condition 
In understanding the context of return to schooling, we would need to keep in 
mind two things. First, we need to understand that a significant part of labor in 
Indonesia was actually considered as ‘unpaid labor’ or ‘family labor’ which received 
zero nominal wages. In 1976 census data, 12% of the workers were family workers that 
received no wages (this could indicate the condition of underemployment). 
Table 6-17 Number of Family Workers in the Sakernas 1976 Census Data 





1 = Labor/Employee         8,822 53.69% 194.15 6.75 33.05
2 = Single business ownership         3,904 23.76% 132.94 3.90 39.73
3 = Business establishment hiring other worker(s)         1,653 10.06% 195.42 4.39 43.09
4 = Family workers with zero wages         2,041 12.42% 0.00 4.44 27.39
5 = Social worker             10 0.06% 0.00 10.60 43.20
Source: calculated by author. 
 
In addition, almost half (43%) of the labor force actually was not working. 
Those who were actually looking for jobs stood at 2% of the labor force, which is the 
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unemployment rate. The 25% of the labor force were going  to school and the other 
24% devoted their time to manage their household. In addition, almost 7% of the 
workers have more than one job.  
 
Table 6-18 Number of people who were not working in the Sakernas 1976 
Census data 







No 22,136 57.42% 0.65 4.92 26.05 
Yes 16,406 42.56% 154.86 5.55 35.04 
   Source: calculated by author. 
Table 6-19 Reasons for not working, Sakernas 1976 Census data 





1 = Looking for job 855 2.22% 4.87 7.50 21.63 
2 = Going to school 9,555 24.79% 0.12 5.51 14.23 
3 = Managing the household 9,430 24.46% 0.55 4.40 32.80 
4 = retired, crippled, etc. 2,296 5.96% 1.72 3.65 49.18 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Table 6-20 Number of Workers Who Have More than 1 Job 





No 15,335 93.47% 157.88 5.58 34.81 
Yes 1,071 6.53% 111.61 5.25 38.44 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
  
6.2 Analysis of Sakernas 1997 Census Data 
Some would have questioned the choosing of 1997 as the year of analysis, 
because it might be distorted by the 1997 crisis. However, as shown below, the 
unemployment figures have not yet shown drastic change in 1997 – signaling that the 
effect of crisis has not been recorded in this national census data. 
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Table 6-21 Unemployment, Employment and Wages, 1992-1997 
Indicator 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 
 Open Unemployment: 
% Labor Force 1) 
Labor force (in Million) 




Underemployment (<35 hours/week) Employment 
growth  
Labor force growth  
Population growth (age 10+)  
  
GDP growth  
Productivity growth  













































































1)Open unemployment : SAKERNAS figures for 1992 and 1993 not comparable with those for later 
years due to change in reference time period for defining unemployment. Figures in bracket from 
National Socio- Economic Survey, SUSENAS. 
2) Job search duration : Median job search time in urban areas only (special tabulations produced by 
CBS). 
 Source : Annual National Labor Force Survey, SAKERNAS (No survey carried out in 1995) cited from 
ILO (1998) in Firdausy (1999). 
 
We could also apply the same procedure used previously with the Sakernas 
1997 data. For national level, we would get the following Mincer regression results 
depicted in Box 6-4.  
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Box 6-5 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, National Level 
                                       Analysis of Variance 
 
                                          Sum of         Mean 
                 Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                 Model            3   8980.66762   2993.55587     7328.655       0.0001 
                 Error        42175  17227.33852      0.40847 
                 C Total      42178  26208.00614 
 
                     Root MSE       0.63912     R-square       0.3427 
                     Dep Mean      12.13757     Adj R-sq       0.3426 
                     C.V.           5.26562 
 
                                       Parameter Estimates 
 
                                Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
               Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
               INTERCEP   1      9.864483    0.02470228       399.335        0.0001 
               HC         1      0.096592    0.00079039       122.209        0.0001 
               EXP        1      0.069110    0.00142096        48.636        0.0001 
               EXP2       1     -0.000736    0.00001875       -39.251        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The Return to Schooling coefficient in 1997 was 9.6%, while ‘age’ as the proxy 
for experience has the coefficient of 7%; which is similar with our result using the 
Sakernas 1976 data. It means that each additional year of schooling resulted in the 
increase of 9.6% in wage, and additional years of experience would increase the wage 
by 7%175. The data characteristics for the above result are given in Table 6-22. 
Table 6-22 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1997 Sakernas 
Description N MIN MAX MEAN STD 
 MONTHLY WAGES 42,179 10,000 33,548,622 252,054 382,712 
 HUMAN CAPITAL  42,179 3 17 9 4 
 AGE  42,179 10 92 34 12 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
We could compare the return to schooling with the return to physical capital, or 
investment, which is shown by the interest rate. The credit interest rate for investment 
activities was around 20% in the 1990s, with an inflation rate of around 10% then the 
real interest rate would be around 10% (Figure 6-1) - which was comparable with the 
return to schooling.   
                                                 
175 Hall (2002 :25) has noted that “recent survey shows that the additional year adds 13.4 percent to 
earnings in sub-Sahara Africa, 10.1 percent in the average country, and 6.8 percent in the well-educated 
countries making up the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (United 
States, Japan, and Western Europe)”. 
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Figure 6-1 Interest Rate of Rupiah Credit, Private National Banks – 
Invesment (Percent per annum) 
 
Source: Bank Indonesia Statistics, www.bi.go.id . 
 
Using the simple method, return to schooling values were similar with those 
calculated using the Mincer regression, although return to schooling at senior-
secondary level and college graduates seems to have higher figures (Table 6-23). 
Table 6-23 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, National Level 








6,429 129,976.51 3 39.40  
Elementary school 10,787 173,739.77 6 31.81 11% 
Junior secondary 6,286 216,538.74 9 30.80 8% 
Senior Secondary 13,997 307,638.76 12 32.82 14% 
College graduates 2,131 432,822.30 15 36.16 14% 
Universty Graduates 2,549 522,597.11 17 36.78 10% 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Applying the Mincer regression based on rural and urban areas we would get 
the results in Boxes 6-5 and 6-6. 
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Box 6-6 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, Urban Level 
                                      Analysis of Variance 
 
                                          Sum of         Mean 
                 Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                 Model            3   4939.61991   1646.53997     4569.509       0.0001 
                 Error        24755   8920.01764      0.36033 
                 C Total      24758  13859.63755 
 
                     Root MSE       0.60028     R-square       0.3564 
                     Dep Mean      12.30181     Adj R-sq       0.3563 
                     C.V.           4.87958 
 
                                       Parameter Estimates 
 
                                Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
               Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
               INTERCEP   1      9.823541    0.03242756       302.938        0.0001 
               HC         1      0.090696    0.00101601        89.267        0.0001 
               EXP        1      0.074392    0.00188306        39.506        0.0001 
               EXP2        1     -0.000758    0.00002496       -30.347        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Box 6-7 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, Rural Level 
                                       Analysis of Variance 
 
                                          Sum of         Mean 
                 Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                 Model            3   2683.92064    894.64021     1936.173       0.0001 
                 Error        17416   8047.34517      0.46207 
                 C Total      17419  10731.26581 
 
                     Root MSE       0.67975     R-square       0.2501 
                     Dep Mean      11.90413     Adj R-sq       0.2500 
                     C.V.           5.71024 
 
                                       Parameter Estimates 
 
                                Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
               Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
               INTERCEP   1     10.021243    0.03796286       263.975        0.0001 
               HC         1      0.090060    0.00141277        63.747        0.0001 
               EXP        1      0.063215    0.00214590        29.459        0.0001 
               EXP2        1     -0.000719    0.00002815       -25.554        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
It seems that the difference of return to schooling on urban and rural areas were 
insignificant between 1996 and 1997 data.  Using regression estimation with a dummy 
variable, we find that that there is still significant differences between rural and urban; 
where a rural environment lowered the return on schooling by 0.13 in the 1997 data. 
The inequality between rural and urban actually has lowered compared with the 1976 
data. 
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Box 6-8 Mincer Regression, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, Dummy Variable 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: LNW 
 
                                      Analysis of Variance 
 
                                         Sum of         Mean 
                Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                Model            4   9143.56822   2285.89206     5649.481       0.0001 
                Error        42174  17064.43792      0.40462 
                C Total      42178  26208.00614 
 
                    Root MSE       0.63610     R-square       0.3489 
                    Dep Mean      12.13757     Adj R-sq       0.3488 
                    C.V.           5.24073 
 
                                      Parameter Estimates 
 
                               Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
              Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
              INTERCEP   1      9.962866    0.02506967       397.407        0.0001 
              HC         1      0.091096    0.00083297       109.363        0.0001 
              EXP        1      0.069600    0.00141445        49.207        0.0001 
              EXP2       1     -0.000743    0.00001866       -39.834        0.0001 
     D          1     -0.133891    0.00667287       -20.065        0.0001 
 
However, the average wages in the urban areas were significantly higher, Rp 
291,498 per month compared with the Rp 195,992 in the rural areas. Also the mean 
years of schooling was higher in the urban areas with the value of 10 years compared 
with 7 years in the rural areas. The data characteristics for urban and rural areas are 
given in Table 6-24. 
Table 6-24 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1997 Sakernas, Urban and 
Rural Level 
Location (B1P5) Characterisic MONTHLY WAGES HUMAN CAPITAL AGE 
N 24,759  24,759.00   24,759.00 
MIN 10,000           3.00          10.00 
MAX 33,548,622         17.00          81.00 
MEAN 291,498         10.23          33.63 
Urban 
STD 430,702           3.88          11.19 
N 17,420  17,420.00   17,420.00 
MIN 10,000           3.00          10.00 
MAX 33,374,432         17.00          92.00 
MEAN 195,992           7.49          33.73 
Rural 
STD 292,642           3.75          12.11 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Using the simple method to calculate return to schooling in 1997, we found that 
return to schooling for elementary and post high-school graduates were higher in the 
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urban areas, but rural areas have higher return to schooling for junior secondary and 
senior secondary (Tables 6-25 and 6-26). 
This could lead to the conclusion that there is labor migration from rural to 
urban areas, and this migration has somewhat reduced the discrepancy of education 
returns in urban and rural areas. The fact remains that both urban and rural requires 
different characteristics of workers, based on their education. Demand for workers with 
elementary level of education is higher in urban areas, most probably for vacancies in 
unskilled level; whereas higher demand for junior secondary and senior secondary in 
rural areas might lead to the stage of intermediate level of technology in agricultural 
productivity (table 6-25). 
Table 6-25 Four Basic Stages of Agricultural Productivity and Their 










from parent to 
child. 
Local varieties of 
seeds and 
implements. 
Addition and subtraction not 
necessarily acquired through formal 
education. 
Level B Intermediate technology. 
Small quantities of 
fertilizer. 
Addition, subtraction, division, and 
rudimentary literacy. 
Level C Fully improved technology. 
High-yielding 
varieties: proven 
seeds, rate of 
application of seed, 
fertilizer, and pest 
control per acre. 
Multiplication, long division, and 
other more complex mathematical 
procedures; reading and writing 
abilities; rudimentary knowledge of 
chemistry and biology. 
Level D Full irrigation- based farming. 
All above inputs: 
tubewell access 
during the off- 
season, and water 
rates per acre. 
Mathematics, independent written 
communication, high reading 
comprehension, ability to research 
unfamiliar words and concepts; 
elementary chemistry, biology, physics; regular 
access to information from print and electronic 
sources. 
Source: Heyneman 1997. 
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Table 6-26 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, Urban Level 








2,222 139,737.88 3.00 38.76  
Elementary school 4,582 192,899.59 6.00 32.70 13% 
Junior secondary 3,972 225,414.36 9.00 31.61 6% 
Senior Secondary 10,213 313,998.05 12.00 32.63 13% 
College graduates 1,597 458,501.53 15.00 35.94 15% 
Universty Graduates 2,173 546,893.14 17.00 37.02 10% 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Table 6-27 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, Rural Level 








4207 124820.879 3 39.7352  
Elementary school 6205 159591.445 6 31.15471 9%
Junior secondary 2314 201303.654 9 29.40622 9%
Senior Secondary 3784 290475.058 12 33.33827 15%
College graduates 534 356025.037 15 36.79963 8%
Universty Graduates 376 382184.149 17 35.35106 4%
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Running the Mincer regression on the provincial level we would get the results 
shown in Table 6-27. 
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Table 6-28 Return to Schooling, Sakernas 1997 Census Data, Provincial 
Level 
Province HUMAN  
CAPITAL
AGE AGE2 
Dista Aceh 0.09 0.07 0.00 
Sumatera Utara 0.07 0.08 0.00 
Sumatera Barat 0.07 0.06 0.00 
Riau 0.06 0.09 0.00 
Jambi 0.08 0.07 0.00 
Sumatera Selatan 0.08 0.07 0.00 
Bengkulu 0.08 0.09 0.00 
Lampung 0.08 0.06 0.00 
D K I  Jakarta 0.11 0.05 0.00 
Jawa Barat 0.10 0.05 0.00 
Jawa Tengah 0.10 0.06 0.00 
D I Yogyakarta 0.09 0.05 0.00 
Jawa Timur 0.10 0.06 0.00 
Bali 0.08 0.06 0.00 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 0.11 0.07 0.00 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 0.10 0.10 0.00 
Timor Timur 0.07 0.18 0.00 
Kalimantan Barat 0.06 0.08 0.00 
Kalimantan Tengah 0.05 0.09 0.00 
Kalimantan Selatan 0.06 0.08 0.00 
Kalimantan Timur 0.05 0.10 0.00 
Sulawesi Utara 0.09 0.06 0.00 
Sulawesi Tengah 0.08 0.10 0.00 
Sulawesi Selatan 0.09 0.07 0.00 
Sulawesi Tenggara 0.07 0.12 0.00 
Maluku 0.06 0.09 0.00 
Irian Jaya 0.09 0.08 0.00 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Again, there was a tendency that the return to schooling would be generally 
higher in the main island of Java. In contrast, the outer islands seem to have age 
coefficients that have higher values than return to schooling coeffiocients, which 
indicate that level of experience affects income quite significantly compared with their 
Java counterparts. The data characteristics for the Provincial Mincer regression is given 
in Table 6-28. 
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Table 6-29 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1997 Sakernas 
Province N MONTHLY 
WAGES 
 HUMAN  
CAPITAL 
 AGE  
Dista Aceh 966 290,300 10.02 34.23 
Sumatera Utara 1,902 273,777 9.60 34.07 
Sumatera Barat 872 232,055 9.58 34.11 
Riau 1,022 353,223 10.33 32.79 
Jambi 696 249,187 9.98 32.83 
Sumatera Selatan 1,158 228,498 8.89 33.57 
Bengkulu 578 241,938 10.34 32.98 
Lampung 1,089 204,478 8.75 32.09 
D K I  Jakarta 3,540 375,086 10.97 32.22 
Jawa Barat 5,444 242,676 8.09 33.25 
Jawa Tengah 5,381 183,433 7.71 34.46 
D I Yogyakarta 1,389 239,521 9.65 35.53 
Jawa Timur 6,218 198,492 7.98 34.77 
Bali 1,563 242,455 9.64 32.51 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 1,131 187,740 8.24 32.15 
Nusa Tenggara Timur 798 254,390 10.07 33.67 
Timor Timur 343 427,108 10.15 33.45 
Kalimantan Barat 1,105 275,871 8.63 32.65 
Kalimantan Tengah 504 303,049 10.75 33.36 
Kalimantan Selatan 951 264,914 9.67 32.50 
Kalimantan Timur 855 337,506 9.68 33.16 
Sulawesi Utara 917 227,626 9.73 34.21 
Sulawesi Tengah 698 233,640 10.59 33.43 
Sulawesi Selatan 1,226 261,410 10.19 33.62 
Sulawesi Tenggara 574 281,749 10.91 34.04 
Maluku 662 293,486 10.96 35.41 
Irian Jaya 597 462,717 10.50 34.77 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Applying the Mincer regression based on sectoral employment classification, 
we would get the following results in Table 6-29. 
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Table 6-30 Return to Schooling, 1997 Sakernas, ISIC Level 
ISIC HUMAN  
CAPITAL
AGE AGE2 
1 : Agriculture 0.31 0.03 0.00 
2: Mining and quarrying 0.30 0.14 0.00 
3: Manufacturing Industry 0.24 0.07 0.00 
4: Electricity, gas and water 0.14 0.09 0.00 
5: Construction/building 0.23 0.05 0.00 
6: Trade 0.17 0.09 0.00 
7: Transportation, storage and 0.17 0.10 0.00 
8: Finance, Insurance, including 0.15 0.08 0.00 
9: Services 0.11 0.13 0.00 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
It is interesting to note that all return to schooling values, except for the services 
sector, had a value above 10%, even agriculture has 31% return of schooling! The 
characteristics of the data used are given in Table 6-30. Mining sector still has the 
largest income, while agriculture was still at the bottom of wage level. 
Table 6-31 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1997 Sakernas, ISIC Level 





1 : Agriculture 5,687 125,014 12.03 36.25
2: Mining and quarrying 672 405,164 12.31 34.02
3: Manufacturing Industry 7,886 232,568 12.14 30.01
4: Electricity, gas and water 319 431,186 12.38 33.52
5: Construction/building 4,540 240,792 12.13 34.04
6: Trade 4,009 232,769 12.31 28.97
7: Transportation, storage and 2,342 289,653 12.16 32.99
8: Finance, Insurance, including 893 443,954 13.34 32.92
9: Services 15,827 288,993 12.89 35.79
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Using an unrestricted sample, the data characteristics of Sakernas 1997 census 
is given in Table 6-31. 
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Table 6-32 Summary of Data Characteristics in 1997 Sakernas, ISIC level, 
unrestricted 





1 : Agriculture 49,182 14,455.59 5.19 38.64
2: Mining and quarrying 1,309 207,998.50 6.78 34.50
3: Manufacturing Industry 14,390 127,451.63 7.27 33.11
4: Electricity, gas and water 363 378,921.42 11.12 33.97
5: Construction/building 5,774 189,330.86 7.28 34.81
6: Trade 24,312 38,383.11 7.31 36.95
7: Transportation, storage and 5,581 121,549.22 7.70 34.15
8: Finance, Insurance, including 956 414,697.58 12.42 33.79
9: Services 19,668 232,555.38 10.42 36.41
Source: calculated by author. 
 
 It seems that the number of unpaid workers of family workers again is still 
significant, even in 1997. To calculate the number of family workers or unpaid workers 
from the  Sakernas 1997 census, we would get the results in Table 6-32. 
Table 6-33 Sakernas 1997 Data Chracteristics, based on Worker’s Status 





n.a. 97,898 0.00 6.39 27.05
1= self-employed 27,782 0.00 6.07 40.03
2= self-employed with the help of unpaid or part-
time worker(s) 
25,000 0.00 5.63 43.59
3=business owner with the help of paid worker(s) 2,229 0.00 8.03 39.79
4=workers receiving wages 42,179 252,053.78 9.10 33.67
5=unpaid workers 24,351 0.00 5.80 31.29
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The number of unpaid workers was more than half of paid workers used in 
deriving the Mincer regression in 1997. What is important also was the fact that those 
who were self-employed actually being recorded as having zero wages, which would 
made them excluded from the Mincer regression. 
 
243
6.2.1 Unemployment condition 
Using the unrestricted Sakernas 1997 census data we could also assess the 
condition of unemployment, as shown in Table 6-33. 
Table 6-34 Main Occupation or Activities, Sakernas 1997 





1 = working 100,771 45.92% 102,009.95 7.26 37.08 
2 = school 46,111 21.01% 373.54 5.98 14.07 
3 = housework 50,372 22.95% 2,676.21 6.31 37.06 
4 = looking for job 2,879 1.31% 2,946.51 10.62 22.62 
5 = others 19,306 8.80% 9,904.59 6.29 41.63 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
The number of people looking for job was only 1.31%, which is even lower 
than the national figures. It must also be remembered when we say ‘unemployment’, 
we are actually saying different thing compared with the usual definition. The low 
unemployment figures thus do not represent the welfare of those people who are 
unemployed. As Dhanani (2004 :1) noted: 
The traditional view of developing country unemployment is that it is of 
minor importance, because it affects mainly members of relatively well-
off families who can afford a long job search to obtain suitable formal 
sector employment.  
 
What is most important, as Dhanani (2004) also emphasise, was working long hours 




6.3 Education in household expenditures, consumption or 
expenditures? 
Education is actually both consumption and investment, and it is relatively 
difficult to isolate the two. If education were being perceived to bring a high return in 
the form of higher income, household would not mind spending on it and to see it as 
investment. However, if education were to be seen only as consumption, like 
consumption for food, it would reach a point of saturation whereby as income grows 
people would spend less on it. 
Taking the issue above as our point of departure, we would use the household 
survey data to see how the share of education spending reacted as spending increases. 
The Engel law postulates that as income rises, the share of food on household spending 
would decrease. And this law has been considered one of the reasons why 
manufacturing, instead of agriculture, should be the engine of growth. Also the Engel 
law seems to support Chenery-Syrquin observation that as an economy develops, the 
share of agriculture in national income would decrease and the share of manufacturing 
and services sector would increase. 
Using the above analogy, we could apply the same reasoning for education 
expenditures. If education were perceived merely as consumption, its share of 
expenditure would decrease as income rises and vice versa. 
In this section, we would run regressions on Engel curve equation using the 
household data. The earliest Susenas data that we had is the 1987 data. As such, we 
would use that as a starting point and compared it with the 1997 data. 
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As income data -although it is available in the census data- is seen as less 
accurate176, total expenditure is often used as a proxy for income. The Engel curve 
specification that we are using is in quadratic form177: 
iiiii rzzy ∈++++= φβββ 2210  
where y = budget share of food or expenditure, z = log of total household 
expenditure, r = household size, and ε is stochastic term. 
6.3.1 Analysis of Susenas 1987 and 1997 data. 
Applying the Engel equation for food, non-food and education expenditure we 
would get the following results in Boxes 6-9 to 6-11. 
Box 6-9 Engel Curve for Food Spending estimation based on Susenas 1987 
data, National level 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: FOOD 
 
                                       Analysis of Variance 
 
                                          Sum of         Mean 
                 Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                 Model            3    103.05483     34.35161     2921.924       0.0001 
                 Error        14520    170.70443      0.01176 
                 C Total      14523    273.75926 
 
                     Root MSE       0.10843     R-square       0.3764 
                     Dep Mean       0.64054     Adj R-sq       0.3763 
                     C.V.          16.92743 
 
                                       Parameter Estimates 
 
                                Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
               Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
               INTERCEP   1     -3.578008    0.21000358       -17.038        0.0001 
               z          1      0.829096    0.03556950        23.309        0.0001 
               r          1      0.019617    0.00047453        41.340        0.0001 
               z2          1     -0.040766    0.00150167       -27.147        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
                                                 
176 It is because people tend to have tendencies to cover their true income. In 1987 Susenas data, the 
income data is generally smaller than the expenditure data, which somewhat confirm this tendencies. 
177 This form has been used, for example by Girma and Kedir (2003) in analyzing the Ethiopian 
household survey. For discussions of structural form, one could read Lim (1968). 
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Box 6-10 Engel Curve for Non-Food Spending estimation based on Susenas 
1987 data, National level 
Model: MODEL2 
Dependent Variable: NFD 
 
                                       Analysis of Variance 
 
                                          Sum of         Mean 
                 Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                 Model            3    103.05483     34.35161     2921.924       0.0001 
                 Error        14520    170.70443      0.01176 
                 C Total      14523    273.75926 
 
                     Root MSE       0.10843     R-square       0.3764 
                     Dep Mean       0.35946     Adj R-sq       0.3763 
                     C.V.          30.16419 
 
                                       Parameter Estimates 
 
                                Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
               Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
               INTERCEP   1      4.578008    0.21000358        21.800        0.0001 
               z          1     -0.829096    0.03556950       -23.309        0.0001 
               r          1     -0.019617    0.00047453       -41.340        0.0001 
               z2          1      0.040766    0.00150167        27.147        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
Box 6-11 Engel Curve for Education Spending estimation based on Susenas 
1987 data, National level 
Model: MODEL3 
Dependent Variable: EDUP 
 
                                       Analysis of Variance 
 
                                          Sum of         Mean 
                 Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                 Model            3      0.83830      0.27943      143.954       0.0001 
                 Error        14520     28.18508      0.00194 
                 C Total      14523     29.02337 
 
                     Root MSE       0.04406     R-square       0.0289 
                     Dep Mean       0.03069     Adj R-sq       0.0287 
                     C.V.         143.57190 
 
                                       Parameter Estimates 
 
                                Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
               Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
               INTERCEP   1     -0.165994    0.08533239        -1.945        0.0518 
               z          1      0.021917    0.01445323         1.516        0.1294 
               r          1   0.000054027    0.00019282         0.280        0.7793 
      z2          1     -0.000439    0.00061019        -0.719        0.4721 
 Source: calculated by author. 
 
Looking at the above results, spending on food actually increases as income 
rises, which is actually a contradiction to the Engel law. However, the positive 
coefficients were also found in other developing countries, like in Ethiopia (Girma and 
Kedir 2003). A 10% increase in income would increase food-spending share by 8.3 
percent. In contrast, for non-food spending (where education expenses are also 
categorized as non-food expenditures) the sign of the coefficient is negative, where a 
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10% increase in income would result in a decrease of non-food expenditures by 8.3 
percent.  
Despite that, the coefficient on education spending is marginally positive, with 
an increase of 2% education share in spending should income rise by 10%. However, it 
must be noted that the R2 value is very low for the equation. The reason is that because 
of the very low share of education expenses in the 1987 Susenas data, recorded at an 
average of 3.58%. For complete data characteristics for the 1997 Susenas data used in 
the engel curve,  refer to table 6-34. 
Table 6-35 Susenas 1997 Data Characteristics for the Engel Curve 
 MEAN  
Education expenditure share in total 
expenditure (EDUX) 
5,508.78 3.58% 
Monthly Expenditures (V2D2) 153,817.66 100.00% 
Monthly Food Expenditures V2D3 89,300.13 58.06% 
Monthly Non-Food Expenditures 
(V2D4) 
64,517.53 41.94% 
Monthly Income Average (V4AK07) 118,924.08 77.31% 
Household size (ART) 6.01  
N 14,524.00  
Source: calculated by author. 
 
 Several functional forms of Engel curve suggested in Lim (1968) were tried as 
well for the education expenditures, with similar if not worst result in terms of 
statistical significance. As such, it would be better to provide the descriptive statistics  
by grouping the sample into 10 groups (decile) based on total expenditures. Doing just 
that, we would get the results in Table 6-35. 
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Table 6-36 Means of Education, Food, and Non-Food Expenditures based on 
Decile of Total Expenditures, Susenas 1987 
Decile Education 
expenditure 










0 1.91 70.29 29.71 43,297.88 4.26 
1 2.24 70.30 29.70 62,134.26 5.08 
2 2.27 70.56 29.44 76,936.97 5.43 
3 2.77 69.21 30.79 92,204.29 5.72 
4 2.77 67.93 32.07 108,629.43 5.98 
5 3.06 66.07 33.93 128,797.68 6.23 
6 3.41 62.68 37.32 154,403.11 6.36 
7 3.84 59.92 40.08 189,582.57 6.62 
8 4.05 56.23 43.77 244,216.29 6.95 
9 4.38 44.34 55.66 438,005.73 7.46 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Actually, based on the descriptive data, the pattern of Engel law could be said to 
have existed as well. For food expenditures, the share started to decline after the 4th 
decile, while for non-food expenditures it started to increase after the 3rd decile. In 
contrast, education expenditures seem to show constant improvement –however small- 
as we move up the total expenditure ladder. 
Dividing the census data based on urban and rural categories, and grouped them 
on a 10 decile groupings based on total expenditures, we would get the results in Table 
6-36 and 6-37. In urban areas, the food expenditures started to decline after the 3rd 
decile, while non-food expenditure statrted to rise generally after the second decile. The 
trend of education expenditure share seems to be varied, with ups and down, but 
generally, the trend is increasing after the fourth decile. 
One other interesting point was that the share of education expenditures was 
higher in urban areas than in rural areas. This could point to two possibilities. One, the 
cost of schooling was simply higher in urban areas. Two, education matters more in 
urban areas – either because it was simply required by employee (shows the dominance 
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of formal sector in urban areas or the demand for more skilled labor), or because it 
provided higher returns due to the availability of employment opportunities.  
Figure 6-2 Education Share in Total Expenditures, based on Decile of Total 






















Source: calculated by author. 
Table 6-37 Means of Education, Food, and Non-Food Expenditures based on 
Decile of Total Expenditures, Susenas 1987, Urban Areas 












0 117 3.15 66.61 33.39 45,257.64 4.01 
1 185 3.87 64.12 35.88 61,886.09 4.64 
2 283 2.89 65.41 34.59 77,481.01 4.99 
3 419 4.08 64.75 35.25 92,522.02 5.45 
4 548 3.33 63.29 36.71 109,096.28 5.65 
5 643 3.65 61.83 38.17 128,962.51 5.90 
6 834 3.92 59.62 40.38 154,852.86 6.14 
7 955 4.19 57.72 42.28 189,871.76 6.42 
8 1098 4.13 55.05 44.95 244,556.52 6.87 
9 1236 4.50 46.72 53.28 438,806.25 7.45 
   Source: calculated by author. 
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Table 6-38 Means of Education, Food, and Non-Food Expenditures based on Decile of 
Total Expenditures, Susenas 1987, Rural Areas 













0 1335 1.80 70.56 29.44 43,126.13 4.29 
1 1268 2.01 71.16 28.84 62,170.47 5.15 
2 1169 2.11 71.81 28.19 76,805.27 5.54 
3 1033 2.24 71.04 28.96 92,075.42 5.83 
4 905 2.43 70.80 29.20 108,346.74 6.18 
5 809 2.59 69.46 30.54 128,666.67 6.49 
6 619 2.72 66.90 33.10 153,797.15 6.66 
7 497 3.20 64.28 35.72 189,026.88 7.00 
8 355 3.80 60.41 39.59 243,163.98 7.21 
9 216 3.51 49.62 50.38 433,424.97 7.51 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Applying the Engel curve equation to the 1997 Susenas data, we would get the 
results depicted in Box 6-10 to Box 6-12. Apparently, the result is similar with the 1987 
result, with a positive income elasticity of demand for food expenditure, and a negative 
one for non-food expenditure. The elasticity coefficient for education expenditure is 
negative, with a very low R2 value. 
Box 6-12 Engel Curve for Food Spending estimation based on Susenas 1997 
data, National level 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: FOOD 
 
                                        Analysis of Variance 
 
                                           Sum of         Mean 
                  Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                  Model            3    951.89942    317.29981    24077.146       0.0001 
                  Error       207347   2732.51506      0.01318 
                  C Total     207350   3684.41447 
 
                      Root MSE       0.11480     R-square       0.2584 
                      Dep Mean       0.66475     Adj R-sq       0.2583 
                      C.V.          17.26922 
 
                                        Parameter Estimates 
 
                                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
                Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
                INTERCEP   1     -4.314084    0.06331817       -68.133        0.0001 
                z          1      0.906866    0.01023238        88.627        0.0001 
                r          1      0.021329    0.00015126       141.006        0.0001 
                z2         1     -0.041355    0.00041249      -100.258        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
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Box 6-13 Engel Curve for Non-food Spending estimation based on Susenas 
1997 data, National level 
Model: MODEL2 
Dependent Variable: NFD 
 
                                        Analysis of Variance 
 
                                           Sum of         Mean 
                  Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                  Model            3    951.89942    317.29981    24077.146       0.0001 
                  Error       207347   2732.51506      0.01318 
                  C Total     207350   3684.41448 
 
                      Root MSE       0.11480     R-square       0.2584 
                      Dep Mean       0.33525     Adj R-sq       0.2583 
                      C.V.          34.24256 
 
                                        Parameter Estimates 
 
                                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
                Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
                INTERCEP   1      5.314084    0.06331817        83.927        0.0001 
                z          1     -0.906866    0.01023238       -88.627        0.0001 
                r          1     -0.021329    0.00015126      -141.006        0.0001 
                z2          1      0.041355    0.00041249       100.258        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Box 6-14 Engel Curve for Education Spending estimation based on Susenas 
1997 data, National level 
Model: MODEL3 
Dependent Variable: EDUP 
 
                                        Analysis of Variance 
 
                                           Sum of         Mean 
                  Source          DF      Squares       Square      F Value       Prob>F 
 
                  Model            3     39.02649     13.00883     3070.563       0.0001 
                  Error       207347    878.45180      0.00424 
                  C Total     207350    917.47829 
 
                      Root MSE       0.06509     R-square       0.0425 
                      Dep Mean       0.02518     Adj R-sq       0.0425 
                      C.V.         258.50239 
 
                                        Parameter Estimates 
 
                                 Parameter      Standard    T for H0: 
                Variable  DF      Estimate         Error   Parameter=0    Prob > |T| 
 
                INTERCEP   1      0.248869    0.03590096         6.932        0.0001 
                z          1     -0.056637    0.00580169        -9.762        0.0001 
                r          1      0.001878    0.00008577        21.897        0.0001 
                z2         1      0.003071    0.00023388        13.131        0.0001 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
Grouping the sample data based on total expenditure ranking in 10 decile 
groups, we would get the following data descriptions in Table 6-38. 
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Table 6-39 Means of Education, Food, and Non-Food Expenditures based on 
Decile of Total Expenditures, Susenas 1997 














0 20734 0.68 69.27 30.73 78546.60 2.30 
1 20736 1.23 70.28 29.72 117471.74 3.27 
2 20734 1.52 70.35 29.65 143257.53 3.69 
3 20737 1.77 69.95 30.05 166243.99 4.02 
4 20734 2.14 69.39 30.61 191664.24 4.29 
5 20736 2.41 68.80 31.20 220482.67 4.55 
6 20735 2.85 67.49 32.51 256031.01 4.78 
7 20735 3.22 65.46 34.54 304194.65 4.99 
8 20735 3.94 61.93 38.07 383617.98 5.28 
9 20735 5.42 51.83 48.17 710326.29 5.62 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
In the 1997 data, the share of food expenditure started to decline after the 
second decile, although only marginally. The significant decline in food expenditure 
occurred in the sixth decile. The opposite is true for non-food expenditures. In contrast, 
education expenditures have shown a constant increase beginning in the 0 decile.   
Again dividing into rural and urban categories, the education spending was 
relatively higher in urban areas. The share of education spending was also relatively 
higher in 1997 compared with 1987.   
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Table 6-40 Means of Education, Food, and Non-Food Expenditures based on 
Decile of Total Expenditures, Susenas 1997, Urban Areas 














0 2673 1.29 65.26 34.74 78,780.05 1.76 
1 2963 2.15 65.09 34.91 117,999.83 2.60 
2 3613 2.35 64.79 35.21 143,619.23 3.01 
3 4205 2.43 64.52 35.48 166,627.42 3.33 
4 5173 3.14 64.18 35.82 192,131.51 3.63 
5 6092 3.41 63.88 36.12 220,975.66 3.97 
6 7442 3.71 62.74 37.26 256,619.90 4.29 
7 9320 4.07 61.15 38.85 305,089.96 4.55 
8 11534 4.64 58.22 41.78 385,940.28 4.94 
9 15569 5.98 49.80 50.20 745,040.61 5.50 
   Source: calculated by author. 
     
Table 6-41 Means of Education, Food, and Non-Food Expenditures based on 
Decile of Total Expenditures, Susenas 1997, Rural Areas 













0 18061 0.59 69.86 30.14 78,512.05 2.38 
1 17773 1.08 71.15 28.85 117,383.70 3.38 
2 17121 1.34 71.53 28.47 143,181.20 3.83 
3 16532 1.60 71.34 28.66 166,146.47 4.19 
4 15561 1.81 71.13 28.87 191,508.91 4.50 
5 14644 1.99 70.85 29.15 220,277.58 4.79 
6 13293 2.37 70.15 29.85 255,701.32 5.06 
7 11415 2.53 68.98 31.02 303,463.66 5.36 
8 9201 3.06 66.58 33.42 380,706.85 5.71 
9 5166 3.72 57.92 42.08 605,706.22 5.99 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The first conclusion would be that return to schooling was sufficiently high in 
Indonesia, with urban figures relatively higher than rural. Industry or manufacturing 
provides higher return to schooling, which probably explains the higher return to 
schooling in urban areas. Higher wages seem to require higher skills, shown by the 
higher mean years of education in urban areas. 
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One other important point that seems to be missing in most literature is the still 
high proportion of labor that was unpaid, which means that a large proportion of the 
society actually was excluded from the ‘formal’ labor market. This condition seems to 
be unchanged from 1976 up to 1997. 
These points out the fact that although some parts of Indonesian economy have 
been ‘modernized’, a large part of it, especially the rural sector, remains untouched – 
and probably still in the subsistence or traditional level of economy. 
In addition, the low share of education expenditures in the household’s budget 
provides a significant role for parents to improve the quality of education received by 
their children. Society should refrain from being too dependent on the state; especially 
when they possess the needed financial resources at their disposal. On the other hand, 
the state should remain progressive in providing education facilities, especially in the 
rural-poor areas. 
Also one important fact is that the share of education expenditures actually 
increases as income brackets went up, it shows that society may already have viewed 
education as a part of investment. Even then, the increment remains relatively small, 
showing that some sort of structural unemployment where the growth of the economy 




Chapter 7 Role of Education at the Ideological 
Level: The Elite, the Masses, and the Entrepreneur 
Role of Education at the Ideological Level: 
The Elite, the Masses, and the Entrepreneur 
This chapter attempts to explain the effect of education at the ideological and 
institutional level, which later on would finally affect economic growth. Education 
affects ideology and culture, both at the elite and at the mass levels, through the 
creation of knowledge and ideas. At the elite level, we will analyze why the economic 
policy-making in Indonesia is so ‘capitalist’ biased, despite the inherent socialist 
ideology of Indonesian founding fathers like Soekarno and Hatta. 
At the level of the masses, we would see the culture and characteristics of the 
average ‘Indonesian Man’ (or ‘Manusia Indonesia’ in bahasa Indonesia). We would 
also assess the ideology of education in Indonesia. Is education seen merely as a 
‘noble’ activity just as Aristotle did? Alternatively, does education function as a means 
of improving the skills and welfare of Indonesians? The final goal is to see how does 
this affect the emergence of ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ entrepreneurs; to relate it with the 
Schumpeter theory of growth. 
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At the end of this chapter, we will attempt to see what kind of ‘businessmen’ 
has emerged because of the institutionalized moldings of these two ideological views 
on education. Is the Indonesian national culture178 shaped by its education has moved 
towards a more entrepreneurial ‘Indonesian Man’? 
Social science scholars tend to define culture179 in a broad manner, as a total of 
mind, creation, and effort produced by humankind that is not based on his instinct, and 
as such can only be produced by man after a learning process (Koentjaraningrat 1974: 
1). 
While institution, according to Koentjaraningrat (1974: 15), was supported by 
three triangular forms of culture: ideas, people, and physical tool; as described in 
Figure 7-1. 
                                                 
178Pidarta (2000: 158) quoting Manan (1989) listed five components of culture as: ideas, ideology, norm, 
technology and things. Koentjaraningrat (1974: 5) mentions that culture has at least three forms: ideas, 
activties and material things. 
179Culture in Indonesian language is spelled as ‘budaya’. ‘Budaya’ originated from a sankrit word, ‘budi’ 
(mind, thoughts) and ‘daya’ (effort). (Koentjaraningrat 1974: 9). While Alghatam (2005: 3) wrote that 
“Culture is the fruit of human civilization, in both material and non-material aspects. It includes 
technology and its related sciences, as well as culture in the narrow sense of the word, which means arts, 
literature and heritage, including religion.” 
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Figure 7-1 Ideas, People and Institution 
 
Source: Adapted from Koentjaraningrat (1974: 15). 
 
Again, it would be interesting, as we have noted from the previous chapter, to 
see how the education sector or the school functions as a ‘miniature’ of the Indonesian 
state. The similarity between ‘education’ and the ‘state’ probably could be traced back 
to Plato’s conception of education, as quoted by Kartono (1997: 26): 
According to Plato, the ultimate goal of education is identical with that 
of the state and of mankind; that is to become a good citizen and man, to 
build a prosperous and justice society. 
 
 
7.1 Education Ideology in Indonesia 
During Indonesian independence, several laws concerning education were 
established. Law no. 4/1950, Law no. 12/1954, Law no. 2/1989, and the latest Law no. 
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20/2003. Law no. 2/1989 was seen as the main regulation covering the education sector 
during Soeharto’s administration.  
In GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara - Broad Outlines of State Policy) 
1993, it was explained that the goal of the education sector policy was to improve the 
quality of Indonesian Man, that is a person that is faithful to God, civilized, has his/her 
own personality, self-sufficient, advanced, intelligent, creative, skilled, discipline, have 
work-ethic, professional, responsible, productive and healthy (Pidarta 2000: 11). 
Law no. 2/1989 defines education as a conscious effort to prepare a student 
through counseling, teaching and/or other practical activities for his/her role in the 
future (Pidarta 2000: 10). An earlier definition from Ki Hajar Dewantara (quoted in 
Pidarta 2000) points out that education is to guide every natural ability in children so 
that they as human and the member of the society could gain the highest level of 
survival and welfare. 
Pidarta (2000: 42) considered Law no.2/1989 as the most comprehensive law 
regarding education in Indonesia. In the law (article 1 verse 2), national education was 
said to be rooted in ‘Indonesian culture’. In reality, as a newly independent nation, 
there was not yet a really modern ‘indigenous’ education system intact.  
The first school established by an ‘indigenous’ Indonesian can be dated to 1922 
when Ki Hajar Dewantara180 founded the Taman Siswa (Student’s Garden) in 
                                                 
180 Dewantara was Minister of education in the first Republican cabinet, and another leader of Taman 
Siswa succeeded him in the next cabinet (Hing 1978:42, quoted Gjelstad). The role of Education 
Ministers in formulating the education ideology of the school is enormous. As explained in the previous 
chapter, the School could be seen as a national miniature of Indonesia. As such, the Education Minister 
also has a decisive role to play just like the President of Indonesia who could be seen as the sole 
representation of the ‘state’, at least up to Soeharto administration. As a result, as ICW (2004) noted, 
education policy was never consistent. A change in the Education Minister would soon be followed by a 
change in Education Policy (in terms of curriculum). To cite an example, when Dr Fuad Hasan was a 
minister, the theme of the curriculum was Active Student Learning Metod (cara belajar siswa aktif - 
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Yogyakarta181. The distinct characteristic of this school was it prepared students with 
an aspiration to be free (freedom), and this was different from other schools mostly 
founded by the Dutch which had the ultimate goal of preparing the students to become 
a part of the government administration. Even then, the Taman Siswa ideology was still 
influenced by the European and western culture, as McVey (1967: 133) noted: 
The Taman Siswa's founder made use particularly of the ideas of 
Montessori and Frdbel in Europe and the Dalton school system in the 
United States, with their stress on self-expression, the adjustment of 
teaching to the terms of the child's world, and the techniques of indirect 
guidance and control. Rabindranath Tagore s criticisms of western 
education and his Santiniketan School were also much admired by Ki 
Hadjar and his associates, though, like other leaders of the Indonesian 
national movement, they never rejected western ways to the extent 
Tagore and Gandhi did.  
 
There is another type of indigenous or community-based school known as the 
Islamic school, popularly known as ‘madrassa’. Madrassa has a long history in 
Indonesia. Different with its counterparts in the Middle East, madrassa in Indonesia 
were more targeted at the primary or secondary level of education, while in the middle-
east they are more targeted at the advanced levels (Shaleh 2004: 12).182 The most 
established Islamic schools today are founded by Muhammadiyah dasting to 1912 and 
Nahdhatul Ulama dating to 1926 (Shaleh 2004: 19-20). 
 
                                                                                                                                              
CBSA). However, when Dr Wardiman Djojonegoro was a minister, CBSA was soon replaced by “link 
and match” theme (ICW 2004). For a simple description of the ‘link and match’ system refer to Daulay 
(2004: 206-208). 
181 Other similar indigenous school was established by Mohamad Syafei, called the Indonesisch 
Nederlandse School in West Sumatra (Pidarta, 2000: 123). 
182 As early as 1596, the Dutch colonial rule under Cornelis de Houtman had found several community-
based schools in Hinduism and Islam (Shaleh 2004: 14).  
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The establishment of a ‘national’ school in Indonesia, despite the existing 
colonialism of the Dutch, probably existed as early as 1908, as Dewantara (1967: 156) 
notes: 
… schools had been founded by Indonesians themselves long before the 
introduction of the term national education. Various educational 
institutions came into being due to the initiative of the oldest national 
association, Budi Utomo, which since 1908 has been most distinguished 
in its service to the general intellectual interests of the people. (Its efforts 
have included the foundation of schools and hostels by the Darmo Woro 
Scholarship Fund and the discussion of educational affairs at its annual 
congresses.) 
 
The Budi Utomo organization was established by Dr Wahidin, a Javanese 
medical doctor, and has the following characteristics (Pidarta 2000: 131): 
1. The basis of the organization is Culture. 
2. The goal is to advance the Indonesian nation in every aspect of life, 
including culture. 
3. The leader is coming from the ‘common’ Indonesian people who are not 
considered as scholars. 
 
The ‘Taman Siswa’ ideology formulated in 1922 consists of the following 
(Pidarta 2000: 125): 
 
1. Individual freedom for individuals to manage themselves, without 
disrupting the concern of the general public at large. 
2. Freedom in thinking, aspirations, and willingness to do something. 
3. Indigenous culture acts as the basis of life, instead of intellectual 
ground. 
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4. Social purpose; where education should be provided to all people 
indiscriminately.   
5. Live independently, try to be self-sufficient, and not to expect 
conditional aid. 
6. Live a simple life, such that Indonesians can be self-sufficient 
financially. 
7. To serve the needs of the children.  
 
From the above set of ideology, we could say that the ideology for education 
before independence was based on freedom, indigenous culture, and egalitarianism. 
This was not much different with the education ideology after independence, except 
that there was added emphasis on business or working purpose and additional emphasis 
on religious purpose. 
Looking at the education objectives after independence, one cannot escape the 
feeling of vagueness of the ‘motherhood’ statement in the GBHN (Garis-garis Besar 
Haluan Negara - Broad Outlines of State Policy) concerning education goals. This is 
especially so when looking at the reality of the heavy state-intervention in education 
policies. As Sindhunata (2000: 12) notes: 
In many countries, as well as in Indonesia, schools are institutions built 
by the state, serving the state’s purpose. Private schools are established 
also to support the goal (of the state).  
 
During the implementation of Law no.2/1989, the process was seen as centralistic, 
undemocratic and to be overly controlled by political authority (Mastuhu 2003).  
262
The vagueness of education-sector goals could be due to the fact that GOI under 
Soeharto put economic growth as its major goal for long-term development plan. As a 
result, there was this emphasis on how education should also contribute to the business 
sector and the economy through a popular concept of ‘link and match’ established in 
the education policies. ‘Link’ means here that education has a functional relationship 
with the market needs; and ‘match’ means here that school graduates should meet the 
requirement of the employers, in terms of quality and quantity183 (Pidarta 2000: 135). 
Nevertheless, we could grasp one of the central themes of education; to build an 
‘Indonesian Man’. This emphasis could be seen from the particularly strong emphasis 
on ‘culture’ and ‘indigenous’ as the main components of education ideology. The 
Ministry for handling education and school matters in Indonesia was the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (MOEC), and not until the Wahid administration (1998-2000) 
that the MOEC was changed to the Ministry of National Education. This shows how 
‘culture’ was seen as inseparable from ‘education’. 
Again, as a newly born nation with diverse regional cultures, Indonesia 
obviously was in need of a definition what was meant to be ‘Indonesian’. The nation-
building goals obviously would be implanted by the state in the education system 
remembering the fact of the authoritarian type of Soekarno and Soehartos’ 
administration. The requirement and the wide usage of Indonesian language as the 
medium of instruction had somewhat showed some success in the nation-building 
process. What is unclear was how the education system would prepare the students to 
face the future, concomitant with the fast changing environment in terms of culture and 
                                                 
183 The “link and match” system was formally introduced after 1993 by Dr Wardiman Djojonegoro when 
he was the Minister of Education. 
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economic growth. To quote Gjelstad (2003) “…challenges that the newly independent 
Indonesian nation faced regarding the task of building up an appropriate system for 
educating the future generations of Indonesians.” 
Rosyada (2004: 226-227) describes the education system in Indonesia as having 
three waves. The first wave was where education (or schooling) was embedded in 
religious institutions like the mosques and pesantren surrounding the communities 
(before indepence period). The second wave (occurred during Soekarno and Soehartos’ 
administration) was where the education sector was heavily regulated and centralized 
by the central government, in terms of planning, financing, curriculum, and human 
resource development (teachers or other educational staff). In the second wave, national 
education was directed towards more secular and nationalistic goals, despite the 
acknowledgement and inclusion of religious objectives in the law and curriculum. The 
third wave took place after the advent of regional autonomy (after Soeharto) and put 
more emphasis to the local conditions and needs, supposedly bringing the community 
back as the main decision makers for educational purposes. 
7.1.1 The Indonesian Man 
Based on the Indonesian constitution the main task of schooling is to create a 
‘new Indonesian Man’ (Shiraishi 1997 quoted in Gjelstad 2003). With Indonesian 
independence, there was a concomitant need to define what was meant to be an 
‘Indonesian’, especially in nationalistic terms. As McVey (1967:138) quoted in 
Gjelstad (2003) notes that “the national revolution itself required a mobilization of the 
masses, the village replaced the court as the main cultural centre”. As Indonesia was 
264
and is predominantly rural, the village obviously has a central role to play in Indonesian 
development.  
However, despite the acknowledgement that the village has a central role to 
play in nation building, there was also a view that the village acted as one of the 
obstacles to nation-building and development. As McVey (1967:138) quoted in 
Gjelstad  (2003) noted: 
On the one hand, nationalist sentiment viewed the village as the reservoir 
of Indonesian culture; on the other hand, the transformation of the 
villager was seen as a major goal of modern nationhood. The common 
man was still ignorant (masih bodoh); he must be made literate and 
educated in his duties as a citizen.  
 
As such it is important to assess the ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ versions of 
Indonesian Man, and then compared it to the ‘modern’ Indonesian Man aspired by the 
development process. Swasono (2004: 48) argues that to reveal the identity of 
Indonesian Man, one needs to look at the mindset, aspirations, and behavioral aspects. 
The three aspects construct the national culture that would later on construct the 
characteristics of the Indonesian Man. 
7.1.2 ‘Traditional’ Indonesian Man 
To know the characteristics or mentality (cultural value/nilai budaya) of 
‘traditional’ or ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ Indonesian Man, the work of Koentjaraningrat 
(1974)184 is still highly relevant. Koentjaraningrat (1974) divided the mentality of 
Indonesian Man before independence into two categories: the ‘farmers’ (petani) 
mentality mostly exists in rural areas, and the ‘employee’ (pegawai or priyayi) 
mentality mostly exists in urban areas. 
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The farmer’s mentality, according to Koentjaraningrat is: 
1. In relation with the meaning of life (hakekat hidup): a person works 
hard so that he would be able to eat (manusia itu bekerja keras untuk 
dapat makan). 
2. In relation with time horizon (persepsi waktu): most of the important 
decisions and life orientation of a farmer is determined by the current 
situation and condition (keadaan masa kini). 
3. In relation with ‘nature’ (alam): a person must be in harmony with 
nature (neither to ‘conquer’ or being ‘dependent’ on nature). 
4. In relation with others in the community: the concept of equality or 
equal distribution (sama-rata-sama-rasa). An Indonesian Man must 
keep a low profile and not to be seen as ‘superior’ compared with 
others.  
 
The employee’s mentality, according to Koentjaraningrat is: 
1. In relation with the meaning of life (hakekat hidup): life is to pursue 
happiness reflected in status, power, physical prosperity (for example 
to own big and luxurious houses). According to Koentjaraningrat it is 
not ‘achievement oriented’. 
2. In relation with time-horizon (persepsi waktu): most of the important 
decisions and life-orientation of an employee is determined by the 
past, with lots of sentimental values attached to ‘pusaka’, mythology, 
‘silsilah’, and with the work of past scholars.  
                                                                                                                                              
184 His work has been reprinted 21 times, with the latest edition on 2004. 
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3. In relation with ‘nature’ (alam): an employee has some tendency 
towards mystical phenomenon that is not rational, and tends to put too 
much emphasis on ‘fate’ (nasib). 
4. In relation with others in the community: an employee puts too much 
emphasis on superiority and seniority, adhering to patron-client and 
vertical relationships, causing lack of initiative and always waiting for 
directions from the boss (menunggu-restu-dari-atas).185 
 
Another type of mentality probably existed in the traditional Indonesian society. 
Besides the agrarian society -that probably had its historical track from the Mataram 
kingdom in Java (Dinsi 2004: 8)- another type of a more maritime and trade-based 
society probably also existed, like the ancient Kingdom of (Kasultanan) Aceh in 
Sumatra island. However, due to the invasion of the Portuguese and later on the Dutch, 
who applied the monopoly system and cut-off the native access to international trade, 
this trading spirit -could be regarded as an ‘entrepreneurship’ mentality- was severely 
dampened. Later on, the Dutch only allowed limited trading opportunities for the 
Chinese, which was a minority in the Indonesian archipelago. 
Koentjaraningrat (1974: 39) actually feels that some of traditional cultures and 
mentality were, in a way, not fit for the spirit of development. The reason was that the 
traditional values were not ‘achievement oriented’, not ‘future-oriented’, giving too 
much emphasis on ‘fate’, and too ‘vertical-oriented’.186 
                                                 
185 This mentality was reinforced during Soeharto’s administration; especially acknowledged by Mr 
Harmoko, the Information Minister from 1983-1997. The local acronym for such behavior is ABS (Asal 
Bapak Senang), could be translated as ‘as long as the Master pleased’.. 
186 Alghatam (2005: 4) in analyzing the Arab culture wrote that “There is no doubt that traditional culture 
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As for the mentality of Indonesian Man after independence, Koentjaraningrat 
lists the following weak characteristics187: 
1. Mentality to disregard quality; 
2. Mentality to look for short-cut or ‘instant’ result without or less effort 
(menerabas); 
3. Mentality of lack of confidence; 
4. Mentality to ignore tight responsibility. 
 
This mentality was the result of the ‘decolonization process’, a stage whereby in 
a transitional period after independence, the old and feudal norms were seen as obsolete 
but on the other hand the ‘new’ or ‘modern’ or ‘nationalistic’ norms were yet to be built 
and agreed upon (Koentjaraningrat 1974:44). 
This traditional mind-set and or ideology had probably hindered the economic 
development process that was occurring in Indonesia. As Sulaeman (2005: 2) notes: 
Economic development plan for the country had been creating issues at 
the beginning after there were presumptions that ‘Indonesian culture’ 
was unfit in supporting economic development program (Boeke 1953; 
Koentjaraningrat 1969). Cultural unfit presumptions were imposed based 
on common comparison between Indonesian origins and Chinese, whom 
had played economic role successfully in the country. 
 
As the post-independence era could be considered as the transition process, the 
state, or more generally the elite, holds a massive and decisive role as the agent of 
change; especially remembering the vertical characteristics (or patron-client 
relationship) of traditional Indonesian society. 
                                                                                                                                              
has played a negative role in the progress of society, and led to a situation of backwardness…”. 
187For the description and explanation of each mentality, refer to Koentjaraningrat (1974: 43-55). 
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7.1.3 ‘Modern’ Indonesian Man 
Though Koentjaraningrat did not state explicitly the characteristics of a 
‘modern188’ Indonesian Man, he stated the necessary development mentality needed for 
Indonesians in order to develop further so as to become more ‘prosperous’ 
economically (Koentjaraningrat 1974: 33). In conclusion, Koentjaraningrat (1974: 36) 
states: 
A nation that aspire to intensify its effort for development must make an 
effort such that more of its citizens attach higher value for future 
orientation, so that man would become more thrifty to calculate his ideal 
life in the future; to attach higher value for explorative drive in order to 
increase its innovative capacity; to attach higher value towards creativity; 
and finally to attach higher value for an independent self-effort 
mentality, self confidence, pure discipline, and have the courage for self-
responsibility. 
 
In addition, Suryadi and Budimansyah (2004) list the characteristics of a (ideal) 
Modern Indonesian Society in the following: 
1. Faithful to God: civil society is expected not to be a mere secular and 
materialist society but one that is more religiously ethical; one that 
puts more emphasis on goodness of mankind as a creation of God; 
2. Democracy: the self-realization to participate in every aspect of life 
towards the implementation of governance and development that 
reside in the hands of the people;  
3. Self-effort: the readiness of society in facing future challanges, global 
competition, increasing value-added, and to transform into a modern 
society; 
                                                 
188 Kartono (1997: 16) stated that a traditional man wanted continuity and stable condition in the society, 
and reluctant to changes. In contrast, a modern man would anticipate changes, development, 
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4. Superiority: human mentality in society that values his/her own work 
highly, and has the drive to produce something because of the 
satisfaction derived from the success of creating his/her own work. 
5. Professional:  a society with the drive to explore nature, to make a 
person a master of his/her own fate, and not to be controlled by fate. 
6. Rule of Law: Laws and regulations agreed upon would control the 
life of society and not through power or force. 
 
More formally, the ‘ideal’ Indonesian Man is described in the National 
Education Goal in Law no.20/2003 with the eight important aspects of national 
education being (Daulay 2004: 198): 1. faithful to god; 2. noble personality; 3. healthy; 
4. knowledgeable; 5. skillful; 6. creative; 7. self-reliant; 8. being a democratic and 
responsible citizen. 
It is clear from the above description that religious and state-building concern 
have been vital to the ideology of the ‘ideal’ and thus ‘modern’ Indonesian Man aspired 
by the state, and probably to some extent by the community as well. It seems that the 
national education system, more specifically its curriculum, has devoted sufficient 
attention towards the making of this ‘modern’ Indonesian Man, as the state requires 
three types of lessons to be taught at every level of education (Daulay 2004: 37): they 
are Pancasila Education, Religious Education, and Civic Education (Law No 2/1989, 
article 39, verse 2).  
                                                                                                                                              
improvement and increment. A modern man has a mobile and flexible personality that easy to adapt to 
any changes and new phenomenon. 
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Unfortunately, the materials and content of Pancasila Education and Civic 
Education were highly controlled by the state (especially at the time of Soeharto’s 
administration) and only acted as an indoctrination tool for the state to maintain its 
power. 
Ideally Civic Education should teach values that encourage the critical behavior 
of students to demand their rights as well as to know their obligations. However, in 
Indonesia, it only emphasises the obligation of citizens to the state, thereby creating an 
obliging, fearful, uncritical person – a person without personality (Darmaningtyas 
2004:11). Pancasila Education also acted as a mere justification and one-sided 
interpretation by the state regarding the use of Pancasila as the nation’s ideology. 
One could argue that the learning process that moulds the culture of ‘Indonesian 
Man’ does not happen only in school, so education vis-à-vis formal schooling might not 
be the sole agent of change. While it is true that learning is a long-life and continuous 
process, it must be admitted that the society or the community have less potential to act 
as the agent of change or development, remembering the ‘traditional’ characteristics or 
mentality of ‘Indonesian Man’. As such, education through schooling could be said to 
be in a more advantageous position to act as the agent of change towards achieving a 
modern society. 
Modernization school-of-thought believed that the school, besides teaching 
knowledge and skills, also has an effective role to play to build modern values needed 
as a pre-condition for every nation aspiring to enter the industrialization era (Wirutomo 
2004: 253). According to this school of thought, the backwardness of a nation did not 
occur because of structural problems, but more related to cultural deficiency or the lack 
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of modern values required for a society to develop and to enter the industrialization era. 
These modern values are entrepreneurship, courage to take risks, creativity, 
achievement motivation, and other attitudes (Inkeles 1969 and Holsinger 1973 cited in 
Wirutomo 2004). 
A couple of the main problems of Indonesian education quality was stated by 
Suryadi and Budimansyah (2004: 15): 
1. The learning process puts too much orientation towards the 
theoretical and the mastering of facts such that the ability of learning 
and logical deductions of the students remains under-developed. 
2. The school curriculum is too tightly structured and fully loaded, and 
this has made the learning process in the schools to become sterile to 
the conditions and changes occurring in the society at large. As a 
result, the education process becomes a mere routine, unattractive and 
does not ignite the students’ creativity to learn. 
 
Others like Buchori (2004: 308) assess the current quality of learning for 
Indonesian nation to be low. It is because in the education curriculum there is no 
agenda for increasing the ability of learning. This is because the overly ambitious 
national curriculum resulted in a generation with a limited ability of learning (Buchori 
2004: 309). 
Other quantitative evidence about the education quality in Indonesia is also not 
encouraging. Supriyoko (2004: 424) noted that the average national score for National 
Final Study Evaluation (EBTANAS) for Junior High School (SMP) and Junior High 
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School (SMA) for mathematics has never reached the score of 6 out of 10! Other 
evidence from South Sulawesi by Supriyoko (1993) cited in Supriyoko (2004) shows 
that many Primary School graduates are still having some problems in literacy. 
However, the modernization school of thought views the effect of schooling 
(towards building a modern attitude and culture) is not done mainly through learning 
materials and curriculum189 but mainly through the process of interaction occurring in 
schools (especially in the classroom) (Wirutomo 2004: 253). This can occur in the 
reward and punishment system in the classroom or using teachers as role models.  
Yet, unfortunately for Indonesia, for the two examples cited above, the 
Indonesian school culture is still not very promising. For example, for using teachers as 
role models, with the current teachers’ poor salary and unexciting career path combined 
with the current materialism culture, it would be hard to imagine that any student, 
except those with a very idealistic aspiration, would use their teacher as a role model. 
It is not easy to define the ‘current’ nature of ‘Indonesian Man’. Firstly, 
because, most obviously, the transition process towards a modern ‘Indonesian Man’ is 
probably still underway – without a likelihood that it would ever finish. Secondly, after 
the crisis erupted in 1997, many writings seem to focus only on the negative sides of 
Indonesian culture. But maybe we should not define it at all, because in doing so we 
would be creating a closed definition of culture which is probably ‘ethically’ 
incorrect.190 
                                                 
189 Nevertheless, Buchori (2004: 303) aspire that curriculum could act as a ‘blue-print’ of an Indonesian 
Man figure expected to grow within the students after undergoing all learning, teaching, and training 
stated in the curriculum.  
190 Djiwandono (2004: 39) for example, opposed the method of Citizenship Education curriculum during 
Soeharto era. During that time, Pancasila was described and elaborated further into ‘hundreds grains of 
Pancasila’, which explain in details what was meant specifically by the ffive principles. He/she 
considered that has created Pancasila as a closed ideology and has made the state to monopolize the 
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Instead of doing that, let us examine what some of the scholars have to say 
regarding Indonesian society currently. Sudarminta (2004: 106) describes three social 
symptoms the current Indonesian society is facing: the massive corruption, collusion, 
and nepotism (KKN-Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme) practices happening in the 
government bureaucracy at all levels and in every aspect of society; the weak social 
responsibility of the nation leaders as well as public officials in general; the lessening 
levels of humanity in many Indonesians. 
Other scholarss, like Herry-Priyono (2004) highlights the emergence of 
materialism in modern Indonesia. As the private sector experienced a booming in the 
1980s fueled by the globalization of trade, a new middle class emerged. This new 
middle class uses capital as their symbol of status. The definition of success in this new 
modern landscape of Indonesia is the amount of capital accumulated. Quoting Ruth 
McVey, Herry-Priyono (2004: 171) writes: 
More often nowadays, the children of state officials no longer seek a 
career in the government bureaucracy. There has been a major shift in 
ideology between the elites, from ‘status’ seekers towards ‘money’ 
hunting and material consumption….we find a situation whereby 
children  of state officials choose to get an MBA instead of entering the 
military or government institute. No one of Soeharto’s children followed 
the military career path as their father’s did. The problem with them, as 
with the new powerful elite generation that is now business oriented, is 
to what extent do they become a real entrepreneur, and not just playboys 
playing around with their family’s fortune.  
 
This new middle class has its own specific characteristics that are different from 
the other types of middle class in Indonesia as shown in Table 7-1. 
                                                                                                                                              
interpretation of Pancasila. 
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Table 7-1 The New Middle Class Characteristics in Indonesia, 1996 
Characteristics New Middle 
Class (MC) 




University Education 69.1 20.8 17.0 1.9 
Family Income 51.9 26.7 17.4 1.0 
PC Ownership 46.2 21.5 13.7 0.0 
Credit card ownership 39.7 19.1 10.1 0.0 
Source: Kompas daily R&D (1996), in Herry-Priyono (2004). 
 
One important work regarding ‘Indonesian Man’ is done by Mochtar Lubis (a 
prominent Indonesian Journalist who won the 1958 Ramon Magsaysay Award for 
Journalism, Literature and Creative Communication Arts) in 1977 with his speech titled 
‘Manusia Indonesia: Sebuah Pertanggungjawaban’ (‘Indonesian Man: An 
Acknowledgement’). In his work, Lubis (1990) described many characteristics of 
‘Indonesian Man’. He boils down the characteristics of ‘Indonesian Man’ to: 
1. Hypocricy. ‘Indonesian Man’ tends to act or talk differently from his/her 
original intentions. This resulted from the long history of the feudal system 
existed in the Indonesian society. One of the implication of this 
characteristic is that ‘Indonesian Man’ would do what his/her supervisor 
expected him to do/say, mostly known as the ‘ABS’ (Asal Bapak Senang – 
As Long as The Master Pleased) attitude.  
2. Reluctance to take responsibility. ‘Indonesian Man’ tends to avoid or shift 
responsibility of his/her own action, decision, behavior and thinking (tends 
to look for scapegoat). When something is wrong, someone else is to blame; 
while when something goes well, only the elites will strive to get the 
recognition. 
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3. Feudal spirit. Hierarchy and sense of orderliness are embedded in 
Indonesian society. Everybody is expected to know his/her place in society. 
Society is constructed vertically, not horizontally. Each person belongs to a 
different stratum of the society and should act accordingly. This establishes 
a firm patron-client relationship in the Indonesian society. 
4. High mystical beliefs. Many ‘Indonesian Man’ have a deep mystical beliefs. 
They believe in ‘higher powers’ above themselves such that fate and ‘good 
luck’ matters above all. One consequences of this dominant mystical belief 
is the wide usage of ‘mantra’ (‘spells’). Modernization is viewed as yet 
another mystical ideology, something that has to be achieved at all costs. 
Modernization at the same time is also being regarded as a ‘mantra’, as if 
modernization could be achieved instantly simply by just saying it.    
5. Artistic. ‘Indonesian Man’ is known to have high artistic values and gives 
high appreciation for the arts. This can be seen from various artifacts across 
the archipelago in the form of wooden artifacts, metal artifacts and other 
temples and buildings. As such, an ‘Indonesian Man’ has high intuition and 
instinct capacity. 
6. Weak character. ‘Indonesian Man’ has a weak character and often does not 
stand up to support its own opinions or arguments. Lubis (1990: 39) cites 
the example that most economists during Soekarno’s administration said 
nothing when Soekarno declared that high inflation was good as long as it 
served the goal of ‘Indonesian revolution’. 
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It is clear the economic growth process has brought and required a (physical) 
structural change as well as the mentally (cultural and ideology) cultural change as 
well. Castles (2000), for example, regarded the “Rostow’s five stages of growth 
culminating in economic ‘take-off’, were based on an ethic of hard work and saving, 
combined with laissez-faire economics and free markets”. 
Changing an ideology, however, would possibly take a very long process, and 
even then, it may not result in a clear-cut ‘model’ of culture. Instead it would most 
probably create a hybrid model of ideology and culture. As King (2005: 8) notes, the 
“convergence around some set of post-modern values is unlikely, as ‘history matters’ 
and traditional values will continue to influence cultures as they modernize”. 
 
7.2 Capitalistic Nature in Economic Policy Making 
The major critique when one studies the economic policy making in the 
Southeast Asian countries is that the policy makers tend to be western-biased in their 
framework of thinking. Indeed, contemporary economic thinking is mostly based on the 
mainstream of economics which is deeply rooted in the capitalistic ways of thinking. 
This can be mainly attributed to the work of Adam Smith, when in 1776 he published 
“An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” -- the book that 
defined modern capitalism191. The so-called neoclassical economics doctrine has 
dominated many of the international organizations such as the IMF and the World 
Bank, and also many of the policy elites and technocrats in developing countries. 
Indonesia is not an exception. One of the reasons is that most of the scholars turn to 
                                                 
191 Bronowski (1960), Chapter 19. 
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policy makers either in the World Bank and IMF. The Governments of the Third World 
are being educated as ‘neoclassical economists’ and tend to ignore other schools of 
thoughts. As Foldvary (1998) argues: 
The problem is even worse in graduate schools, where economists are 
trained. The students become indoctrinated into one or other school of 
economics. Unfortunately, economics is not a unified body of 
knowledge, but divided into schools of thought that are often radically 
different. The predominant neo-classical school is subdivided into 
subschools of macroeconomics, which studies the economy as a whole. 
We have demand-side New Keynesians, supply- side New Classicals, 
along with Monetarists and others. Graduate students get attached to 
some subschool, and then think that this is correct economics. Few are 
interested in challenges to their doctrine, since they first need to get their 
Ph.D degree, and then they must please the faculty they join in order to 
get tenure. By the time they get tenure, they have been working with 
neoclassical doctrine so long that they believe it is the only way to go.  
    
In order to become independent from from the western-biased approach and to 
gain a deeper and more critical understanding about the formulation of government 
policy in Indonesia, this chapter attempts to explicitly discuss the origin of ideas in 
policy-making through some sort of biographical approach of the policy makers, 
otherwise known as an actor-oriented analysis of development policy192. Why some 
policies are favorable when compared with others, and understanding the process of 
decision-making could give broader insight for policy analysis purpose. This is 
particularly relevant for Indonesia, where the state and policy elites play a central and 
dominant role in economic development as well as in politics. 
 
                                                 
192 A new framework of analysis for policy making that was recently developed being known as a 
‘memetic framework’ is actually similar with the method being used here. The memetic framework 
consists of a view where descriptions of actions and people endorsing them, compete to get these action 
proposals into policy plans. This framework enables the inclusion of rational, non-rational and other 
selection forces, having their effects when choices are made. Because it also deals with the historical 
legacy of the ideas used to formulate a policy, it expands on the concept of 'bounded rationality', limiting 
the role of rationality or reasoning in making choices even further (Speel, H-C., 1997). 
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7.2.1 Economic Policy Making Ideology in Indonesia 
As a relatively young country that gained independence in 1945, the national 
government was faced by a high poverty level that was being felt mostly by indigenous 
people of Indonesia. Swasono (1997) has described the ‘indigenous population of 
Indonesia’ as “…the warganegara pribumi (native Indonesians), consisting of various 
ethnic groups spread all over the country. Each considers a place in Indonesia as its 
land of origin, where it maintains ancestors’ graves and major cultural heritage”. In its 
preamble of the 1945 constitution, the goals of the Indonesian Nation are stated as:  
 
…to form a government of the state of Indonesia which shall protect all 
the people of Indonesia and their entire native land, and in order to 
improve the public welfare, to advance the intellectual life of the people 
and to contribute to the establishment of a world order…193 
 
So the goal of ‘public welfare’ has been embedded in the nation’s ideology and 
the government should pursue this goal accordingly. The goal of public welfare is 
stated more specifically in Article 33 (under Chapter XIV: Social Welfare) items 2 and 
3 that: 
2. Sectors of production which are important for the country and affect 
the life of the people shall be controlled by the state. 
3. The land, the waters and the natural riches contained therein shall be 
controlled by the State and exploited to the greatest benefit of the people.  
 
In addition, Article 34 states that the poor and destitute children shall be cared 
for by the State. Article 33 clearly mentions that any sectors of production that are 
important for the country and affecting the lives of the general public should be 
                                                                                                                                              
 
193Department of Asian Studies, University of Texas, 
http://inic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/indonesia/ConstIndonesia.html 
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controlled by the state and to be exploited for the greatest benefit of the people. This is 
actually the legal foundation for establishing PERTAMINA194, the Indonesian State oil 
company that manages the natonal oil resources. With vast oil resources and supported 
by an increase in oil prices, PERTAMINA provided Soeharto with a vast amount of 
capital that could have been efficiently invested to further accelerate economic growth 
(Sangkoyo 2003). 
The basic ideology of the Indonesian economy is supposedly a ‘family system’ 
as mentioned in the 1945 constitution195 in Article 33 item 1: 
The economy shall be organized as a common endeavor based upon the 
principles of the family system196. 
 
The capitalist development path that is being taken by Indonesia is actually not 
even mentioned in the Indonesian constitution. On the contrary, the 1945 constitution 
actually opposes the notion of capitalism (by proposing a system called “Economic 
Democracy”), Swasono (1995) states “The welfare of the society should be emphasized 
and not individual welfare”. As such the economy should be built as a joint-effort based 
on ‘azas kekeluargaan’(family system). The structure of company that suitable that is 
suitable then is cooperative (koperasi).” (Swasono 1995: 84). 
                                                 
194 Pertamina was established in 1968 as a merger of Permina and two other firms. Its director, General 
Ibnu Sutowo, a hardy survivor of the transition from Guided Democracy to New Order who had been 
director of Permina, embarked on an ambitious investment program that included purchase of oil tankers 
and construction of P.T. Krakatau, a steel complex. In the mid-1970s, however, it was discovered that he 
had brought the firm to the brink of bankruptcy and accrued a debt totaling US$10 billion. In 1976 he 
was forced to resign, but his activities had severely damaged the credibility of Indonesian economic 
policy in the eyes of foreign creditors. (The Library of Congress, Country Studies Data as of November 
1992) <http://www.indonesiaphoto.com/article237.html> 
195 The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalists who had fought hard for independence from the 
Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian 
nation (Kawamura 2003). 
196 After rejecting individualism and liberal democracy as a basis of Western democratic regime, 
founding fathers adopted family principle (kekeluargaan) as a philosophical base for constructing 
original political institutions in Indonesia. 
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The economic policy-makers during the early independence period actually 
disliked capitalism as it was often associated with colonialism. They were more 
attracted to the idea of socialism though this is not to be equated with the Marxism or 
Leninism. Socialism is more related to ‘kerakyatan’, or to be associeated with 
‘Indonesianization’ or ‘indigenism’. The only difference was whether this should be 
achieved by state nationalization or by promoting an Indonesian business class197 
(Mackie 1971: 44 quoted in Thee 2003: 9). 
During Soekarno’s administration, socialist ideas seemed to be projected by the 
only economic programme ever constructed in 1963, the Dekon (an acronym for 
‘Deklarasi Ekonomi’ or ‘Economic Declaration’) which focused on deconcentration 
(Thee 2003: 19). 
7.2.2 Who are the Actors? 
Policies are not made in a vacuum. Instead they are made in some sort of policy 
subsystems consisting of actors dealing with public problems. How a policy is actually 
decided on and implemented is a complicated process involving many actors, in which 
some have more roles to play while others are only marginally involved. The 
relationships between these actors in the policy-making arena largely depend on their 
institutional affiliations and settings, and their interests and efforts. This policy arena, 
or sometimes referred to as ‘policy subsystems’, are forums where actors discuss policy 
issues, persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests. During the course of their 
                                                 
197 The first major programme to develop a strong indigenous Indonesian business class was the Benteng 
(Fortress) programme launched in April 1950 (Thee 2003: 12). This programme success rate was, 
however, controversial. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, the Minister of Finance in 1949, disagreed with 
Soemitro’s Benteng Programme, arguing that the Indonesian society must first be educated in 
management and technology first (business skills) before rushing into forced industrialisation, otherwise 
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interactions with the other actors, they often give up or modify their objectives in return 
for concessions from other members of the subsystem (Angelov 2002).  
Howlett proposes a policy process as shown in Figure 7-2, which is complicated 
and non-linear in nature. Many actors and various issues are involved in the policy-
making process. Sutton (1999) provides a more detailed description of the policy 
process in Figure 7-3. 
Figure 7-2: Actors and Institutions in the Policy Making Process 
 
 
Source: Howlett, M. (1995). 
 
                                                                                                                                              
without proper education the programme would only create Ali Babas (nick name for indigenous rent-
seekers who sub-contract their license to Chinese businessmen for fast profits) (Thee 2003: 82). 
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Source: Sutton (1999) from Keeley (1997) adapted from Meier (1991). 
 
In the Indonesian context, we can spell out the three most important policy 
actors that have a large influence over how policies are shaped. Firstly of course, is the 
President. The Presidential system in Indonesia has provided the President with large 
political resources198 that determine the final outcome of the policy process. The 
executive branch in Indonesia, especially the president, monopolizes power, leading to 
arbitrary conduct of politics (Kawamura 2003). The second is the policy elites. By 
policy elites we refer to the ministers and technocrats that are involved in designing the 
policy structures and alternatives. The third actor is the general public at large. It would 
be difficult to capture and to determine the cohesive position of the general public, so 
we would use the working-class and middle-class to represent the general public.  
Actually there are two other main actors that have significant roles to play in the 
policy process. One is the international actors, such as the World Bank, IMF, etc. The 
other one is the Business Interest Group, either the indigenous business group (usually 
                                                 
198 President, as the head of the state, holds the executive power and organizes the government (Article 
4). 
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represented by The Indonesian Chambers of Commerce-KADIN199) or the Chinese 
faction (including mostly the wealthy magnates like Liem Sioe Liong). But the interests 
of these groups have been embedded in the domestic policy actors indirectly and not 
directly, either represented by the technocrats or by the bureaucrats. 
 
7.2.3 The Middle Class and the Working Class: Where Have All the Socialists Gone? 
Despite his notorious leadership style, Soeharto indeed has left something 
positive as legacy, which is the increasing number of middle class. Heinz W. Arndt 
(2000) states that: 
The legacy is the rise of a solid educated Indonesian middle class. For 
almost 30 years, the real national product increased by an average 6% a 
year, real incomes tripled in a generation. Admittedly, many members of 
the new middle class were urban Chinese, but economic growth also 
lifted most farmers out of traditional mass poverty. Their rise in living 
standards lifted their demand for manufactures and services. 
 
Arndt also argues that the economic and welfare growth that was achieved during the 
Soeharto era would not have happened if Indonesia pursued a socialist pattern of 
development under Soekarno. 
Davis (2004: 1-2) defines the middle class200 to comprise of “three basic 
occupational categories: salaried employees in commerce, services, industry, and the 
professions, as well as those employed by the state; self-employed artisans, craftsmen 
                                                 
199 Shin (1991) noted that “The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) demonstrated 
the most obvious interest in accepting the enhanced role of the private sector in business affairs. In the 
early 1980s, the state, in a symbolic gesture, designated KADIN as the only legitimate social institution 
to provide assistance to small and medium (mostly pribumi-owned) companies. After that, KADIN, 
which was originally organized to protect pribumi business interests, collected funds primarily from 
Chinese entrepreneurs and distributed them through its regional offices”. 
200 It must be remembered, however, that it is difficult to define middle class in a clear cut manner. As 
Anthony Giddens [quoted in Davis (2004: 363)] said, “one of the most interesting attributes of middle-
classness is the absence of class identity or consciousness”. Others like Senauer and Goetz (2003: 1) 
stated that “A middle class lifestyle is typically associated with the widespread ownership of major 
284
and other rural and urban-based producers, who in developing countries are often called 
petty commodity producers (or yeomen farmers in the rural sector); and owners and 
operators of small enterprises, including family firms, in service, industry and 
agriculture”. Davis’ (2004) understanding of middle class is to differentiate it with the 
major capitalists and wage laborers. 
While Hattori, Funatsu and Torii (2003) define the different classes scheme 
described in table 7-2. 
Table 7-2 Class Scheme and Categories 
 
Sources: Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, pp. 38–39) and Hsiao (1999, pp. 6–9) in Hattori, 
Funatsu and Torii (2003). 
 
Based on the above definitions of the middle class we can see that it arises when 
the income and skills of the traditional working class improve. As the economy grows, 
we can expect that the middle class would also grow simultaneously. 
                                                                                                                                              
household durable goods, such as refrigerators, telephones and automobiles”.  
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As Davis (2004) argues, while the middle class has usually been seen as the 
bounty or product of economic growth and modernization, this group would in turn 
shape industrial and economic development; “the particular ways in which middle class 
shaped themselves – and the ways historical conditions shaped them – influence 
development trajectories in multiple ways” (p.1). While Shiraishi (2004) argues that 
middle classes are “a product of developmental states and their politics of economic 
growth” (p.1).  
The end of Soekarno’s administration has caused the socialist movement that 
supposedly represents some of the major interests of workers to vanish. Despite its big 
share of votes in the 1955 election201, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) seems to 
have been wiped out, probably due to the blood-bath which happened after the 30 
September 1965 incident that had cost many supporters and sympathizers of the PKI to 
vanish, and their children, grandchildren and other relatives to be denied entry into 
politics during Soeharto's 32-year administration.202 
The working class, as one of the main ingredients of development, (both in the 
capitalist or Marxist development model) and the middle-class, have been under-
represented in the Soeharto era. In 1974 the New Order administration formulated its 
Industrial Relations policy as the Pancasila Industrial Relations (Hubungan Industrial 
Pancasila, HIP). The policy was outlined in the Minister of Manpower Decision No. 
                                                 
201 Of the 37,785,299 votes cast in the 1955 general election, six parties received more than one million 
votes each: the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia—PNI), 22.3% of the total; the 
Council of Muslim Organizations (Masjumi),20.9%; the Orthodox Muslim Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama—
NU),18.4%; the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia—PKI), 16.4%; the United 
Muslim Party, 2.9%; and the Christian Party, 2.6%. PKI at the height of its power in 1965 had an 
estimated three million members and was especially strong on Java. 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Indonesia-POLITICAL-PARTIES.html 
202 The Jakarta Post, Monday, October 6, 2003, “History book rewrite to focus on Soeharto issues” 
http://iiasnt.leidenuniv.nl:8080/DR/2003/10/DR_2003_10_10/OneFile. 
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645, 1985 (SK Menaker RI No.645/Men/1985), stipulating relations between the 
various agents involved in the production of goods and services based on the five 
principles of Pancasila. Pancasila Industrial Relations emphasizes cooperation and 
partnership between employees, employers, and the government with the aim of 
building an ideal industrial society (SMERU 2002).  
Despite the noble goals, the fact is that the workers were underrepresented and 
were not allowed to be involved in political activities or to form their own independent 
unions. The Soeharto government continued  to  associate  labor  activism  with  the  
Indonesian  Communist  Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia-PKI), as the Indonesian 
government noted in a submission to the United States Trade Representative in  
November  1992:  "One  possible  inroad  for  communist  subversion  is  through  
worker  unrest.  The Government especially fears that the communist ideology might be 
attractive to young people who did not live through the national distress of the 1960's, 
and many of those young people can best be reached on the job through labor 
disputes."203 
Eventually as Wood (2005: 21) notes: 
The labor movement met with fierce opposition throughout Suharto’s 
tenure as president, and only began to take hold in the aftermath of the 
1997 financial crisis when the International Monetary Fund forced 
Indonesia to adopt Western-style labor rights as part of a $14.1B 
economic bailout. Suharto’s suppression of unions was an integral part of 
his strategy to promote exports by luring international investors to a 
country whose labor was kept artificially inexpensive. After Suharto’s 
bloody crackdown of Communists in 1965 he permitted only one union, 
and appointed that union’s leaders directly (Arnold 2004). 
 
                                                 
203Human Rights Watch, September 1993  Vol. 5, No. 15, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/I/INDONESA/INDONESI939.PDF  
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While the capitalist view of development has been fairly represented by the 
academics and technocrats in the policy elites (made possible by the generous 
scholarships provided by the US and other western countries), the near-socialist and 
indigenous view of development remains under-represented. 
It is of course difficult to grasp and to identify what is the ‘indigenous concept 
of development’. The closest approximation of the indigenous view were those 
proposed by the former Vice President Hatta204, one of the founding fathers of 
Indonesia, with his concept of ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ (the people’s economy).  
Bresnan notes that as early as 1955 the economic architects of modernisation in 
Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, both economists trained 
in the Netherlands, had formed around them a core of economic thinkers who have to a 
greater or lesser degree controlled Indonesian economic direction ever since (Bresnan 
1993: 77). Widjojo Nitisastro, a leader of the economic thinkers or the ‘Berkeley 
Mafia’, who later on lead the BAPPENAS205 from 1967-1983, articulated their 
approach as being in favour of “an economic system based on the joint efforts of the 
entire community, with the objective of achieving a higher level of per capita income 
and an equitable distribution of income, with the state playing an active role in guiding 
and implementing economic development.” (Nitisastro 1970). This view of ‘ekonomi 
kerakyatan’ is actually similar with Article 33 of the constitution (Cone and Everett 
2003). 
                                                 
204 Hatta had been a tireless supporter of Indonesian independence since his days as a student in the  
Netherlands in the 1920s. He was a Minangkabau from Sumatra and a faithful Muslim. During the 1940s 
and 1950s, he was seen as an advocate for the interests of Muslims and people from outside of Java. He 
resigned as Vice-President just before the PRRI rebellion, and while he did not support the rebellion, he 
was sympathetic to the rebels' concerns. He continued to play a role in public life into the 1970s. 
http://home.iae.nl/users/arcengel/Indonesia/1950.htm 
205 Bappenas: the Economic Planning Body is founded in 1963. 
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The concept of ekonomi kerakyatan is actually very similar with the socialist 
view of development, although the socialist view is not incompatible with the 
capitalistic model of development. As Gabriel (1998) argues: 
As for the more ambiguous term, socialism, the intellectual and political 
leader of the Bolsheviks in Russia recognized that capitalism and 
socialism were not incompatible. On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917, Vladimir Lenin wrote that "Socialism is nothing but a state-
capitalist monopoly used for the benefit of the entire nation and thus 
ceasing to be a capitalist monopoly." Thus, it appears that Lenin is 
defining socialism as a variant form of capitalism, rather than a different 
type of society from capitalism.  
 
However, during its development, the economic strategy of these economists 
has been narrowed down to a capitalistic view of development, putting strong 
emphasizes on foreign investments to resolve the 1966 economic crisis in the form of 
the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). The new regime also abandoned 
its nationalist policies in politics and economics and encouraged foreign investments 
through the foreign capital investment law enacted on Jan. 1, 1967. 
The concept of ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ is not without its supporters. One of the 
strong proponents is the group of economists who mainly come from The University of 
Gajah Mada206 (UGM), like Prof. Mubyarto. Other scholars actually also come from 
FEUI (Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia), like Prof. Sri-Edi Swasono and 
Prof Sarbini. The term ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ is also called ‘ekonomi pancasila’ which 
in theory should be highly acceptable by the new order government that had always 
considered the term ‘Pancasila’207 as sacred. But it seemed that even Soeharto, who had 
                                                                                                                                              
<http://home.iae.nl/users/arcengel/Indonesia/1950.htm> 
206UGM is to be considered among the top four of universities in Indonesia, namely: Institute 
Technology of Bandung (ITB), University of Indonesia (UI), University of Gajah Mada (UGM) and the 
Agricultural Institute of Bogor (IPB). 
207 These five principles were announced by Soekarno in a speech known as "The Birth of the Pancasila," 
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conveniently used and abused Pancasila for political purposes, prefered the capitalist 
view of development by his emphasis on ‘growth’ and in many of his speeches in the 
1990s that the ‘pie’ of development needs to be enlarged in the first place before it 
could be redistributed (or in the economic jargon usually referred to as the ‘trickle 
down effect’).  
However the ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ had failed to attract massive endorsement, 
either from the government or from academics. One reason given by the (neo-classical) 
academics is that the concept of ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ is not clear, the methodological 
framework and its application towards pragmatic economic policy are not so attractive 
and apparent to the technocrats. 
Based on the fact that the workers were being repressed of their socialistic 
views, and these workers are one of the main ingredients of the would-be middle-class 
society, we could expect that the resulting middle class would be very ‘capitalistic’ in 
nature. The emerging middle class in Indonesia, as it was discussed previously, is very 
dependant on the elites and foreign capital. As such they were probably not carried 
their indigenous identity as well.  
We can conclude then that with the repressed working class, and the emerging 
materialistic and capitalistic middle class, most of society’s preferences would surely 
point to capitalism. The near-socialism views, that supposedly acted as a balancing 
                                                                                                                                              
which he gave to the Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1, 1945. In brief, and in the order 
given in the constitution, the Pancasila principles are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism; 
nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice. Beginning in 
1978, a national indoctrination program was undertaken to inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens, 
especially school children and civil servants. From an abstract statement of national goals, the Pancasila 
was now used as an instrument of social and political control. To oppose the government was to oppose 
the Pancasila. To oppose the Pancasila was to oppose the foundation of the state. (US Library of 
Congress) http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/86.htm 
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force to capitalism, unfortunately remained underrepresented, as well as the indigenous 
view of ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’. 
7.2.4 Soeharto’s New Order 
Soeharto regime, also known as the ‘New Order’, was in power from 1965-1998 
and is to be considered an authoritarian one. During his leadership Soeharto was able to 
manipulate both the army and the parliament to be always in agreement with his 
decisions and policies. Shiraisi (2003) describes Soeharto’s style of government as 
centralized, militarized and authoritarian. Having taken power from Soekarno in times 
of crisis and instability in 1965, Soeharto promised two main goals for the Indonesian 
society, namely stability and development (economic growth). In order to provide 
legitimacy and justification for his authoritarian style Soeharto reconstructed the path 
of capitalist development by inviting foreign investment to resolve Indonesia’ s 1966 
economic crisis in the form of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). The 
new regime also abandoned its nationalist policies in politics and economics, and 
encouraged foreign investment through the foreign capital investment law enacted on 
Jan. 1, 1967. 
The development policy of the New Order is defined in the Five-Years Plan 
known as REPELITA that started in 1969208. The main aim of REPELITA is 
supposedly “…to establish a government of the State of Indonesia which shall protect 
the whole of the Indonesian people and their entire homeland of Indonesia and in order 
to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to 
                                                 
208REPELITA is a planning document produce by Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional ( 
BAPPENAS ) -- the National Development Planning Agency – after interpreting GBHN, the "Broad 
Outlines of State Policy" that is drafted by the Indonesian Parliament. The government annual budget is 
291
increase Indonesian prosperity..”209 by adopting a growth-orientation development 
strategy.  
Soeharto always maintained a ‘trickle-down hypothesis’ in justifying the large 
businesses or conglomerates dominating the national economy. Soeharto’s 
acquaintance with the conglomerates has a long history. Indeed it was during the 1960s 
in Central Java that Liem Sioe Liong (one of the richest men in Indonesia210) satisfied 
the basic day-to-day needs of Soeharto’s platoon division in Central Java. The good 
mutual relationship between the two was such that the political connection allowed 
Liem and his business empire (the Salim group) to grow behind monopoly privileges 
and tariff protection to become Indonesia’s largest industrial and financial 
conglomerate.211 Azis (1999) notes that: 
There was a perception among policy makers and the business 
community that large business enterprises or conglomerates, whether 
state or private owned, are essential if the country is to catch up with 
modern technology and compete internationally. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many large business enterprises, including those owned by 
Indonesian families of Chinese descent, owe their size to government 
favors, including preferential access to government contracts and 
licenses. 
 
The Repelita established foundation of development which is manifested in the 
Development Trilogy: stability, growth, and distribution. Stabilization is conducted by 
implementing of political stability through: party ‘fusion’ from 10 parties to be three 
                                                                                                                                              
usually proportional according the importance stated in the REPELITA. 
209 The preamble of 1945 Constitution of The Republic of Indonesia.  
210 By 1990 Liem was Indonesia's richest man, presiding over a corporate empire under his Indonesian 
name of Salim which stretched across Asia, into Australia and the United States and pulled in billions of 
dollars and employed hundreds of thousands of Indonesians. (Sydney Morning Herald Indonesia, 
January 24, 1998)  
211 Soeharto seemed to have also shared and enjoyed the wealth of Liem. Forbes Magazine lists Soeharto 
as one of the wealthiest people in the world, with a personal fortune estimated at $16 billion. The 
magazine says his family's combined wealth totals about $40 billion -- nearly the same amount the 
International Monetary Fund has been trying to pump into Indonesia to save its economy for the past 
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parties, labor union co-optation, abolishing the opposition party, and supervising or 
controlling tightly the democratization movements. The economic development was 
basically growth oriented, which started with the industrialization strategy of import 
substitution and with the export orientation in the 1980s; meanwhile distribution is 
expected to be realized after economic growth is reached. 
During his leadership, Soeharto had a total of 9 cabinet ministries where since 
1968 the cabinet ministries have been labeled as ‘Development Cabinet’. The number 
of ministries during each cabinet numbered around 30 ministries. Some ministries held 
more important role than others in development planning. Rosser (2002: 43) notes that: 
During the 1980s, it was the State Secretariat and the Ministry for 
Research and Technology that were to emerge as the most influential 
politico-bureaucratic players in the policy-making process. The former 
was to be granted control over the allocation of government supply and 
construction contracts in 1980, a power that it retained until 1988. With 
two strongly nationalist politicians, Sudarmono and Ginanjar 
Kartasasmita, in charge of the Secretariat, this power was used to 
promote the cause of numerous indigenous business groups (Winters 
1996:123-139; Pangaribuan 1995:51-73).  
 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita was another Soeharto favorite who had been since the 
early 1970s been a champion of protectionism for indigenous entrepreneurs. However, 
after the economic crisis in 1997, Ginandjar seems to have changed his paradigm by 
favoring the IMF advice and began to side with the economists-technocrats (Liddle 
1999). 
On the other hand, technocrats who have dominated the economic policy-
making were considered to be liberal in their paradigm. The technocrats of the 
Indonesian economic architecture mostly came from a group called the ‘Berkeley 
Mafia’, consisting of Indonesian economists educated in Berkeley and also members of 
                                                                                                                                              
eight months. (The Washington Post Tuesday, June 2, 1998)  
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the Faculty of Economics University of Indonesia (FEUI), like Widjojo Nitisastro, Emil 
Salim, Ali Wardhana, Soemitro, and Radius Prawiro. The “Berkeley Mafia” economic 
school of thought of capitalism had obviously defeated earlier models of development 
proposed by one of the founding fathers of Indonesia, Hatta, which adopted a more 
socialist development view (Arief 1995: 104). Soeharto obtained his first basic 
knowledge about economics from these liberal FEUI economists (Sadli 1993 cited in 
Thee 2003: 21). 
We could view the process of economic policy-making in Indonesia as a battle 
between the ‘nationalist212’ in the bureaucrats and the majority of the ministerial 
cabinet on one side, and the ‘capitalist’ in the technocrats consisting mainly of the 
economics advisors213 of Soeharto on the other. 
As the 1945 constitution gave the state a legitimacy to use the nation rich 
natural resource for the greater good, Soeharto with the enormous revenues from oil 
exports combined his political and financial resources and turned Indonesia into a form 
of developmental state. Combined by the opening of foreign investments, the massive 
influx of capital coming from FDI and oil revenues surely will result in high economic 
growth, whatever disturbances or distortion that would happen. That was why, despite 
the growing problems of corruption214 and inefficiencies, the Indonesian economy was 
still able to perform relatively well – providing yet another justification for the New 
Order government. Systematic exploitation of natural resources, as shown among other 
                                                 
212 The ‘nationalist’, however, did not always subscribe to Hatta’s original ideas. 
213These liberal technocrats played an important role as macroeconomic managers and mediators in 
relation with the World Bank and IGGI (Rodan, et.al. (1997) in Hadi (2005: 59)). 
214 There were intensifying complaints against the endless greed of the Soeharto family and of a tiny 
minority of extremely wealthy Sino-Indonesians, most of whom were also closely associated with the 
Soehartos. (Liddle 1996) 
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things, by the establishment of PERTAMINA, provided Soeharto with the basic capital 
for the development process. Without vast reserves of oil, timber, minerals, and other 
resources, the Indonesian economic story would be very different.215 
The fact was that PERTAMINA was used by Soeharto and his comrade, Gen. 
Ibnu Sutowo216 to build a vast empire that encompassed manufacturing, shipbuilding, 
hotels, tourism and agriculture in addition to oil exploration and development. 
PERTAMINA was also used to finance some military projects and to build roads, 
schools and hospitals. The close personal relationship between Soeharto and 
Pertamina’s head, Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, meant that Sutowo was able to circumvent 
rigorous inspection by more liberal oriented technocrats in the Department of Finance 
and the Bank of Indonesia (Abbott 2001). 
The revenues from Pertamina have enabled the nationalist bureaucrats to create 
a state-led industrialization policy by investing in a steel company (Krakatau Steel), 
fertilizer, and other metal and petrochemical industries. As a result, the value of 
investment by the state in 1967-1980 period was dominated by the state. 
Table 7-3 The Value of State and Private Investment in Indonesia, 1967-1980 
(in %) 
Investment by the State 58.75 
Investment by the non-native (local 
chinese or sino-indonesian) 
29.95 
Investment by the Pribumi 11.2 
Others 3.10 
Source: Tempo, 4 March 1981 in Hadi (2005: 171). 
 
                                                 
215 The Case Study of Indonesia, by Charles Victor Barber, World Resources Institute, Section III, 
µhttp://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/state/indon/indon2.htm§  
216According to Wibisono (1998) [quoted in Hadi (2005: 249)], Pertamina under Ibnu has applied the 
conception of 'Indonesian Corporated'. 
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The Pertamina affair revealed the problems of what Australian economist 
Richard Robison, in a 1978 article, called Indonesia's system of "bureaucratic 
capitalism": a system based on "patrimonial bureaucratic authority" in which powerful 
public figures, especially in the military, gained control of potentially lucrative offices 
and used them as personal fiefs or appendages, almost in the style of precolonial 
Javanese rulers, not only to build private economic empires but also to consolidate and 
enhance their political power. Because Indonesia lacked an indigenous class of 
entrepreneurs, large-scale enterprises were organized either through the action of the 
state (Pertamina, for example), by ethnic Chinese capitalists (known in Indonesia as 
cukong), or, quite often, a cooperative relationship of the two. 
In May 1976, Mohamad Sadli, the minister for mining, confirmed that 
Pertamina had combined debts of over $10 billion, almost two-thirds of Indonesia’s 
GNP at the time. At the time of Pertamina’s crisis, the technocrats seemed to have 
gained the upper hand by dismissing Sutowo from Pertamina. However, as Sadli 
himself explained that Soeharto was only willing to side with the technocrats once “we 
convinced him that what Sutowo was doing was dangerous for the country” (Abbott 
2001). Winters (in Abbott 2001) cites a former minister for Industry, Soehoed: 
The technocrats are very good at scaring the old man [Soeharto]. They 
keep him on the razor’s edge, and that’s how they get their way. They 
tell him that if he doesn’t follow their suggestions the people will go 
without food and clothes , or the economy won’t grow. 
 
Despite the inefficient and corrupt state apparatus in Indonesia, the government 
continued to perform quite well in distributional terms. A growing percentage of the 
population in most regions of the country were able to seize the opportunities created 
by the booming economy and to lift themselves into the middle class. Hal Hill stated 
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that “the percentage of the population in poverty in both rural and urban areas in 1993 
was about one-third of that in 1976” (Hill 1996: 93).  
To ease some demands in rural areas and other regional governments, the 
Central Government provided some off-budget measures to help local governments in 
handling the poverty problems in the form of INPRES Grants; it was a funding 
mechanism system which allowed direct grants to be made by the central government 
to local governments in two important fields: education (SD INPRES, the expansion of 
primary school) and health services (PUSKESMAS). The criteria for receiving the 
grants, however, were arbitrary such that it was being abused for political reasons to 
encourage endorsement for the ruling party. 
In addition, the distributional policy also took place across spatial boundaries. 
Provincial and district budgets were being channeled with subsidy funds by the central 
government, which also implemented a wide variety of local level welfare programs, 
including school and health-center construction, staffing, and equipping, road- and 
bridge-building, reforestation, and so on (Liddle 1999: 12). What Soeharto did was 
merely transferring revenues from resource-rich provinces, such as Aceh and 
Kalimantan, to other resource-poor provinces. 
In conducting and implementing its economic policies, the New Order had a 
high degree of autonomous supremacy and was insulated from the pressures of other 
parties. The President and his ministers did not have to compromise with any other part 
of the government apparatus over economic policy, the bureaucracy had been a 
compliant administrative tool, and there was little real scope for public resistance to 
government action due to the oppressive role of the military. As a result, when 
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economic challenges or crises had arisen, the government was able to move promptly, 
make difficult and unpopular policy decisions, and implement them. The relative 
autonomy of the political executive and the decisiveness of the policy process had 
greatly facilitated the task of maintaining by and large a sound macroeconomic 
framework as well as liberalizing trade, investment, and financial regulations when this 
became necessary and unavoidable (MacIntyre 1999: 17). 
In conclusion, Hadi (2005: 60) notes that the liberal-capitalistic development 
model provided large benefits to the upper level bourgeoisie groups, like the army217 
and foreign investors. The liberal-capitalist policy benefited the army in preventing the 
spread of communism in Indonesia. 
Even then Soeharto's economic policies could not be seen to be 'purely' liberal-
capitalist. Hadi (2005: 61) sees Soeharto to have a fragmented vision of economic 
policy. At one time during the oil boom, the nationalist was given more space in the 
economic policy arena by using its protectionist industrial policy. After the oil boom, in 
the 1980s, deregulation was the buzzword in the economic policy circles where the 
liberal-neoclassical technocrats were mostly in charge.  
However it is clear that the Soeharto administration had used 'development' as 
the ideology and main theme of his governmental policies (all of his cabinet ministries 
was called “development cabinet”), where later on 'development' is often narrowly 
defined as 'economic growth'. In turn, capitalism had been given a pivotal role during 
the New Order, which was supported by both the technocrats who generally had a 
neoclassical and liberal economics ideology.  
                                                 
217The army took control of all nationalized Dutch enterprises in the late 1960s (Hadi 2005: 163). 
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7.2.5 Habibie’s transitional period 
On May 21, 1998, Soeharto resigned from his 32 years at the helm and was 
succeeded by his vice-president, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) Habibie. Soeharto was an 
army general and had been managing a mutually beneficial relationship with the army 
since he took power in 1966. On the other hand, Habibie is a civilian engineering 
scientist with the longest government service as Minister of Research and Technology 
since Soeharto asked him to return to the government in 1974. Habibie always saw 
Soeharto as his ‘teacher’ in politics and was hence actually rather disappointed when 
Soeharto seemed reluctant to pass the presidency to him in 1998 (Liddle 1999). As 
soon as he was in command, Habibie promptly loosened the tight cencorship on the 
national press, allowed the forming of new political parties218 and promised to deliver a 
‘truly’ free and fair democratic elections in 1999. Habibie’s policies were staggering, 
remembering that in 1994 he has caused the largest National political magazine, 
Tempo, to be banned.219  
Habibie’s policy to embrace democracy shed some hope that Indonesian could 
be released from its authoritarian regime and that the people would have their voices 
heard. 
Liddle (1999: 5-6) described Habibie as below: 
Habibie is a German-schooled aeronautical engineer who rose to a 
vicepresidency at Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm in Hamburg before 
returning to Indonesia at Soeharto’s request in 1974. His principal 
                                                 
218 During Soeharto era, only 3 political parties were allowed. 
219 When Tempo was banned in 1994, the proximate cause was a story about an internal government split 
-where the ministers of finance (Mar'ie Muhammad) and defence (Edi Sudrajat) critical of the funding 
and benefits of the project-  over the purchase of 39 former East German warships placed by Habibie, 
who at the time was Research and Technology Minister. Soeharto was reportedly furious that the 
magazine had dared to air a cabinet controversy in public and the Ministry of Information moved quickly 
to revoke the magazine's license. (Bringing Back a Legend: Tempo Magazine Reopens in Jakarta by A. 
Lin Neumann, http://www.cpj.org/dangerous/1998/11_13_98/tempo.html )  
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assignment was to develop an Indonesian aircraft-manufacturing 
capacity. He did this with great gusto and at enormous unrecoverable 
expense to the state budget, earning him the lasting enmity of virtually 
all of the country’s trained economists. He also headed the state ship-
building company and supervised several other key state-owned 
“strategic industries,” including munitions factories. 
 
Habibie named his own cabinet the "Development Reformation Cabinet" 
(Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan) (Kawamura 2003: 27). Habibie did not have the 
luxury of massive political and economic resources that Soeharto had. Habibie’s 
relationship with the military was not good220, and he had been opposed frequently by 
the economics technocrats of the Berkeley Mafia because of his ambitious mega-
projects that had costs the state’s budget dearly. As Minister of Research and 
Technology for 20 years, he tried to develop technology-heavy but capital-intensive 
"strategic industries" like steel and transport. Habibie, despite his 20 years of service, 
had not been in the limelight of national politics. He was usually seen as one of 
Soeharto’s assistants. Liddle (1999) wrote that while Soeharto was for three decades 
the “father of development,” Habibie was the “king of high-technology import 
substitution,” the leading promoter in the New Order of an approach to development 
that cost the economy billions of dollars in investment capital with little or no return 
(Liddle 1999).  
Habibie was known for his pro-nationalism ideas and logically would side more 
with the nationalistic bureacurats rather than with the technocrats. In a National 
Dialogue held by HIPPI (Himpunan Pengusaha Putra Indonesia-The Organization of 
                                                 
220 During the 1970s, control of several ABRI industries was transferred to the Coordinating Agency for 
Strategic Industries, headed by Habibie. This body covers 10 strategic industries, including the IPTN 
aircraft company, Krakatau Steel, the shipbuilding company PT PAL and the weapons and ammunition 
factory, PT PINDAD. This has caused tensions between Habibie and the military, since Habibie was 
viewed as ‘over the line’ by seizing the authority from the military business group. (Balowski, 1998) 
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Indonesia's Young Entrepreneurs) he proposed a reconstruction of the national 
economy resources distribution or productive asset redistribution (Wangsa 2004: 81). 
Habibie also aspired to emulate the Japanese success in acquiring high-
technology capabilities, though unlike Mahathir of Malysia, Habibie was never 
interested to learn specifically the Japanese trading and industrial policies (Hadi 2005: 
251).  
Soeharto seemed to have merely used Habibie as an icon for the nationalist 
high-tech industry that acted as ivory tower and source of national pride for 
achievement in technological capabilities. Habibie’s influence was actually unstable as 
Soeharto, forced by the shrinking central government budget, had to listen to his 
economics ministers, who wanted to scale down if not eliminate Habibie’s ambitious 
projects.221 However by 1993, the economist-technocrats had been sidelined. Habibie 
then pushed interventionist industrial policies that were costly and bound to fail.222 
Habibie also has a long history of political, policy, and personal conflict with his 
Coordinating Minister for the Economy Ginandjar Kartasasmita223. That is why it was 
                                                 
221 Although he did not graduate from Berkeley, Anwar Nasution is also a Professor and Economist from 
the University of Indonesia and a Senior Deputy for the Central Bank. He was among the many 
economists that has blamed Habibie’s project for inefficiencies and wastage, comparing him with the 
former PERTAMINA director, Ibnu Sutowo that nearly bankrupted the Oil State Agency. (http://www-
b.tempo.co.id/ang/min/02/32/utama4.htm) Radius Prawiro, one of the Berkeley Mafia, also once 
remarked, “First Habibie comes to the government for the money to make the airplanes. Then he comes 
back for us to buy them.” (Balowski, 1998) 
222 Arndt said the real troublemaker was Habibie, an engineer with no understanding of economics. 
Indeed, as of now the icon of Habibie’s industrial policy, IPTN or now is called PT DI (Dirgantara 
Indonesia) has been under serious financial problems. After undergoing a financial restructuring in 2000, 
the company has narrowed down its business focus on the making/selling of CN-235 aircraft. The 
number of employess has to be cut down from 16,000 to 9,600. The problems still remains, the current 
debt that still has to be paid is still at Rp 3.17 trillion while the business contract value remained low 
compared with the number of employees. As such in order to just financing the operational cost of Rp 25 
billion/month the company is struggling to make ends meet. http://www.angkasa-
online.com/13/11/fokus/fokus1.htm 
223 Mr Kartasasmita, previously one of the nationalist bureacuracts, after the 1997 financial crisis had 
changed his paradigm by supporting the IMF policy prescriptions.  
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surprising that Habibie later on announced an enhanced advisory role for Professor 
Widjojo Nitisastro224, the University of Indonesia economist who is considered the 
architect of New Order development policy. 
During Habibies period, the concept of Ekonomi Kerakyatan (People’s 
Economy) had gained some momentum. The issuance of Parliament Decree (Ketetapan 
MPR) Tap XVI/MPR/1998 had advocated that Ekonomi Kerakyatan to be the 
economic system suitable for Indonesia. Also Habibie had put Adi Sasono into his 
cabinet as the Cooperatives Minister. During Soeharto’s administration, Cooperatives 
Minister usually only stood on the margin, since important economic policies were 
usually made in the Finance Ministry, BAPPENAS, and State Secretariat. But as soon 
as Sasono took charge, he has soon reckoned to be one of Indonesia's most influential 
officials. Sasono was said to finally posses the power to carry out his ideas on what he 
called a "People's Economy."225 Sasono was a well known grassroots and Muslim 
activist, and NGO specialist. After Soeharto came to power, Sasono joined car-maker 
Krama Yudha as one of its executives. He also spent some time working for Habibie in 
the Ministry of Research and Technology. In 1979, Sasono returned to full-time non-
government grassroots work. He eventually became chairman of the Habibie-sponsored 
CIDES, a think-tank for social and political issues. 
In order to achieve his goals of developing ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’, Sasono used 
a subsidized credit that was channeled to cooperatives and small-businesses. Again, the 
University of Indonesia’s economists were against it. The economists worried about the 
market-distorting effect of too much cheap credit. Sasono's ministry was granted 20 
                                                 
224 Widjojo had been Soeharto’s chief economic advisor from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. 
Informally he was still being consulted by Soeharto for economic advice until the end of Orde Baru. 
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trillion rupiah (US$2.67 billion at current exchange rates) for relending at interest rates 
as low as 16 percent. Since deposit rates can be as high as 50%, the economists feared 
the money will simply be placed in bank accounts, with co-op managers pocketing the 
yields.226 On the one hand, Habibie seemed comfortable with Sasono's brand of 
economic nationalism, remembering the latter’s history as one of his allies. Habibie 
even prepared a budget of Rp 10.8 trillion to be channeled into Sasonos’s cheap credit 
program.227 
One point to note about Habibie was that, unlike Soeharto, Habibie had 
explicitly developed his own model of how the economy should grow. Habibie offered 
a ‘new’ economic policy model in 1993, which was labeled by some as 
‘Habibienomics’. Habibie’s idea was of course not new. Habibie’s idea just resembled 
the idea of industrial policy (or developmental state) that put emphasis on the mastering 
of high-level technology and used technological capabilities as the driving force for 
economic development (Juoro 1993). ‘Habibienomics’ argued that Indonesia should 
invest heavily in technology to give an added value to domestic production, which, in 
the long term, will create spin-offs across the industry.228 
7.2.6 Conclusion 
The apparent capitalist development path that was taken by Indonesia was 
actually not even mentioned in the Indonesian constitution. On the contrary, the 1945 
                                                                                                                                              
225 www.asiaweek.com 
226 www.asiaweek.com  
227detik.com  
228 Habibie's “big bang” theory of development was never popular with international financial 
institutions. On February 14, 1998, the London Financial Times wrote that diplomats and business 
people would roll their eyes and “crack jokes about his zigzag theory, which held that high interest rates 
boost inflation and should therefore be brought down, raised again and lowered once more to promote 
economic growth” (Balowski 1998). 
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Indonesian constitution actually opposes the notion of capitalism (by proposing a 
system called “Economic Democracy”) as Swasono (1995: 84) states “The welfare of 
the society should be emphasized and not individual welfare. As such the economy 
should be built as a joint effort based on ‘azas kekeluargaan’ (family system). The 
structure of company that is suitable then is cooperative (koperasi)”. 
Two major poles were controlling the formulation of economic policy in 
Indonesia; one were the technocrats, and the other were the nationalist-bureaucrats. 
However, due to the overwhelming powers held by Soeharto (partly because of the 
immense authority given by the Indonesian constitution) during the New Order, the 
final decision on policies were decided by Soeharto.  
During the Soeharto era, we saw ups and downs in the capability of technocrats 
in influencing the policy processes. The reason was that the nationalist bureaucrats 
were able to offer more attractive ‘policy package’ to Soeharto, a policy that was 
feasible to foster economic growth and yet also able to provide Soeharto and his cronies 
with a huge personal wealth. Not until a crisis occurred did Soeharto take the advice of 
the technocrats more seriously. 
The economic nationalists—including Habibie—advocated government 
leadership in directing resources into industries (whether it was high-tech or not) in 
pursuit of development, while the technocrats were fairly mainstream neoclassical 
economists and therefore more market oriented. Policy successes tended to originate 
from the technocrats through foreign investment in Indonesia. In turn, to gain personal 
wealth, Soeharto created an environment in which every investor needed a partner with 
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connections to Soeharto in order to be able to conduct business smoothly (Cassing 
2002). 
Knowing his limited capabilities as a scholar, Soeharto used Habibie as an icon 
for his economic policy making. Habibie, with his excellent educational background, 
provided an advantage to Soeharto in dealing or reasoning with the technocrats 
(represented by the Berkeley Mafia). To be clear, the concept of economic development 
adopted by Soeharto and Habibie was different.  Habibie favored a protectionist 
scheme for high-tech domestic industries to achieve economic growth, also known as 
‘Habibienomics’. Soeharto favored a state-led development policies which resulted in 
the emerging Chinese Conglomerates that has dominated the Indonesian economy up to 
now. Made possible by the lucrative revenues from natural-resource industries, 
Soeharto and Habibie were able to pursue their policies autonomously. Using the 
government’s budget revenue from the oil windfall profit, Habibie created industries 
and research institutions based on high technology. Later on, to market his high 
technological products, he used his political power to approach several government-
owned companies and institutions to buy those products (Amir 2003).  
The indigenous thought of economic policy-making, represented by the 
‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ paradigm, had failed to get considerable attention from the policy 
makers, despite its legal backing from the 1945 constitution and its political backing by 
using an alias of ‘ekonomi pancasila’. The Indonesian people in general, most of whom 
did not own capital due to poverty, seemed to be left behind in the economic 
development process. 
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This was true in the Soeharto era, because both the nationalists -that favored a 
protectionist strategy for certain industries-, and the technocrats  -that supported a more 
liberal and free market regime- only gave the huge shares and benefits of economic 
development either to domestic (either indigenous or not) capitalist elites or to foreign 
capitalist. 
In the Habibie era, even though Habibie actually did not favor the ‘ekonomi 
kerakyatan’229, the emerging and increasing role of Adi Sasono that supported small 
businesses and thus the ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ paradigm provided some heighten 
attention towards the concept. But because of its weak concept partly due to its off-
stream label in Indonesian economics scholarship, the economic policy of ‘ekonomi 
kerakyatan’ appeared to be captured by predatory domestic capitalists in the end. 
The failure of ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ concept to develop, to view it as an 
alternative or indigenous development paradigm, could be attributed to the historical 
factors of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Using PKI as his single 
‘constitutional’ reason to stage a takeover in 1965, Soeharto had been repressing the 
leftist or socialist view of development, shown by denying the rights of workers to form 
unions and by banning the teaching of Marxist thought even in Universities. 
However to simply label the Soeharto government as ‘not responsive’ to the 
indigenous demands, or unsuccessful in utilizing local inputs – policies that respond to 
local conditions and problems - seemed to be an oversimplification. The next question 
arising is of course how we should measure responsiveness? Does responsiveness mean 
that when the ideas from the grassroots level are being noted or being discussed openly 
means responsive?  Does the inclusion of certain policies for the general public, such as 
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the policy to eradicate poverty or to provide free education considered responsive? 
Alternatively, should we directly look at the result of those policies instead? 
Indeed it is difficult to ‘measure’ responsiveness, not to mention the fact that as 
we attempt to ‘measure’ something, we usually limit ourselves to those phenomenon 
that is ‘measurable’ or to ‘(quantitative) indicators’. Other phenomenon that is not 
measurable would not be given adequate emphasis. 
 The Soeharto government did show responsiveness to some local inputs. For 
instance, the indigenous (or ‘pribumi’) dissatisfaction over Chinese wealth that arose 
early in the Soeharto regime, and provoked an early instance of anti-Chinese rioting in 
1974 has caused an issuance of the Presidential Decree to give preferential treatment to  
“economically weak groups” in 1979 (Coppel: 154). Even though the scheme was also 
criticized as benefiting only a handful of businessmen who were selected on the basis 
of favoritism. Soeharto’s preferred mode, when under pressure to do more for the 
pribumi economically, was the grand gesture; such as his 1990 Tapos speech where he 
assembled the most prominent Chinese businessmen, and pleaded them to transfer 25% 
of their wealth to the co-operatives sector, a long-held symbol of egalitarianism in 
Indonesian society (Jesudason 2000).   
Also there is a professional consensus in the literature that the reasonably good 
record on spatial disparities in Indonesia, particularly in terms of its non-income 
dimensions, should be linked to a policy regime during the long reign of Soeharto that 
sought to enhance the living standards of the poorer provinces, especially those located 
in the Outer Islands, through a centralized system of inter-regional income transfers. In 
this sense, the central government acted as an important vehicle for spreading the 
                                                                                                                                              
229 It was shown by the concept of ‘Habibienomics’ that Habibie has introduced. 
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windfall gains from the oil price boom and the inflow of foreign aid to the various 
regions of Indonesia. Central transfers for health, education and infrastructure have, to 
a certain extent, significantly improved economic and social indicators across the 
regional communities of pre-crisis Indonesia (Islam 2003). 
7.3 ‘Traditional’ versus ‘Modern’ in Economic Development 
There has always been a tendency to associate ‘industrialization’ with 
‘modernity’ and ‘rural-agriculture’ with ‘traditional’ or ‘primitive230’. Perhaps it is 
because an industrialized society is viewed as more ‘developed’ and thus being more 
‘modern’ than ‘traditional-agriculture’ society.  
 
Adam Smith probably made this association early on, as Meek quoted by 
Ougaard (2005) wrote: 
Smith was probably the first thinker to put forward the immensely 
influential notion that societies normally tended to progress over time 
through four more or less consecutive and distinct socio-economic 
stages, each based on a different mode of subsistence, namely, hunting, 
pasturage, agriculture, and commerce. To each of these bases, in Smith’s 
account, it as assumed that there corresponded a different superstructure 
of political, moral, and legal ideas and institutions. 
 
According to Meek, it follows that there were inherently important conceptual 
principle contained in Smith’s thinking. Ougaard (2005: 3-4) quoting Meek stated the 
conceptual principle as follows: 
                                                 
230 Definition of ‘primitive’ is indeed problematic. As Pearson (2000) interestingly wrote: 
 “What is a “primitive” man? Such invidious terminology is, alas, easier regretted than replaced. 
Here we will follow the traditional usage, to include not only the hunter-gatherer (what English 
economists liked to call “the savage,” and Germans called der Wilde), but also the transhumant 
pastoralist (the archetypal “barbarian”) and the slash-and-burn horticulturist (whom the Germans came to 
include with the above under the rubric Naturvölker). This broader denomination is apt not so much for 
what it includes as for what it systematically excludes: plow culture, towns, the state—in a word, 
civilization.” 
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The first is the totality perspective, the principle of analyzing and 
characterizing society at a high level of aggregation and abstraction as a 
whole. Second is the historical perspective: society is seen in a 
developmental or evolutionary way, as undergoing continuous change. 
The third idea is the notion of periodization into stages, in other words 
the idea that in the process of evolution, qualitatively different stages can 
be identified, marked by different configurations of economic, political, 
legal, and cultural features. Fourthly is what later has become known as 
“economic determinism” …, which can also be stated as the principle of 
privileging the mode of subsistence – the economic base – when 
analyzing and explaining these different historical stages. 
 
This view of development from ‘primitive’ or ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ or 
‘industrialized’ society probably also occurred from applying the meta-narrative of 
Charles Darwin’s “On the Origin of Species” (1859) on the theory of evolution 
(Pearson 2000: 935).  Soeharto’s planning documents, the REPELITA, planned the 
take-off stage in 1994 using a Rostowian framework, in which it was assumed that at 
that turning-point (the ‘take-off’ stage) there is going to be a transformation of a 
traditional-agricultural Indonesian society into an industrial-modern society as had 
happened in developed western countries (Hadi 2005: 164).  
Arief and Sasono (1980: 7-8) agreed that the replacement of traditional values 
of paternalism or feudalism with a capitalistic system could be the first step in the 
process of transformation system towards advancement as it had happened in the west, 
but the result actually increased the exploitative degree on the weaker class. The 
resulting exploitative nature of the owner of capital even could be worse than the 
exploitative nature of the feudal lords occurring in the traditional society. 
Modernization and development involves and requires a transformation of 
values besides material development. As Castles (2000) notes: 
Development was a question of instilling the ‘right’ orientations–values 
and norms–in the cultures of the non-Western world so as to enable its 
people to partake in the modern wealth-creating economic and political 
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institutions of the advanced West. Borrowing a familiar page from Max 
Weber, sociologists set out to identify what those modernizing ideologies–
functional equivalents to the Protestant ethic–could be. Japanese 
Shintoism, Turkish state secularism under Kemal Ataturk, and even certain 
versions of Chinese Confucianism were identified and described as likely 
candidates. (Portes 1997: 230 quoted in Castles 2000) 
 
For Indonesia, the 'instant' process of modernization by importing western 
culture seems to be occurring. As Wanandi (2004) writes: 
In Indonesia, since the first Cultural Congress in the 1940’s, the debate 
was whether Indonesia should be based on her own cultural and values 
system as has been laid down by history, with a rich cultural heritage 
based on Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, or whether it has to 
westernize completely to be able to modernize the society. 
  
It is more likely that the steps towards modernization in Indonesia did not 
happen ‘naturally’ as it was pushed by both the global community and by the 
indigenous elites, for different reasons. The global community would like to see their 
capital and goods utilized and absorbed by the Indonesian people to expand their 
economies further, while the indigenous elites, most probably being ‘instantly’ 
modernized due to their wealth, education and access to capital, needed to actualize 
their ambitions and to provide legitimization for their powers.  
The community at large, and to some extent the middle-class or working-class, 
probably does not yet have a clear vision or aspiration on how and what is to be 
‘modernized’. This condition was further worsened by the weak Indonesian education 
ideology and curriculum in molding the character of an ideal ‘Indonesian Man’ for 
modernization. 
For example, as Sulaeman (2005) noted below on work orientations of 
indigenous Indonesians: 
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Other perspectives on Indonesian work orientations found: (a) no 
speculation on working and life, (b) working hard is attempted just to 
“get food for survival for the day”, and short term basic need orientation; 
(c) trying to get harmony with nature and stressing maintenance; (d) 
orientation to the present time, and (e) social contact for economic 
survival or business are changed to group maintenance, with proverbs 
“eat or not, but live together.” 
 
While for the elites, their cultural ideology was (Sulaeman 2005): 
Among elite groups, cultural work values were identified with (a) aims 
of living and working are for status, power and symbol of prosperity, (b) 
doing business, consulting business, farming, trading and manufacturing 
are given low values, and (c) there are ‘amal’ concept, oriented to 
achieve symbol for power, status, and prosperity, not for achievement 
(Kartodirdjo 1982). 
 
It is clear that the above cultural traits were probably incompatible with the 
individualistic and materialistic nature of a ‘modern economic man’ aspired by the 
capitalist system. In addition, most probably this kind of ‘cultural’ environment would 
do little in ‘breeding’ entrepreneurs needed for economic growth to be sustained. 
The work of Boeke (1948) probably is the first that seriously considered that a 
‘fragmented’ society would occur as a result of economic growth in his ‘dualistic’ 
theory231 (he also refered to it as the ‘oriental economics’): the clash between two 
divergent and heterogonous social systems, the urban (capitalist) and the rural (village 
or pre-capitalist) society. Boeke (1948: 11-12) differentiates between the two by 
writing: 
In economic matters the precapitalistic society is far less coherent than is 
the capitalistic society, because of the general practice of subsistence 
farming. Social division of labor, production for exchange, economic 
interdependence – all characteristic of modern society – hardly exist in 
the village community. However, this lack of economic cohesion is made 
                                                 
231 Boeke (1953: 3) described dual society as “…for societies showing a distinct cleavage of two 
synchronic and full grown social styles which in the normal, historical evolution of homogenous 
societies are separated from each other by transitional forms, as, for instance, precapitalism and high 
caitalism by early capitalism, and which there do not coincide as contemporary dominating features”.  
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up for by an intense social cohesion. Whereas in the capitalistic society 
every individual in principle watches over his spiritual independence, in 
the precapitalistic community everybody feels himself part of the whole, 
accepts tradition and group morale as his directives. This social 
coherence restricts in large measure his personal freedom, while it makes 
collective action the normal form of activity. 
 
It must be remembered, however, that Boeke based his analysis on Indonesia 
during the colonial period. With independence, the degree of ‘dualism’ should be 
expected to be less, though probably still relevant. The effect of Dutch colonialism 
seems to be long lasting. Arief and Sasono (1980: 57) argue that ‘Cultuurstelsel’ 
(forced cultivation) has a far-reaching repercussion and retarding effect for the 
Indonesian society as the main form of exploitation responsible for underdevelopment 
and backwardness. 
7.4 Entrepreneurship in Indonesia 
Historically, an entrepreneur originally meaning ‘businessman’, can simply be 
defined as “someone who organizes and assumes the risk of a business in return for the 
profits”.232 Wibawa and Mukhlis (1997: 5) for example define entrepreneur as “people 
who change the value of resources, labor, materials and the other production factor 
become bigger than before”, or as “people who start and do business, organize and 
developed firm by themselves”. 
Entrepreneurship has been viewed as one of the lacking ingredients for less-
developed and not self-reliant economies233. Lacks of entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurship have often been said as the cause of the low quality of 
                                                 
232 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Entrepreneurship.html 
233 However, Sautet (2005) argued that “the problem of poverty and development is not that 
entrepreneurship is abundant in some countries and lacking in others.  Entrepreneurial activity is never in 
short supply. … while entrepreneurship is always present it may not always be directed towards socially 
312
industrialization process happening in the LDCs despite the massive FDI flowing into 
those economies. Entrepreneurship seems to have a catalytic dimension in the 
industrialization and growth process. Entrepreneur performances also differ across 
countries, depended on the regional and socio-cultural aspect of each specific 
country234 (Afza 2001). 
Lingelbach (2005: 1) quoting Landes (1998) stated that “where it has existed in 
plenty, entrepreneurship has played an important role in economic growth, innovation, 
and competitiveness, and it may also play a role over time in poverty alleviation235. 
Kreiser, et. al. (2002), utilizing data from 1,070 firms in six countries to assess 
the impact of national culture236 on two key dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO): risk-taking and proactiveness237, found that “national culture has an important 
and identifiable impact on the willingness of entrepreneurial organizations to engage in 
risk-taking and proactive firm behaviors.” 
The effect of education on entrepreneurship is unclear. Blanchflower (2001) 
found that the probability of being self-employed is lower among highly-educated 
workers. While a study by Inter-American Development Bank (2002) on 
entrepreneurship in Latin America and East Asia found that most entrepreneurs have a 
                                                                                                                                              
productive activities. This will depend on the incentives created as a result of the formal and informal 
institutions that exist in a society.” 
234 Kreiser, et. al. (2002) noted that “societies vary in their ability to create and sustain entrepreneurial 
activity”. 
235 Numbers of entrepreneurs indeed was large even in developing countries. Over 400 million 
individuals in developing countries are owners or managers of new firms, where over 200 million are 
found in China and India alone (Lingelbach (2005) quoting Reynolds et al. (2004)). 
236 Kreiser et. al. (2002: 3) define culture as “the system of collective values that distinguishes the 
members of one group from another” (quoting Hofstede (1980) and Mueller & Thomas (2001)), and sees 
national culture to act as the “common frame of reference or logic by which members of a society view 
organizations, the environment, and their relations to one another” (quoting Geletkanycz 1997: 617). 
237 In addition, self-employment has been often used as a ‘proxy’ for entrepreneurship (Salgado-Banda 
2005). Self-employment is said to be the simplest form of entrepreneurial activity (Blanchflower, et. al. 
2000). 
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graduate degree or post-graduate qualifications, although entrepreneurs also say that 
formal education did not play a decisive role in creating their business ventures. On the 
other hand, Johannisson, et. al. (1997: 1) stated that “Entrepreneurship and 
intellectualism are usually juxtaposed”. 
Hwang and Powell (2005: 179) observe that “the cornerstone of 
entrepreneurship is the belief in individual autonomy and discretion, a liberal creed that 
locates agency in individuals as the primary unit for creating new activities”. Van der 
Sluis and van Praag (2004: 1) suggest that should “entrepreneurs face constraints such 
as limited human capital, then these economic benefits might not be realized”, as they 
also found that US entrepreneurs seem to benefit more from an additional year of 
education than their employed counterparts. Also, Parker and van Praag (2004) relate 
Entrepreneurship, Capital and Schooling and call it an “endogenous triangle”, whereby 
extra years of schooling enhance entrepreneurial performance, even more when capital 
constraint existed. 
While entrepreneurs and/or entrepreneurship affect economic development, the 
environment where entrepreneurs or would-be entrepreneurs operate would determine 
the ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ of entrepreneurs emerging. As Boettke and Coyne (2002) 
quoting Baumol (1990) and Olson (1996) noted: “the institutions that economic agents 
(including entrepreneurs) operate in – political, legal and cultural – directly influence 
their activity and hence economic development”. In addition Mises, an Austrian 
economist238, quoted in Boettke and Coyne (2002) wrote: 
In any real and living economy, every actor is always an entrepreneur 
and speculator… Economics, in speaking of entrepreneurs, has in view 
                                                 
238 Austrians school of thought “stress that entrepreneurship does not describe a distinct group of 
individuals, but rather, is an omnipresent aspect of human action” (Boettke and Coyne 2002). 
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not men, but a definite function. This function is not the particular 
feature of a particular special group or class of men; it is inherent in 
every action and burdens every actor…The term entrepreneur as used in 
catallactic theory means: acting man exclusively seen from the aspect of 
the uncertainty inherent in every action (1949: 252-3).  
 
Further, Boettke and Coyne (2002) strongly argue: 
…that entrepreneurship cannot be the cause of development, but rather, 
that the type of entrepreneurship associated with economic development 
is a consequence of it. That is, development is caused by the adoption of 
certain institutions, which in turn channel and encourage the 
entrepreneurial aspect of human action in a direction that in turn spurs 
economic growth. 
 
In addition Coyne and Boettke (2005) argue that indigenous institution were 
often overlooked while exogenously imposed institutions, like capital and aid, were 
overly emphasized. By ‘indigenous institution’, Coyne and Boettke (2005) give the 
following definition: 
The anthropologist James Scott (1998: 6-7) has revived the Greek word 
mētis which will serve as the foundation for our understanding of 
indigenous institutions. Mētis includes skills, culture, norms and 
conventions that are shaped by the experiences of the individual. This 
concept applies to both interactions between people (i.e., interpreting the 
gestures and actions of others) and the physical environment (i.e., 
learning to ride a bike). The notion of mētis is not one that can be written 
down neatly as a systematic set of instructions, but rather is gained only 
through experience and practice. 
 
Mētis is not static in nature. Obtaining and acting on knowledge should 
be viewed as a changing process over time. As knowledge travels 
between groups and international borders, new mētis is created and old 
mētis fades away and loses relevance. Therefore, a key problem in 
economic development is whether mētis has adapted to the new and 
changing circumstances. As we will see, if the stock of mētis does not 
align with reforms and formal institutions, these institutions will fail to 
be effective even if they are growth-inducing institutions. It should also 
be noted that the existence of mētis does not guarantee successful 
economic development. If the stock of mētis aligns with institutions that 
are growth retarding, economic development will not be achieved. 
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As such, while the liberal and capitalist environment provided by the Soeharto 
administration (especially after deregulation in the late 1980s) would be expected to 
generate ‘entrepreneurs’, it might have also failed to do so. As Boettke (1996) wrote: 
Economics may establish the properties of alternative rules, but culture 
and the imprint of history determine which rules can stick in certain 
environments. The problem is not one of private property and freedom of 
contract generating perverse consequences, but the fact that some social 
conventions and customary practices simply do not legitimate these 
institutions (1996: 257-8, italics original). 
 
As such ‘indigenous-ness’ would matter. As Mises quoted in Coyne and 
Boettke (2005), writing on the reconstruction of Europe, argues:  
This reconstruction cannot be undertaken from without, it must come 
from within. It is not simply a matter of economic technique, still less of 
engineering; it is a matter of social morale and of social ideologies 
(2000: 29).  
 
Judging from the ideology and culture of native Indonesians it is probable that 
post-independence Indonesia was (and is) not yet a good breeding ground for 
entrepreneurs.  
To be more specific, the evolution of entrepreneurs is assumed to take place 
from working class, middle-class, and then entrepreneur. Working class, borrowing 
Karl Marx’s definition, is a group of people without any tools of production (or 
capital), working mostly as unskilled workers. As the economy grows, the working 
class can acquire some wealth and be able to get some of the surpluses of production, 
not all surpluses are taken by the capitalists. This capability to retain some surplus of 
value from production would only be possible if they have acquired some skills239, such 
that they have some bargaining power.  In turn, this working class might become 
                                                 
239 However, Lazear (2002: 2) stated that “…maybe entrepreneurs are created when a worker has no 
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investors as they purchase stocks and/or bonds, despite maintaining their positions as 
employees or wage-earners. When they do, they become middle class. As this middle 
class becomes wealthier, they would be interested to start their own business, and 
finally become entrepreneurs. According to McNelly (2005) “capitalism can only 
emerge with the rise of a “capital-oriented class – originally always a merchant class – 
from a subordinate position within society to a position of leverage.” The box below 
describes some of the key findings about entrepreneurship in East Asia. 
Table 7-4 Key Findings About New Enterprises and Entrepreneurship 
1 Personal profile of the entrepreneurs: Predominantly male. Average age, 40. University 
graduates or post-graduates. Founded businesses in their early 30s. Financed launch mainly with 
personal savings. 
2 Work Experience: From previous jobs, entrepreneurs get ideas, business skills, and professional 
contacts that create the basis for launching their ventures. 
3 Networks: Dynamic firms make greater use of their social networks and their networks of clients, 
suppliers, and professional and commercial contacts. 
4 Teamwork: The majority of dynamic firms are founded by a team of entrepreneurs with 
complementary skills. 
5 Motivation: Money isn’t everything. Entrepreneurs’ motivations include the desire for personal 
development, contributing to society, and improving personal income. 
6 The limited role of formal education: To a surprising degree, entrepreneurs say that formal 
education did not play a decisive role in stimulating their desire to create business ventures, 
although their university studies do provide them with relevant technical knowledge. 
7 Business strategies: Dynamic firms share similar business strategies; they serve market niches 
with growing demand and their product is differentiated by quality and service, rather than price. 
8 Financing: At the inception stage, financing for starting a business comes mainly from the 
personal savings of the entrepreneur and his friends and family. During the early development 
stage, firms tend to make greater use of external sources of financing, such as loans from banks 
and institutions. 
9 Business environment: The Latin American business environment is less friendly to new 
ventures; financing is scarce, red tape is thick, and tax and regulatory costs are high. By contrast, 
the East Asian business environment is friendlier to new ventures because financing is much more 
readily available and outsourcing is a more widespread practice. 
10 Growth patterns: East Asian dynamic businesses grow faster and become larger than Latin 
American dynamic ventures. They also have more stable networks and a more varied range of 
contacts than their Latin American counterparts. 
11 Business sectors: Among East Asian entrepreneurs, there are more new knowledge-based 
ventures and a higher percentage of enterprises are involved in exporting. 
12 The role of the media: East Asian entrepreneurs are more influenced by role models portrayed in 
the media than is the case in Latin America. East Asian entrepreneurs also find more opportunities 
for social mobility through entrepreneurship. 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2002) 
 
                                                                                                                                              
alternatives.  Rather than coming from the top of the ability distribution, they are what is left over”. 
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Even entrepreneurs could be further divided240. A simple definition of 
entrepreneur could be “person who undertakes the creation of an enterprise or business 
that has the chance of profit (or success)” (Dorf and Byers: 2005). Entrepreneurs at its 
simplest can take the form of businessmen; they also could be traders, industrialists and 
even inefficient rent-seekers. For example, Agarwal (2004) identified five types of 
entrepreneurs as: 1) the Opportunistic type, who was driven by expectations of 
financial gain, 2) the “Push” type, driven by negative “push” reasons for starting a 
business, 3) the Managerial type, who have high leadership, administration and 
environmental skills, as well as a desire for financial returns, 4) the New Craftsman 
type, with a high need for autonomy at work and desire to pursue a product/service 
idea, and 5) the Idea driven Opportunist type, which emerged as a “mixed” type”.  
Sautet’s (2005) typology of entrepreneurship includes productive entrepreneurship; 
evasive entrepreneurship; and/or, socially destructive entrepreneurship. As such we can 
see that the types of entrepreneurs came from a range of the spectrum; those with the 
highest degree of entrepreneurship could be regarded as ‘true’ entrepreneurs. 
In a glance, the private sector, businesses, capitalists and entrepreneurs seem to 
be the same241. Relating to our previous discussion regarding that entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneurship as the main engine of growth, then an ‘efficient’ entrepreneur 
probably is the main ingredient that we are after. 
                                                 
240 Entrepreneurs,  in  the  Schumpeterian  sense,  are  businessmen  who  discover  new market niches by 
integrating production factors in order to make profits 
241According to Milton Friedman (quoted McNally 2005), capitalism represents the “organization of the 
bulk of economic activity through private enterprise operation in a free market.” According to McNally 
(2005) the conception “expresses the popular understanding of the core characteristics of capitalism: 
private enterprise and free markets”. 
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In Indonesia most large businesses belong to the Chinese-ethnic community. 
Though small in numbers, Chinese conglomerates own most of the economic assets in 
Indonesia. As Chua (2005) noted: 
Chinese owned corporations constituted, however, by far the largest ones 
and the absolute majority of the top enterprises. In 1996, for instance, 
Chinese tycoons owned 22 conglomerates of the top 25 (Warta Ekonomi, 
1997). Another ranking indicated that 82.6 percent of the top 300 
conglomerates’ total assets were owned by the 217 Chinese business 
groups within this tier (Backman, 2001: 194). 
 
There is a well-known statement that "the Chinese constitute only 3.5 percent of 
the population but control 70% of Indonesia's economy". While the Chinese probably 
really did only constitute around 3.5% of the population, the fact that they have control 
over 70% of the Indonesian economy might be debatable242. Aditjondro (1998) argued 
that almost every Indonesian Chinese Conglomerates would have some native 
Indonesians also acting as one of the management executives inside the corporations. 
Also, Aditjondro (1998) further argued that: 
…Indonesian's Chinese minority controls nowhere near 70% of 
Indonesian's economy. After discounting foreign investors- such as 
Freeport McMoRan which controls a majority stakes in Indonesia's 
largest taxpayer, PT Freeport Indonesia, Inc, and Coca-cola Amatil-and 
state-owned companies, such as the ten strategic industries previously 
overseen by B.J. Habibie and the lucrative sate-owned oil company, 
Pertamina- in the Indonesian economy, the remaining large private 
companies are indeed controlled by a handfull of Chinese business 
families, These include Liem Sioe Liong, Eka Tjipta Widjaja, and 
Prajogo Pangestu and their relatives.  
 
However, the perception of Chinese domination in the Indonesian economy is 
real. As Rosser (1999: 9) notes that “The mid-1970s had seen a series of 
                                                 
242 Lanti (2004) notes that the Chinese entrepreneurs probably controlled more than half of the nation 
economy while acknowledge that they were dominant in trade, commerce, property, manufacturing, 
processing, transportation, and banking especially in the 1990s. 
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demonstrations by students, small businessmen and other marginalised groups at which 
the government’s economic policies were criticised and appeals were made for an end 
to foreign and Chinese domination of the economy.” 
The role of the Chinese in the Indonesian economy could be traced back from 
the Dutch colonization in 1596-1942. The first Chinese was said to arrive in Indonesia 
in 17th century Batavia (now Jakarta) for economic reasons. The Dutch had 
intentionally separate the Chinese from the native Indonesians (or the pribumi), and has 
utilized the Chinese for trading monopolies, banking and tax collections. As such, the 
pribumi often viewed the Chinese as a subordinate of the colonial Dutch243. The 
Chinese have since spread to the outer Island of Sumatra, Kalimantan and the Eastern 
Indonesia. 
One of the well-known big Chinese entrepreneurs during the colonial rule was 
Oei Tiong Ham, who has been labeled the first modern capitalist in Indonesia. Later on, 
the Oei Tiong Ham company was nationalized during the Soekarno administration. 
During Soeharto’s administration, Liem Sioe Liong244 was the most well-known 
Chinese entrepreneur, both in Indonesia and in Asia mostly for his outstanding wealth. 
From the 40 top private business groups in Indonesia, only 10 were owned by 
pribumis, while the rest was owned by the ethnic Chinese. This domination probably 
even extends to the medium-sized firms (Berry and Levy 1994). Pribumi entrepreneurs 
probably dominate in the small and informal businesses.  
                                                 
243Lanti (2004: 75) writes that “Like the British in Malaysia, the Dutch also confined the Chinese in the 
Netherlands East Indies to economic activity, mostly in retail and trading. However,unlike the British, 
the Dutch applied a status system based on race. The Europeans occupied the upperclass, the pribumi 
(indigenous people) were in the lowest rank, while the Chinese and other Asian races were in between”. 
244Liem Sioe Liong headed the Salim Group, which is one of the world's largest business-conglomerate 
groups,accounting for around 8% of Indonesia's GDP. Indonesia's President, Soeharto, has had a long 
relationship with several chinese entrepreneurs, Liem included, ever since he was still a Comander of the 
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Other scholars, like Lindblad (2002), consider that the Chinese domination in 
Indonesian business was actually exaggerated. In the 1950s, “the share of Indonesian 
firms was strikingly high on occasions, 43 % in 1951 and 50 % in 1953. Almost all of 
the remainder, 48 % in 1951 and 45 % in 1953, consisted of Chinese firms” (Sutter 
1959: 1307 quoted Lindblad 2002: 13). In 1953, “the proportion of indigenous (or 
`Indonesian’ as in the graph) firms is strikingly high: almost two-fifths among trading 
firms and one-third among manufacturing enterprises” (Lindblad 2002: 15). 
However, as of 1984, the government encouraged the abolishment of the 
Chinese vs pribumi dichotomy, to replace it with 'national entrepreneurs/businessmen’. 
It was marked by the changing of an exclusively 'pribumi' oriented business 
organization into an open-ethnic business organization.245 At the same time, in the 
1980s, following the deregulation phase, special support to 'pribumi' entrepreneurs 
came to an end. Shin (1991: 142) wrote246: 
The Keppres nos. 29/1984 and 30/1984 were the last of the ill-fated 
indigenist programs...By 1985, the decision and opinion makers appeared 
to lean toward the final conclusion that the growth of small pribumi 
capitalists should be achieved by market forces and submitted to the free 
will of the business people involved, or to put it more appropriately, the 
mercy of the strong economic group. 
 
It is not easy to discuss entrepreneurship in Indonesia, in terms of its culture or 
ideology, since not many resources were available on this topic. The difficulty lies in 
the data available. If we talk about small entrepreneurs, the quantitative data is very 
                                                                                                                                              
army  (Lanti 2004: 78). 
245In 1984, the Indonesian Indigenous Businessmen's Association (HIPPI; Himpunan Pengusaha Pribumi 
Indonesia) - headed by the President's half-brother – changed its name to Himpunan Pengusaha 'Putera' 
Indonesia. The word 'pribumi' (meaning 'native' or 'indigenous') has been changed into 'putera' meaning 
'son' (Shin 1991). 
246Shin (1991) views this change of policy direction in the context of the elites’ ideology and initiative in 
creating capitalist hegemony in post-oil boom Indonesia. 
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limited. Turning to big entrepreneurs, not until recently, most conglomerates usually 
keep to themselves. For example, in the case of Liem Sioe Liong, a book published in 
1989 about him even could not even get him for an interview247. Other books on 
William Soeryadjaya248, another big Chinese conglomerate (second to Liem) who 
owned PT Astra International, is titled “Dare to Do” (Butler 2002). The recipe of 
success, interpreting from the book, is a willingness to take opportunity and risk, 
financial networking, anticipation and some connection with elites. The wide financial 
networks of the Chinese businesses are well known. Robison (1986) quoted in Efferin 
(2000) noted that due to the factor of financial network that the New Order had chosen 
to work closely with the Chinese businesses after the end of oil boom. This close 
relationship between business and government has given the Chinese a rather bad name 
of 'pariah entrepreneurs'; meaning “businessmen who depends on personal connection 
with powerful politico-bureaucrats for political protection and, in turn, are parasitised 
economically by them (Mackie 1992; Robison 1986 quoted in Efferin 2000). 
 It is strange that there are not many serious books on entrepreneurs in 
Indonesia, considering its huge population. Indonesia previously had a marvelous 
entrepreneur and tycoon named Oei Tiong Ham with his company Oei Tiong Ham 
Concern(1930s-1960s), who Kunio (1991) described as “the first business empire in 
Southeast Asia”. Oei Tiong Ham has been described as a businessman who was willing 
to take risks, innovative, forward-looking, took long-term investment, invested in long-
term assets, invested in manufacturing and created a professional management team in 
                                                 
247 The book was written by Sori Ersa Siregar and Kencana Tirta Widya, both are Indonesian journalists. 
248Liem Sioe Liong's conglomerate and William Soeryadjaya's Astra Corporation, hold assets that were 
estimated to be worth Rp. 6.4 trillion and Rp. 2 trillion respectively (US$3.5 billion and $1.2 billion) in 
1988. However William did not have the same access and close relationship with Soeharto compared 
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managing his group of companies; in short he was described as a 'modern capitalist' 
(Kunio 1991 and Mackey 1991). Mackey (1991: 87) noted that the key factors of Oei 
Tiong Ham success were “an awareness of the need to adopt Dutch business methods 
and technical skills combined with a shrewd sense of timing in his purchases and 
sales”. 
However, the nationalization of Oei Tiong Ham Concern during the Soekarno 
administration in 1961 had virtually destroyed the entrepreneurship, and probably has a 
greater negative impact towards the entrepreneurship climate that probably has lasted 
even during Soeharto's ruling249. 
Liem Sioe Liong has a contrasting story compared with Oei Tiong Ham. Lim 
was just a common Chinese businessman before he met with Soeharto in Semarang in 
the 1950s when Soeharto was a military commander in there. However, when Soeharto 
took power in 1965, Liem businesses has grown rapidly. Liem was criticized for having 
too close a relationship with Soeharto, a relationship that was not enjoyed by other 
Chinese tycoons except for Bob Hasan. Liem was also viewed to have less 
extraordinary entrepreneurship skills compared with Oei Tiong Ham (Liem's 
entrepreneurial and management skills were often viewed as mediocre), as a significant 
number of Liem's businesses ended up in failure. These, combined with his close 
relationship with Soeharto had created doubts as to whether Liem was merely just 
another ‘erzats’ rent-seeking capitalist250 (Mackie 1991). In a more neutral tone, it is 
                                                                                                                                              
with Liem (Mackie 1991).  
249 Kunio (1991: 26) described the nationalization incident as 'tragic phenomenon for Indonesian 
economy as a whole. 
250Mackie (1991: 96) described it on a larger scale as “.. it increasingly seems that Indonesia may be 
moving toward a pattern of political relationships strikingly similar to Rush's picture of the 
nineteenthcentury opium kings "nested within the power structures" of Java”. 
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said that Salim group followed the oscillatory dynamics between economies of scope 
and economies of connectedness (Dieleman and Sachs 2005 and 2005b). 
 Susanto (2005) provides a list of 'entrepreneur's characteristics' based on three 
successful Indonesian businessmen in the Table 7-5.  
Table 7-5 Entrepreneur's Spirit, Behavior and Style in Practical Experience 
based on their Success Stories 
Bob Sadino Purdi F. Chandra Sukyatno Nugroho Other Entrepreneurs 
- Dare to look different - Imaginative - Willing to take risks - Never give up, persevering 
- Learn from mistake - Like to experiment - Adaptable - Diligent, hard worker 
- Employee Empowerment - Courage to explore - Never give up - Brave to act against the flow 
- Decentralization - Brave to fail - Strong will - Keep learning 
- Enabling - Strong will to 
succeed 
- Persevering - Creative 
- Recognition - Creative - Team work - Flexible 
- Depends on the teamwork - Skills management - Innovative - Willing to take risk 
- Open management - Interpersonal skills - Ready to change - Strong will to improve 
- Friendly - Leadership skills - Creative - Able to compete 
- Father-son relationship  - Intuitive to survive - Possess initiative - Discipline 
- Family atmosphere - Optimistic - Diligent - Leadership skills 
- Strong leadership - Possibility and 
success 
- Willing to learn - Business efficiency 
- Pioneering spirit - Ambitious  - Self-reliant 
thinking 
- Open minded 
- Failure is normal  - To make 
breakthrough 
- High spirit 
   - Modest 
   - Puts in best efforts 
   - Quick in responding to 
   market opportunity 
   - Sharp in reading customer 
   Needs 
   - Uses of new technology 
   - Self-reliant 
   - To make breakthrough 
Source: Susanto (2005). 
 
Judging from the above characteristics, it is very likely that becoming an 
entrepreneur would require skills and a person with a strong character. Unfortunately 
some of the traditional ‘Indonesian Man’ ideology seems to be incompatible with the 
above characteristics. Aburizal Bakrie, the current Coordinating Minister for Social 
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Welfare and previously the Coordinating Minister for Economy and Finance, who was 
previously one of the successful native entrepreneurs, wrote that: 
...the entrepreneurship spirit and behavior of the (Indonesian) society is 
generally still a 'trader', tend to wait and likely to be mediocre. This 
could be the result of a traditional-agricultural mindset, that is fully 
dependent on the seasons. It could also as a result of other factor, like the 
historical colonial trauma...in other words, passive trader mentality must 
be actualized to become a dynamic entrepreneurship (Wangsa 2004: 40). 
 
Some would argue that the informal sector also has entrepreneurs, and should 
not be simply dismissed altogether. I would agree that there were and still many small 
businesses in the economy; around 86% of these small businesses work in the 
agricultural sector for the year 2000-2003 (Wangsa 2004: 161). However, it is difficult 
to assess their performance, let alone their existence. Most of these small businesses are 
family businesses that employ unpaid family workers. Some are probably in these small 
businesses because they cannot find a better job elsewhere because they are unskilled 
and must become 'entrepreneurs' simply to survive in a hand-to-mouth condition. As 
Aburizal Bakrie stated: 
The structure of our (Indonesia's) businesses is often called 'hollow-
middle', with the lower level being colored by a majority of small and 
weak entrepreneurs251 whom often in difficult conditions (Wangsa 2004: 
74). 
 
A study of micro and small-scale enterprises in Java by Singh et. al. (2004) 
reveals the following characteristics of small businesses in Java: the average age is 41, 
of which 90% of them are Javanese (natives), majority has only primary education, and 
with low technical skills obtained from formal education. This would most probably 
                                                 
251These small entrepreneurs tend to be associated with the people's economy ('ekonomi rakyat' or 
'ekonomi kerakyatan'). 
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highlight the limited capabilities of these small businesses to grow and to become the 
engine of growth.  
Table 7-6 Characteristics of Small Entrepreneurs in Java 
Characteristics N=200 
Average age 41.2 
Ethnicity   
1. Chinese 10.5 
2. Javanese 89.5 
Education  
1. No school 6.5 
2. Primary school 57.5 
3. Junior high school 16 
4. Senior high school 13 
5. College 3 
6. University 2.5 
Operator had any training in the Business being 
operated (percent) 
 
1. Yes 52.5 
2. No 47.5 
Technical Skill  
1. No training 6.5 
2. From parents/family 33 
3. Formal education 3 
4. Self taught 38.5 
5. Informal workshop/apprentice 40.5 
6. Other - 
   Source: Singh, et. al. (2004) 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
The emergence of an entrepreneurial class, which is considered crucial for 
economic growth, is discussed in this chapter. The traditional ‘Indonesian Man’ most 
probably lacks the entrepreneurship-capacity needed to achieve growth, due to its 
previous colonial experience and subsistence culture.  
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From below, the entrepreneurial class is more likely to come out from a vibrant 
growing working class, which, as they accumulate enough capital, skills and 
networking, would further set up their own businesses and become entrepreneurs.    
From above, the elite capitalist class could also become entrepreneurs. From 
previously simple traders or even rent-seekers, these capitalists could become 
entrepreneurs as they become exposed to the economic globalization and global 
competition. The political elites or their descendants could also become entrepreneurs. 
As the age of materialism has entered Indonesian culture, material and capital wealth 
have become one of the important symbols for status and power. 
After independence and the removal of the colonial powers it was assumed that 
people would behave differently, from a static to a more dynamic society. However, 
culture naturally would only change gradually. Education is one of the tools that could 
create an ‘enabling’ environment for a dynamic and vibrant society. 
It seems that schooling could be seen as a miniature of the state itself. As the 
authoritarian regime of Soeharto took place, the school was simply used as a tool to 
indoctrinate the students with the ideology of the New Order regime. Not much 
attention, if any at all, was given to the development of the new ‘Indonesian Man’ 
culture that supposedly accompanies the ‘physical’ modernization process of growth. 
The working class was also suppressed; denied of it rights to organize and aspire its 
ideas. Developing entrepreneurial class from below then was hindered by the lack of 
support from educational institutions as well as the suppressed working class. 
From above, though businesses have grown rapidly with the economy, the type 
of entrepreneurs emerging seems to be less than ideal. The Oei Tiong Ham Concern 
327
nationalization in the 1960s seems to have left a deep trauma for the Sino-Indonesian 
entrepreneurs. As such, these Chinese entrepreneurs would try to maintain a close 
relationship with the State so as to safeguard their businesses. Some Chinese 
entrepreneurs like William Soeryadjaja who founded Astra did manage to show 
significant entrepreneurship, but even then the success of Astra still requires an 
intervention from the bureaucrats of the state itself (Butler 2000). Others like Liem Sioe 
Liong and Bob Hasan had too close a relationship with Soeharto such that the quality of 
their entrepreneurship is controversial. 
As for the native entrepreneurs, hindered by the lack of skills of capital 
network, their progress is slow. The new native entrepreneurs, unfortunately, also come 
from the political-elite circle, such that it is doubtful whether they have the necessary 
entrepreneurial skills to start businesses or they simple take the advantage of their 
political connections.  
Small businesses actually had shown some promise to develop further to 
become medium and big entrepreneurs. However, the lack of channels that these 
entrepreneurs have to capital and their limited skills are still a problem. The political 
supports for these small businesses are also lacking, as the ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’ 
paradigm was usually sidelined when compared with the liberal and nationalist 
economic policy.  Though the government had partially tried to support the funding of 
these small businesses, most of the funding seems to be mischanneled and being tapped 
only by the medium enterprises instead.     
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The liberal technocrats did manage to balance the ‘nationalist’ view252, and, due 
to its close relations with Soeharto, provided some policy guidance that attempted to set 
the economy to the right and efficient path. However, their role was limited – in 
accordance with Soeharto’s approval. As such, the outcome was not a pure liberal 
economic policy, but instead ‘liberal economic policy a la Soeharto’; where Soeharto 
still made significant and often damaging intervention to help his cronies. This would 
in turn, also create ‘erzats’-capitalists and rent-seeking entrepreneurs instead of the 
‘ideal’ Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. Later on, both the liberal-capitalist nationalist 
economic policy making tend to support the ‘elite’ entrepreneurs while marginalizing 
the role of small indigenous entrepreneurs. 
This chapter represents the triangular relationship, to borrow Dhakidae’s (2003: 
xxxi) terminology, between ‘capital’, ‘power’ and ‘culture’. Unfortunately, in the end 
‘power’ (as it was mostly shown during Soeharto’s administration) determines the 
effective role of the other two.  
                                                 
252 For a study of the ‘battle of ideas’ between liberal and nationalist paradigm,  refer to Mallarangeng 
(2004). 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Implications 




Based on the analysis at the macro level, physical capital represents the main source of 
growth in Indonesia. It must be emphasized that the origins of physical capital for 
production mainly originates from two main sources: oil revenues and Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
Looking back at the growth narratives of Indonesia, investment (and thus 
capital) inevitably becomes the central attention for growth, which is in line with the 
thinking behind traditional mainstream economics. Indonesia, after independence, was 
confronted by the low income of its people. This resulted in low aggregate savings, and 
thus low investments, finally leading to the low level of capital stock. It was only 
natural that capital acted as the constraint to growth as labor was relatively abundant.  
Following historians like Rosenberg and Birdzell (1985), the main constraint on 
development was not technology, but more the scarcity of capital. Doepke and Zilibotti 
(2004: 3) wrote: 
 
330
many technologies that became widespread during the Industrial Revolution 
had actually been available long before. The steam engine, for instance, had 
been invented in the early part of the eighteenth century, but its diffusion 
remained very limited until the following century. …in the pre-industrial 
world, financial rather than technological underdevelopment was the 
bottleneck which prevented sustained increases in the standard of living.  
 
The macro regression results from my research confirm the importance or the 
condition of capital scarcity described above. The negative human capital coefficient on 
the Solow growth model most probably points to the condition of labor surplus in the 
Indonesian economy. It also probably shows the failure of the economy to reach a 
technological level that is suitable considering the condition of their labor force. 
The education standards of the population, viewed as labor quality, were rarely 
seen as the constraint of growth despite its low quality. Indeed, the poorly educated 
masses provided cheap labor (should be equated with ‘unskilled labor’) which was 
often promoted as a ‘comparative advantage’ instead of weakness. 
Mamuneas et. al. (2002: 19) mentions that elasticity of human capital with 
respect to output “varies substantially across countries and is, in general, positive for 
the high income economies though for low income economies it tends to be low and in 
some cases zero”; as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 8-1 Human Capital Output Elasticity 
 
Source: Mamuneas et. al. (2002). 
 
As such, advanced economies might have a positive value on human capital 
coefficient because their level of technology (and their level of economy) is sufficient 
to absorb them. Moreover, this condition would later on enable them to continue 
upgrading their level of technology leading to sustainable level of growth.  
We could argue that the advanced economy has reached a condition of turning 
point (most probably occurring at a level where the average educational attainment of 
the labor force has reached primary education (6 years of schooling, as shown in figure 
8-1) whereby labor has ceased to become a burden to growth and transform itself to 
become the engine of growth. 
Another possible way of using the Solow model to gauge the contribution of 
Human Capital is by using a growth accounting method. The result of applying the 
growth accounting method to Indonesian data is given in the following table. 
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GDP Growth 5.5 4 7.6 6.2 7.4 
Capital Stock 1.2 -1.9 2 2.7 2.9 
Labor Force 1.8 1.4 1.9 2 1.9 
Schooling, 
years 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.6 
TFP 1.9 3.6 3.2 1.2 2 
Source: Hofman, Rodrick-Jones, and Thee (2004). 
 
Though the contribution of human capital on growth is not negative, it still 
remains the smallest compared to the contribution of capital and labor. One important 
thing to note is the corelation between a high TFP with high human capital 
contribution. This might suggests that human capital might contribute to higher TFP 
through higher technological capability. 
At the household level, we attempt to measure the return to schooling using the 
Sakernas survey. Return to schooling was sufficiently high in Indonesia, with urban 
figures relatively higher than rural ones. The manufacturing sector provides labor with 
higher return to schooling, which probably explains the higher return to schooling in 
urban areas where factories are located. Higher wages seem to require higher skills, as 
shown by the higher mean years of education in urban areas. The inequality of 
education returns also shows signs of economic duality mentioned by Boeke. 
The inequality of education return in urban and rural areas seems to have 
lessened from 1973 to 1997. The inequality of education returns might be needed at the 
beginning phase of development to facilitate the migration of labor from rural to urban 
areas to support industrialization. The rural to urban migration in Indonesia is indeed 
high, even compared with its neighbours as it shown in the following table. 
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Table 8-2 Average rates of rural-urban migration, percent per year, decade 
averages 
Country 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Period averages 
Thailand 0.61 0.89 0.55 3.09 1.32 
Philippines 1.32 0.35 1.39 1.45 1.11 
Indonesia  1.72 0.39 2.27 1.44 
Asia 1.07 1.4 1.8 n.a.  
Source: Mundlak, Larson and Butzer (2004) 
 
However, Indonesia is still plagued by the high proportion of labor that is 
unpaid. This means that a large proportion of society is excluded from the ‘formal’ 
labor market. This condition seems to have remained unchanged from 1976 to 1997. 
This could point to the fact that although some parts of the Indonesian economy have 
been ‘modernized’, a large part of it, especially the rural sector, remains relatively 
untouched – and probably still exists at the subsistence level. 
The low share of education expenditures in the household budget provides a 
significant barrier in the attempts to improve the quality of education received by 
children. But as education expenditure increases as income brackets go up, it shows 
that society may view education as a part of investment if the household budget allows. 
Even then, the increments remains relatively small, showing that some sort of structural 
unemployment where the growth of the economy fails to absorb the growing number of 
labor force. (this last sentence doesn’t make sense as the paragraph is talking about 
household expenditure) 
On the ideological level, the emergence of an entrepreneurial class is considered 
crucial for economic growth. The traditional ‘Indonesian Man’, as I have argued 
previously, is most likely to be lacking in the entrepreneurship capacity needed to 
334
achieve growth, due to Indonesia’s previous colonial experience and subsistence 
culture.  
From below, the entrepreneurial class is more likely to arise from a vibrant 
growing working class who, as they accumulate enough capital, skills and networking, 
would be likely to set up their own business and become entrepreneurs.    
From above, members of the elite capitalist class could also become 
entrepreneurs. From previously simple traders or even rent-seekers, these capitalists 
could become entrepreneurs as they become exposed to economic globalization and 
global competition. The political elites or their descendants could also become 
entrepreneurs. As the age of materialism has entered Indonesian culture, material and 
capital wealth have become important symbols for status and power. 
During the authoritarian regime of Soeharto, the school was simply used as a 
tool to indoctrinate the students with the ideology of New Order regime. Not much 
attention, if any at all, was given to the development of the new ‘Indonesian Man’ 
culture that supposedly accompanies the ‘physical’ modernization process of growth. 
The working class was also suppressed; denied of it rights to organize and aspire its 
ideas. The developement of an entrepreneurial class from below then was hindered by 
the lack of support from educational institutions as well as the suppressed working 
class. From above, though businesses had grown rapidly with economic growth, the 
type of entrepreneurs emerging seems to be less than ideal; creating more rent-seekers 
or ‘traders’ rather than entrepreneurs. 
To conclude, I reiterate the following points: 
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1. Economic growth basically involves a ‘transformation’, and not 
merely ‘change’; it is important so that the resulting growth could be 
considered sustainable. 
2. This transformation must occur broadly, both at the society or 
aggregate level and also at the individual or ideological level. 
3. At the aggregate level, the level of technology is the main 
determinant of growth. At the beginning of development, the 
contribution of human capital is usually negative. The expansion of 
education in Indonesia is made possible by the oil revenues. 
4. In Indonesia most of technological capabilities are occurring due to 
FDI; as such the technological capabilities are not embedded in the 
society. 
5. At the individual level, after a certain level of human capital level, 
education would make sure that the level of technology is 
continuously updated and maintained to guarantee a sustainable level 
of growth. 
6. At the ideological level, entrepreneurs are needed as a catalyst to 
apply the technological capability into the most efficient sectors of 
the economy; again to make sure that the growth is sustainable.  
7. Entrepreneurs would mostly emerge from a vibrant and modern 
society, in which education and schooling holds a pivotal role. 
However, as education system in Indonesia is being dominated by the 
state and being used by the state to continue its domination, education 
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has failed to adequately modernized the Indonesian society and to 
create the new identity of the Indonesian man. 
 
 
8.2 Policy Implications 
 
Based on the three levels of analysis, it is clear that economic growth – whether 
it should be sustainable, should not be and cannot be simply viewed only in terms of 
physical or material phenomenon. Structural changes occur both at the physical and at 
the deeper ideological level. Economic growth brings about changes in both the society 
and the individual level as well.  
In the policy level, the capitalist development approach adopted by the GOI, 
though able to generate growth, did not add much to promoting entrepreneurial 
capacity of ‘Indonesian Man’, since it only focuses on big businesses and capitals. The 
notion of ‘ekonomi kerakyatan’, that supposedly help to cultivate most small 
businesses, remains marginalized as the result. 
On the other hand, despite the high political emphasis on education, many 
countries in Asia do not seriously considered education issues in their development 
policy. Education is simply seen as ‘a social policy’, a policy that eats up the 
government budget without providing revenues in return. In short, education policy is 
seen as a non-generating revenue item.  
Maybe this explains the lack of focus on education in the development policy. 
Because education policy, like schools construction and hiring teachers, is simply seen 
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as budget expenditure items that does not generate revenue for the state budget. 
Education is simple seen as ‘consumption’ and not ‘investment’. 
Where as capital oriented policy, like foreign direct investment (FDI), 
extraction of natural resource, international trade, all brings in investment money that 
could be taxed by the state, thus generating budget income. It is for the sake for its own 
budget sake does the state pursuing a capitalist-centered approach for development and 
seems to shy away from a people-centered approach such as human capital based of 
development. 
Recent development in Indonesia, however, has shown significant 
improvement. In the context of decentralization started out in 1998, the Government of 
Indonesia (GOI) has shown a deep interest on promoting education as one of the goals 
of development. The Human Development Index (HDI), despite its weaknesses, has 
been included as one of the criteria/indicator in the Government Regulation in terms of 
dividing the central budget revenues towards its more than 300 districts. 
Education or schooling, while providing some support for ‘physical’ growth in 
the framework of human capital in the household and less at the national level, could 
have done better in creating high quality economic growth if it is also directed towards 
building an ‘Indonesian Man’ that is self-sufficient, independent and entrepreneurial. 
Only then, the economic growth could be said to be ‘self-driven’, and not to follow the 
current pattern of dependence, either on FDI, international trade, or on oil. This 
emphasis on domestic capability has also been stressed by Rodrik (2001: 45): 
Economic development ultimately derives from a home-grown strategy, and 
not from the world market. Policy makers in developing countries should avoid 
fads, put globalization in perspective, and focus on domestic institution 
building. They should have more confidence in themselves and in domestic 
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institution building, and place less faith on the global economy and blueprints 
emanating therefrom.  
 
In order to successfully compete in an environment of globalization, Snowdon 
(2006) specifies twelve pillars that are required to survive for different stages of 
economic maturity: Factor-driven economy, efficiency-driven and innovation-driven). 
Human capital (basic and advanced human capital) enters at the levels of both the 
factor-driven and efficiency-driven economy. I would argue that human capital should 
also be considered in the innovation-driven economy as well since it is people and 
entrepreneurs who create innovation. 
Figure 8-2 The Twelve ‘Pillars’ of the Global Competitiveness Index 
 
Source: Snowdon (2006), adapted from Sala-i-Martin and Artadi (2004). 
Faal (2006) also specifies skills/innovation as one of the three pillars to support 
a sustained productivity growth leading to higher living standard in advocating the 
growth policy for Papua New Guinea.  
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Figure 8-3 Economic Growth and Human Capital is Important in Sustaining 
Productivity Growth 
 
Source: Faal (2006). 
The fact that our result of return to schooling shows more favorable and 
convincing results than our macroeconomic contribution of human capital shows that 
there is a need to address institutional issues. As Hall (2002: 27) noted that “education 
may pay off to the individual but not to the nation”. According to Hall (2002: 31) the 
three components shown in table 8-4 are “quite highly correlated—that is, countries at 
the top in education tend to be at the top in plant and equipment and in efficiency”. 
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Table 8-3 Data on Output per Worker and Its Three Determinants, for 
Selected Countries 
Contribution from Country Output per 




United States 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Canada 0.941 0.908 1.002 1.034 
Italy 0.834 0.650 1.063 1.207 
West Germany 0.818 0.802 1.118 0.912 
France 0.818 0.666 1.091 1.126 
United Kingdom 0.727 0.808 0.891 1.011 
Hong Kong 0.608 0.735 0.741 1.115 
Singapore 0.606 0.545 1.031 1.078 
Japan 0.587 0.797 1.119 0.658 
Mexico 0.433 0.538 0.868 0.926 
Argentina 0.418 0.676 0.953 0.648 
U.S.S.R. 0.417 0.724 1.231 0.468 
India 0.086 0.454 0.709 0.267 
China 0.060 0.632 0.891 0.106 
Kenya 0.056 0.457 0.747 0.165 
Zaire 0.033 0.408 0.499 0.160 
 
Hall further stresses the importance of ‘social infrastructure’ as he writes: 
Some countries have institutions that promote accumulation and efficiency. 
Where the social infrastructure is strong, businesses and workers concentrate 
on productive activities. They do not fear the loss of the fruits of their efforts to 
parasites. More than anything else, strong infrastructure means an effective 
rule of law. 
 
Indonesia needs to tap to its human resources potential to survive the upcoming 
decades. In identifying ‘Global Growth Centres 2020’, Deutsche Bank Research’s 
(2005) empirical investigation supports the view that human capital is the most 
important factor of production in today’s economies; where increases in human capital 
are crucial to achieving increases in GDP. Evers (2001) sees knowledge as the crucial 
productivity factors that would enable the transition from light industrial and 
commercial agricultural society to a condition of knowledge economy and society.  
Evers and Gerske (2004) also maintain that knowledge makes the difference between 
poverty and wealth, by using Korea and Ghana as examples. ‘Knowledge Economy’ 
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then should be viewed as the ultimate goal of developing human capital; as such 
developing human capital should be viewed as a means of achieving a knowledge 
society and not an end by itself. 
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Figure 8-4 Knowledge and Development 
 
Source: World Development Report 1998/99 in Evers 2004. 
For education policy, more society and local participation in developing 
education curriculum is desirable. The school represents and portrays the kind of 
society that would developed in the future. The school should not dictate nor instilled 
specific values on their curriculum. Government intervention should be kept at the 
minimum level, though budget supports is still highly desirable. Let the society decide 
and determined what is important and necessary for their children to study in facing the 
future. As Polanyi 1922 in Mendell (p.10) stated that:  
working class education was about more than access… A working class 




Social transformation in Indonesia is and was never fully completed thoroughly 
in an independent manner. Interventions by the state, by globalization, by the elites, 
have made the process even less natural and leding more to a fabricated society. The 
school needs to hold a central role at this point, by creating a conducive and free 
environment for students in developing new ideas freely. 
I would like to end this dissertation by a quote from Stiglitz (1998: 7): 
“…of these development strategies saw development as a technical problem 
requiring technical solutions— better planning algorithms, better trade and 
pricing policies, better macroeconomic frameworks. They did not reach deep 
down into society, nor did they believe such a participatory approach was 
necessary. The laws of economics were universal: demand and supply curves 
and the fundamental theorems of welfare economies applied as well to Africa 
and Asia as they did to Europe and North America. These scientific laws were 
not bound by time or space”. 
 
Any policy taken by the government should follow a participatory approach, as 
each development strategy is unique, highly dependant on society’s norms, values and 
ideologies. Public policy should limit its role, to serve as a ‘catalyst’ and not to be 
overly ambitious; as the ultimate goal is to instill a transformation from within society 
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Appendix A   The Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS): 
Brief Description 
The Indonesia Family Life Survey is a continuing longitudinal socioeconomic 
and health survey. It is addressed to a sample representing about 83% of the Indonesian 
population living in 13 of the nation’s 26 provinces. The survey collects data on 
individual respondents, their families, their households, the communities in which they 
live, and the health and education facilities they use. The first wave (IFLS1) was 
administered in 1993 to individuals living in 7,224 households. IFLS2 sought to 
reinterview the same respondents four years later. A follow-up survey (IFLS2+) was 
conducted in 1998 with 25% of the sample to measure the immediate impact of the 
economic and political crisis in Indonesia. The next wave, IFLS3, is scheduled to be 
fielded in 2000. 
The Indonesia Family Life Survey is designed to provide data for studying these 
behaviors and outcomes. The survey contains a wealth of information collected at the 
individual and household levels, including multiple indicators of economic well-being 
(consumption, income, and assets); education, migration, and labor market outcomes; 
marriage, fertility, and contraceptive use; health status, use of health care, and health 
insurance; relationships among co-resident and non-coresident family members; 
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processes underlying household decision-making; transfers among family members and 
inter-generational mobility; and participation in community activities. In addition to 
individual- and household-level information, the IFLS provides detailed information 
from the communities in which IFLS households are located and from the facilities that 
serve residents of those communities. These data cover aspects of the physical and 
social environment, infrastructure, employment opportunities, food prices, access to 
health and educational facilities, and the quality and prices of services available at those 
facilities. 
Source: Frankenberg, E. and D. Thomas. “The Indonesia Family Life Survey 
(IFLS): Study Design and Results from Waves 1 and 2. DRU-2238/1-NIA/NICHD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
